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“You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first place your uncertainty function
has been used in statistical mechanics under that name, so it already has a name. In the
second place, and more important, no one really knows what entropy really is, so in a
debate you will always have the advantage.”
John von Neumann, to Claude Shannon
Abstract
Entropies have been immensely useful in information theory. In this Thesis, several results in quantum
information theory are collected, most of which use entropy as the main mathematical tool.
The first one concerns the von Neumann entropy. While a direct generalization of the Shannon entropy
to density matrices, the von Neumann entropy behaves differently. The latter does not, for example, have
the monotonicity property that the latter possesses: When adding another quantum system, the entropy
can decrease. A long-standing open question is, whether there are quantum analogues of unconstrained
non-Shannon type inequalities. Here, a new constrained non-von-Neumann type inequality is proven, a
step towards a conjectured unconstrained inequality by Linden and Winter.
Like many other information-theoretic tasks, quantum source coding problems such as coherent state
merging have recently been analyzed in the one-shot setting. While the case of many independent,
identically distributed quantum states has been treated using the decoupling technique, the essentially
optimal one-shot results in terms of the max-mutual information by Berta et al. and Anshu at al. had to
bring in additional mathematical machinery. We introduce a natural generalized decoupling paradigm,
catalytic decoupling, that can reproduce the aforementioned results when applied in a manner analogous
to the application of standard decoupling in the asymptotic case.
Quantum teleportation is one of the most basic building blocks in quantum Shannon theory. While
immensely more entanglement-consuming, the variant of port based teleportation is interesting for appli-
cations like instantaneous non-local computation and attacks on quantum position-based cryptography.
Port based teleportation cannot be implemented perfectly, and the resource requirements diverge for
vanishing error. We prove several lower bounds on the necessary number of output ports N to achieve
port based teleportation for given dimension and error. One of them shows for the first time that N
diverges uniformly in the dimension of the teleported quantum system, for vanishing error. As a byprod-
uct, a new lower bound for the size of the program register for an approximate universal programmable
quantum processor is derived.
Finally, the mix is completed with a result in quantum cryptography. While quantum key distribution
is the most well-known quantum cryptographic protocol, there has been increased interest in extending
the framework of symmetric key cryptography to quantum messages. We give a new definition for
information-theoretic quantum non-malleability, strengthening the previous definition by Ambainis et
al. We show that quantum non-malleability implies secrecy, analogous to quantum authentication.
Furthermore, non-malleable encryption schemes can be used as a primitive to build authenticating
encryption schemes. We also show that the strong notion of authentication recently proposed by Garg
et al. can be fulfilled using 2-designs.
Resume´
Entropibegrebet har vist sig ekstremt nyttigt i informationsteori. Denne afhandling samler en h˚andfuld
resultater fra kvanteinformationsteori, hvoraf de fleste bruger entropier som matematisk hovedværktøj.
Det første resultat omhandler von-Neumann-entropien. Selvom von-Neumann-entropien er en direkte
generalisering af Shannonentropien til tæthedsmatricer, opfører den sig anderledes. Den mangler for
eksempel Shannonentropiens monotonicitetsegenskab: Entropien kan blive mindre n˚ar et kvantesystem
gøres større ved at tilføje flere systemer. Et spørgsm˚al, som har været a˚bent i mange a˚r, er, om der
er uligheder for von-Neumann-entropien, der svarer til ubetingede uligheder af ikke-Shannon type. Her
beviser vi en ny betinget ulighed af ikke-von-Neumann type, som er et skridt mod en formodet ubetinget
ulighed af Linden og Winter.
Ligesom mange andre informationsteoretiske problemer, er kvantekildekodningsproblemer, for eksempel
fusion af kvantetilstande, fornyligt blevet analyseret i det s˚akaldte one-shot (”enkelinstans”) scenarie.
Mens kvantetilstandsfusionsproblemet blev løst ved hjælp af afkoblingsmetoden i tilfældet af mange
uafhængige, identisk fordelte kvantetilstande, krævede de næsten optimale one-shot resultater af Berta
et al. og Anshu et al. yderligere matematiske redskaber. Vi indfører en naturlig generalisering af
afkoblingsmetoden, katalytisk afkobling, som kan bruges til at genbevise de førnævnte resultater analogt
til hvordan standardafkoblingsmetoden bruges i den asymptotiske sammenhæng.
Kvanteteleportation er en af de mest basale byggesten i kvante-Shannonteorien. En variant af teletrans-
portationsprotokollen, kaldet portbaseret teleportation, kræver meget større mængder af sammenfiltring,
men er interessant for f. eks. øjeblikkelig ikke-lokal beregning. Portbaseret teleportation kan ikke realis-
eres perfekt, og de nødvendige ressources divergerer for sm˚a fejlparametre. Vi beviser flere nedre grænser
for antallet af udgangsporte N , som kræves for at realisere portbaseret teleportation for en given fejl-
tolerance og et kvantesystem af en given dimension. En af dem viser for første gang at N divergerer
uniformt i kvantesystemets dimension, n˚ar fejltolerancen g˚ar mod nul. Som biprodukt beviser vi ogs˚a en
ny nedre grænse for en tilnærmet universel programme´rbar kvanteprocessors programregisterstørrelse.
Endelig runder vi af med et resultat fra kvantekryptografien. Mens kvante-key-distribution (deling
af krypteringsnøgler v.h.a. kvantesystemer) er den mest kendte kvantekryptografiske protokol, er der
opst˚aet en voksende interesse i at generalisere symmetrisk kryptering til kvantebeskeder. Vi giver en ny
definition for ubetinget sikker non-malleability, som forbedrer den hidtidige definition af Ambainis et al.
Vi viser at kvante-non-malleability medfører hemmelighed, analogt til kvanteautentificering. Yderligere
kan kvante-non-malleable krypteringsprotokoller bruges til at bygge kvanteautentificeringsprotokoller.
Vi viser derudover at den seneste stærke definition af kvanteautentificering forsl˚aet af Garg et al. kan
opfyldes ved brug af 2-designs.
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Notation
x := y, y =: x x is defined to be equal to y
N the nonnegative integers
Z the integers
R the reals
C the complex numbers
n mod m remainder when dividing n by m
log x, log(x) logarithm with base 2
z the copmplex conjugate of z ∈ C
[n] {1, 2, ..., n}
Xn {0, ..., n− 1}
I ∩ J intersection of the sets I and J
I ∪ J union of the sets I and J
I \ J set difference
Ic complement of a set I with respect to a base set
that is mentioned or clear from context
X ,Y,Z Alphabets, i.e. finite sets
X,Y, Z classical systems
Pp[E] probability of an event E over the probability distribution p
Ep[f ] expectation of a quantity f over a probability distribution p
(v, w) inner product on a real vector space
A,B,C quantum systems
HA,HB,HB... Hilbert spaces of the systems A,B,C...
H∗ dual hilbert space of H
|A| the dimension of HA
AB composite quantum system consisting of subsystems A and B
Hom (HA,HB) Space of linear maps from HA → HB
End (HA) Hom (HA,HA)
X,XA element of End (HA)
ix
Notation x
X,XA→B element of Hom (HA,HB)
X† the adjoint of a matrix X ∈ Hom (HA,HB)
I dedicate this thesis to Sarah-Katharina Meisenheimer, who has
left us in January before handing in hers.
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Chapter 0
Prologue
Information theory, the theory of information processing with physical systems, has
revolutionized our lives in the last 70 years. Without it, you would likely be reading
this thesis written on a typewriter, with the formulas inserted by hand, and, of course,
on a different topic. Mobile phones, hard drives and digital radio stations would be
unthinkable without error correction codes, to name just one achievement of information
theory and a few examples of its applications.
A central and ubiquitous concept in information theory is entropy. The question that
different entropy functions try to answer is one that everybody living through these times
should ask themselves when, for example, writing another e-mail requiring a chunk of the
recipient’s precious time: How much information does a certain system contain? In the
example, this question has to be asked from the perspective of the recipient. When she
or he is told that they will receive an e-mail from you, and are asked to model it before
it arrives, they will have to resort to probability theory. There are many possibilities for
the content of the e-mail, and in general they would consider it more or less likely that
they receive one or another kind of e-mail from you.
A more basic example is the role of a dice. When rolling a dice, the outcome is unknown.
The dice roll contains a lot of information from the perspective of the spectators before
the dice has actually been rolled. This is, because, ideally, we would expect any outcome
from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with equal probability.
Each of the two examples have precisely defined analogues in information theory, that
are analyzed with the help of different entropy functions. The analogue of the first
situation is the task of data compression, also called source coding. In this task, some
raw data, that we imagine coming from an information source, is to be encoded in a way
such that (i) the original data can be recovered, and (ii) the memory that the encoded
1
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message takes up is minimized. Following the founder of information theory, Claude
Elwood Shannon, we take English text as an example [Sha51]. A very coarse model of
somebody writing English text is a source that spits out random letters independently
according to the probability distribution given by the frequency distribution in some
large sample of English text, i.e. the letters are independent and identically distributed.
This situation is called the IID setting. In particular, it will for example spit out the
letter ‘e’ more often than the letter ‘q’ on average. This simple model already enables
us to store a (large) piece of English text using approximately the Shannon entropy of
the letter distribution, 4.14 bits, of memory per letter instead of log 26 ≈ 4.7 bits – a
significant saving.
The analogue of the second example is the problem of randomness extraction, which
is mainly relevant in cryptography. There are many ways to obtain seemingly random
numbers. One can roll a dice a couple of times, or shuffle some cards and distribute
them, as is done in games for entertainment. Or one can harvest random numbers from
the RAM of a computer. In all of these cases there are several obvious questions about
the quality of the random data. How random is it? Are there other observers from whose
perspective the numbers are less random? If the data is not uniformly random, can I
extract uniformly random numbers from it, and if so, at which rate? The last question
is answered by the construction of randomness extractors, and the achievable rate of
uniformly random numbers is given by the min-entropy of our original data. The min-
entropy is also connected to the probability of guessing the original data correctly. This
probability is the same as for guessing the outcome of the extracted uniform random
number, which has Shannon entropy equal to the min-entropy of the original data.
The basis of classical information theory as introduced by Shannon is classical physics,
a dice, the text on a piece of paper or the current through a transistor in a computer
behave classically. It is therefore a more or less obvious question to ask how information
theory changes when using the more fundamental theory of quantum mechanics as an
underlying physical theory. When Alexander Holevo asked this question and answered
it for some tasks in the 70’s, quantum information theory was born.
Since then quantum information theory underwent fast development, from a research
field in some niche between physics and computer science, to a field transitioning from
pure academic activity to business development. There are already quantum information
processing devices on the market, like quantum random number generators, and it seems
likely that more will follow soon. Today, most experts think that a practical quantum
computer, is a midterm perspective on the order of 10s of years. The contribution of
quantum information theory is to lay the foundation for quantum information processing
and enable the users of quantum devices to make informed and prudent use of them.
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There are two general kinds of problems in quantum information theory. On the one
hand, given a certain task or problem from classical information theory, one can ask how
it changes if some or all systems involved are assumed to be quantum instead of classical.
On the other hand, there are tasks that have no classical analogue. This is because
certain tasks can be achieved with quantum resources that are impossible classically,
like unconditionally secure key distribution, and there are tasks that reduce to simpler
ones in the classical setting, like source coding with side information at the encoder.
There are also the paradigms of quantum teleportation and superdense coding, that
concern the interplay of quantum and classical information. A quantum teleportation
protocol is a way to send quantum information by using classical communication only
by making use of preexisting quantum correlations between sender and receiver. In the
second half of Chapter 3, port based teleportation is analyzed, a variant of standard
quantum teleportation.
Entropy plays an equally central role in quantum information theory as it does in the
classical one. The two examples above, data compression and the optimal guessing
probability, both have quantum versions. The quantum generalization of Shannon’s
source coding theorem is the so called Schumacher compression. Given a source that
spits out independent “quantum letters”, i.e. quantum systems in some mixed quantum
state, the resulting quantum data can be compressed to only use an amount of quantum
memory per letter equal to the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state. This coding
problem becomes more involved, when the decoder has some side information about the
encoded data. This is a special case of the classical scenario of Slepian-Wolf distributed
source coding. In the quantum setting, this problem was famously solved by Horodecki,
Oppenheim and Winter using the so-called decoupling technique. In the first half of
Chapter 3, this technique is generalized to be aplicable to the one shot setting, where
information processing of data that does not have the simple structure of the IID setting.
In a multi-party setting, every non-empty subset of the parties can be assigned an
information-theoretic state. An example is the task of network coding. Here, informa-
tion has to be redistributed over a certain network of communication channels. While
this problem is solved by a simple store-and-forward routing protocol in the case of the
internet, more complex protocols will be used in the 5G mobile communication stan-
dard, and there are conceivable scenarios where non-trivial network coding is necessary.
The fundamental limits for communication rates over a network are given by entropy
inequalities. While infinitely many such inequalities have been proven for the case of four
or more classical parties, only the basic inequalities that can be derived from the strong
subadditivity inequality are known in the quantum setting, except for some inequalities
that only hold for a special set of quantum states fulfilling some extra constraints. In
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Chapter 2, we prove a new inequality of the latter kind by removing one of the con-
straints from an inequality by Linden and Winter. This is a step towards proving an
unconstrained inequality conjectured by these authors.
In cryptography, entropy plays a role as well. One application, randomness extraction,
was already mentioned. Another example is entropic security definitions in symmetric
key cryptography. Here, two parties share a secret, the key, and use it to communicate
in a way that is protected against malicious adversaries. If they want to keep their
message secret, they have to make sure that the encrypted message does not contain
any information about its content from the perspective of somebody who does not have
the key. This can be formulated in terms of an entropic quantity called the mutual
information. A different security paradigm is non-malleability. Here, an active adversary
should not be able to modify the message in a meaningful way. An entropic formulation
is, that any adversary should essentially not be able to gain any correlations with the
message content, as measured by the mutual information. In Chapter 4, this formulation
is shown to remedy the shortcomings of the previous definition in the quantum setting.
During the time of the PhD program at University of Copenhagen I had the pleasure to
collaborate with many excellent researchers. The results of three of these collaborations
are included in this Thesis, two of which have appeared in peer reviewed articles. It is
stated explicitly in the text where results from collaborative research is presented. The
section on catalytic decoupling, Subsesection 3.1.2, presents results from the following
article:
• Christian Majenz, Mario Berta, Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Renato Renner, and Matthias
Christandl. Catalytic decoupling of quantum information. Physical Review Let-
ters, 118(8):080503, 2017.
The chapter on quantum non-malleability and authentication, Chapter 4, consists of
results from the article
• G. Alagic and C. Majenz. Quantum non-malleability and authentication. ArXiv
e-prints, accepted for publication in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2017,
October 2016.
The results in Subsubsection 3.2.4.3 have been obtained in collaboration with Matthias
Christandl and Florian Speelman.
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, the basic mathematical and information-theoretical concepts are intro-
duced that are used throughout the rest of this thesis. It is organized in four sections,
introducing the basic formalism of quantum information theory, distance measures, en-
tropies, and some fundamentals of representation theory of finite and compact groups,
respectively.
1.1 The formalism of quantum information theory
Quantum information theory is the theory of processing information using physical
systems that behave according to the laws of quantum mechanics. While building
on the the theory of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, modern quantum informa-
tion has developed its own theoretical framework which is presented in the follow-
ing section. Good introductions to the topic can for example be found in References
[NC00, Wil13, Pre98, Ren12].
1.1.1 Systems and States
As in standard Schro¨dinger quantum mechanics, a quantum system A is described by a
Hilbert space HA. While infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces do play a role in quantum
information theory, we will use only finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces in this thesis, i.e.
dimHA <∞. Therefore we have HA ∼= Cd ∼= H∗A with d = |A| = dimHA and where H∗A
is the dual of HA. In Dirac bra-ket-notation, an element of a Hilbert space H is denoted
|ψ〉 ∈ H, and its dual vector is denoted by 〈ψ| ∈ H∗. That way, the inner product
of two vectors |φ〉 , |ψ〉 ∈ H is denoted by 〈φ|ψ〉, and the outer product by |φ〉〈ψ|. We
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sometimes write |ψ〉A , 〈ψ|A , |φ〉〈ψ|A and 〈φ|ψ〉A to emphasize which quantum system
and which Hilbert space these objects belong to.
Given two quantum systems A and B, we can consider them jointly by defining the
composite quantum system AB. Its Hilbert space is the tensor product of the Hilbert
spaces of its parts, i.e. HAB = HA ⊗HB. For elements of HA ⊗HB we sometimes omit
the tensor product symbol, |φ〉A |ψ〉B = |φ〉A ⊗ |ψ〉B.
The state of of a quantum system A is given by a positive semidefinite matrix ρA ∈
End (HA) that is normalized to have unit trace, i.e. ρA ≥ 0 and trρA = 1. If clear
from context, the subscript is sometimes omitted, i.e. we just write ρ instead of ρA.
We use the notation S(HA) ⊂ P(HA) ⊂ Herm(HA) ⊂ End (HA) for the set of quantum
states, the set of positive semidefinite matrices, the set of Hermitian matrices and the
set of matrices, on HA, respectively. A state is called pure if it is a projector, i.e.
ρA = |ψ〉〈ψ|A for a vector |ψ〉A. States that are not pure are called mixed. For a pure
state ρA = |ψ〉〈ψ|A, the vector |ψ〉A is called state vector. A distinguished quantum state
is the maximally mixed state τA =
1A
|A| .
Another special subset of End (HA) is the unitary group. A matrix UA is unitary if
UA ∈ End (HA) with UAU †A = 1. A special unitary on HA ⊗ HA′ for HA ∼= HA′ is the
swap F , defined by F |φ〉A ⊗ |ψ〉A′ = |ψ〉A ⊗ |φ〉A′ . The following is a handy fact about
the swap.
Lemma 1.1 (Swap trick). For any matrices A,B we have tr[AB] = tr[FA⊗B].
By the isomorphism HA ⊗HB ∼= Hom (HA,HB) and the singular value decomposition,
for every pure state ρAB = |ψ〉〈ψ|AB there exist orthonormal bases {|αi〉A}|A|−1i=0 and
{|βi〉B}|B|−1i=0 such that
|ψ〉AB =
min(|A|,|B|)−1∑
i=0
√
pi |αi〉A ⊗ |βi〉B (1.1)
for some probability distribution p = {pi}min(|A|,|B|)−1i=0 . This representation is called
the Schmidt decomposition. A short calculation shows that p is the spectrum of both
ψA = trB |ψ〉〈ψ|AB and ψB == trA |ψ〉〈ψ|AB, the marginals |ψ〉〈ψ|AB. Here, trA is the
partial trace over the system A which is defined in Subsection 1.1.3 for pedagogical
reasons. As it is convenient to switch between vectors and the projection onto them in
the case of pure states, we write ρ = |ρ〉〈ρ| for a given pure state ρ, or for a given vector
|ρ〉.
Via an isomorphism HA ∼= Cd, a Hilbert space HA can be assigned a standard basis
{|i〉}|A|−1i=0 , which is also called computational basis in quantum information theory. A
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state that is diagonal in that basis is called classical. When considering composite
systems, such a basis is chosen for the atomic Hilbert spaces. The computational basis of
the tensor product Hilbert space is the product bases induced by the local computational
bases. This is necessary to ensure that classical states have classical marginals, i.e. they
are classical on all subsystems and correspond to a joint probability distribution of a
composite classical system. A bipartite quantum state ρAB is called a quantum-classical
state, or cq-state for short, if the A-system is classical. This means, that ρAB has a basis
of eigenvectors |ψij〉AB = |i〉A ⊗ |ψj〉B. In other words,
ρAB =
∑
i
pi |i〉〈i|A ⊗ ρ(i)B (1.2)
for some probability distribution p and a family of normalized quantum states ρ
(i)
B .
For every mixed state ρA there exists a pure extension to another quantum system A
′,
i.e. a pure state ψAA′ = |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′ such that ψA = ρA. Such a pure state is called a
purification of ρA, and by the Schmidt decomposition theorem all purifications of ρA can
be transformed into each other by applying a (partial) isometry to the purifying system.
One of the most interesting and useful features of quantum theory is entanglement. A
bipartite pure state |ψ〉〈ψ|AB is called entangled, if it is not a product state, i.e. |ψ〉AB 6=
|α〉A⊗|β〉B for all |α〉A and |β〉B. A mixed state is called entangled, if it is not a convex
combination of product states, otherwise it is called separable. A particular entangled
state that is used frequently is the standard maximally entangled state |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ∈
S (HA ⊗HA′) with
|φ+〉AA′ =
1√|A|
|A|−1∑
i=0
|i〉A ⊗ |i〉A′ . (1.3)
If we want to emphasize the dimension of the local Hilbert space, we write |φ+|A|〉AA′ =
|φ+〉AA′ . For HA = C2, |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ is called an entanglement bit, or ebit. The maxi-
mally entangled state has a property called the mirror lemma,
XA |φ+〉AA′ = XTA′ |φ+〉AA′ , (1.4)
where XT is the transpose of X in the computational basis. A similar statement holds
even when X is a rectangular matrix.
Lemma 1.2. Let XA→B ∈ L(HA,HB) be a linear operator from A to B. Then
XA→B |φ+〉AA′ =
√
|B|
|A|X
T
B′→A′ |φ+〉BB′ . (1.5)
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Proof.
XA→B |φ+〉AA′ =
1√|A|
|A|−1∑
i=0
|B|−1∑
j=0
Xji |j〉B ⊗ |i〉A′
=
1√|A|
|A|−1∑
i=0
|B|−1∑
j=0
XTij |j〉B ⊗ |i〉A′
=
√
|B|
|A|X
T
B′→A′ |φ+〉BB′ . (1.6)
By the Schmidt decomposition and the mirror lemma, any state vector |ψ〉AB can be
expressed in terms of the maximally entangled state,
|ψ〉AB =
√
|B|ψ1/2A VB′→A |φ+〉B′B . (1.7)
Sometimes it is convenient to use subnormalized quantum states, i.e. ρ ≥ 0, trρ ≤ 1.
The set of subnormalized states on a Hilbert space H is denoted by S≤(H). This is
mainly a mathematical tool. One can, however, think about subnormalized states as
the result of some protocol that has aborted with a certain probability. When we use
subnormalized states in this thesis, we will explicitly mention it.
1.1.2 Measurement
The last section detailed how to describe quantum systems, containing quantum infor-
mation, mathematically. As human beings, however, we interact with the world in a
classical manner. This means that if we want to reap the benefits that the superior
information processing power of quantum mechanical systems promises, we have to un-
derstand how to extract classical information from a quantum system. This process is
called measurement. While the interpretation of what exactly happens in the physical
process of measurement is the subject of an intense ongoing debate, its mathematical
description for the purpose of quantum information theory is well-established and will
be described in the following.
A measurement on a quantum system A is mathematically described by a positive
operator-valued measure (POVM). A POVM is a family of positive semidefinite ma-
trices {E(i)A }r−1i=0 , E(i)A ∈ P(HA) such that
∑
iE
(i)
A = 1A. The set {0, 1, ..., r − 1} is the
set of outcomes. When the measurement is applied to a quantum system in state ρA,
the probability of the measurement returning outcome i is p
(i)
ρ = trE
(i)
A ρA. Note that
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p
(i)
ρ = (E
(i)
A , ρA)HS, where for X,Y ∈ Hom (HA,HB), (X,Y )HS = trX†Y is the Hilbert
Schmidt inner product.
A given a POVM {E(i)A }r−1i=0 can be applied to the A-part of a composite system AB
by defining a POVM {Eˆ(i)AB}ri=0 by setting Eˆ(i)AB = E(i)A ⊗ 1B. As a shorthand we write
{E(i)A }ri=0 instead of {Eˆ(i)AB}ri=0, omitting the identity matrix 1B.
1.1.3 Quantum channels
Transformations between quantum states are mathematically described by completely
positive trace-preserving linear maps ΛA→B ∈ Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)), called quan-
tum channels. As for quantum states, the subscript is omitted at times, i.e. we write
Λ ∈ Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)). To avoid confusion with the identity matrix, we denote
the identity map in End (End (HA)) by idA. The tensor product of two maps ΛA→B ∈
Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)) and Λ′C→D ∈ Hom (End (HC) ,End (HD)) is defined by its
action on product matrices, ΛA→B ⊗ Λ′C→D(XA ⊗ YC) = ΛA→B(XA)⊗ Λ′C→D(YC).
Definition 1.3 (Quantum Channel). A map ΛA→B ∈ Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)) is
called
i) positive if Λ(P(HA)) ⊂ P(HB)
ii) completely positive (CP) if ΛA→B ⊗ idC is positive for all C
iii) trace preserving (TP) if trΛA→B(XA) = trXA for all XA ∈ End (HA).
If a map has properties ii) and iii), it is called a CPTP map or quantum channel. The
set of quantum channels from A to B is denoted by CPT PA→B.
Embedding a POVM into a composite system as described in the last section defines a
CP-map ιA→AB(XA) = XA ⊗ 1B. An important quantum channel is the partial trace
trB = (ιA→AB)†, the adjoint of the embedding map with respect to the Hilbert Schmidt
inner product. On product matrices it acts as trB(XA ⊗ YB) = tr(YB)XA. Note that
the subscript denotes the system that is discarded. The partial trace is used to define
the marginals of a quantum state ρAB, ρA = trBρAB and ρB = trAρAB.
There are two important characterization theorems for CPTP maps, the Kraus and
Stinespring representation theorems.
Theorem 1.4 (Kraus representation, [Kra71]). Let ΛA→B ∈ Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)).
ΛA→B is CP if and only if there exists a set {Ai}r−1i=0 ⊂ Hom (HA,HB) of matrices such
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that
ΛA→B(X) =
r−1∑
i=0
AiXA
†
i (1.8)
for all X ∈ End (HA). Λ is in addition TP if and only if
∑r−1
i=0 A
†
iAi = 1A.
The reversible channels from a quantum system to itself are unitary channels UA→A(XA) =
UAXU
†
A, where UA is a unitary matrix
Theorem 1.5 (Stinespring representation, [Sti55]).
Let ΛA→B ∈ Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)). ΛA→B is CPTP if and only if there exists a
Hilbert space HE and an isometry V ∈ Hom (HA,HBE) such that
ΛA→B(X) = trEV XV † (1.9)
for all X ∈ End (HA). V is called a Stinespring dilation of Λ.
The latter theorem is important to relate the notion of discrete dynamics in the form
of quantum channels back to the physical picture of Schro¨dinger quantum mechanics.
Any quantum channel can be implemented by appending a quantum system, applying
a unitary time evolution and then discarding part of the result.
An important tool when analyzing quantum channels is the Choi-Jamio lkowski isomor-
phism.
Theorem 1.6 (Choi Jamio lkowski isomorphism, [Cho75, Jam72]). Let HA′ ∼= HA. The
map
Φ : Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB))→End (HA′ ⊗HB)
ΛA→B 7→ΛA→B(
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AA′) (1.10)
is an isomorphism. We write ηΛ = Φ(Λ). Furthermore, Λ is CP if and only if ηΛ ≥ 0,
and Λ is TP if and only if (ηΛ)A′ = τA′.
The state ηΛ is called the Choi-Jamio lkowski state or CJ state of Λ.
1.2 Distance measures
How similar or different are two quantum states? How about two quantum channels?
To answer these question, metrics on the respective sets are introduced. The most
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important metric is the trace distance. The trace distance is defined in terms of the
Schatten 1-norm or trace norm,
‖M‖1 = tr
√
M †M, (1.11)
for a matrix M ∈ Hom (HA,HB). The trace distance is now defined as half the trace
norm distance of two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ S (H),
δ(ρ, σ) =
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1. (1.12)
On classical states, it is equal to the total variational distance of the corresponding
probability distributions. The importance of the trace distance stems from the fact,
that it has an operational interpretation. The optimal strategy of guessing whether an
unknown state is ρ or σ, when promised that it is one of the two with probability 12 each,
has a sucess probability of
psucc =
1
2
(1 + δ(ρ, σ)). (1.13)
The relevant norm for state vectors is the 2-norm which is induced by the inner product,
‖ |φ〉 ‖2 = 〈φ|φ〉. The following lemma relates the 2-norm distance of two state vectors
to the trace distance of their projectors.
Lemma 1.7. Let |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ H be two vectors. Then
‖ |ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ| ‖1 ≤ 2‖ |ψ〉 − |φ〉 ‖2. (1.14)
Proof. The trace norm distance of two pure states is given by [NC00]
‖ |ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ| ‖1 = 2
√
1− | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2. (1.15)
We bound
‖ |ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ| ‖1 =2
√
1− | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2
=2
√
(1− | 〈φ|ψ〉 |)(1 + | 〈φ|ψ〉 |)
≤2
√
2(1− | 〈φ|ψ〉 |)
≤2
√
2(1− Re(〈φ|ψ〉))
=2‖ |ψ〉 − |φ〉 ‖2 (1.16)
Introduction 12
Another important quantity that is used to define a metric is the fidelity, a measure of
similarity. The fidelity of two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ S (H) is defined as
F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1. (1.17)
If σ = |σ〉〈σ| is pure, then a simpler formula, holds,
F (ρ, σ) =
√
〈σ| ρ |σ〉, (1.18)
and therefore
F (ρ, σ) =
∣∣〈σ|ρ〉∣∣ (1.19)
if in addition ρ = |ρ〉〈ρ|. The fidelity can be used to define a metric on the set of quantum
states. The purified distance of two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ S (H) is defined as
P (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2. (1.20)
For pure states |ψ〉〈ψ| , |φ〉〈φ| we sometimes write F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) := F (|ψ〉〈ψ| , |φ〉〈φ|) and
P (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) := P (|ψ〉〈ψ| , |φ〉〈φ|).
The purified distance and the trace distance can be related in the following way,
1
2
P (ρ, σ)2 ≤ 1−
√
1− P (ρ, σ)2 ≤ δ(ρ, σ) ≤ P (ρ, σ). (1.21)
These inequalities are called Fuchs van de Graaf inequalities.
Both metrics can be extended to the set of subnormalized states [TCR10]. For two
sub-normalized quantum states ρ, σ ∈ S≤(H), the trace distance is defined as
δ(ρ, σ) =
1
2
(‖ρ− σ‖1 + |tr(ρ− σ)|) .
Their purified distance is defined as
P (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2, where F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1 +
√
(1− trρ)(1− trσ)
is the generalized fidelity. We extend these definitions to apply to pairs of probability dis-
tributions by considering the corresponding diagonal density matrices. Bε(ρ) ⊂ S≤(H)
denotes the purified distance ball of radius ε around ρ ∈ S≤(H). The Fuchs-van-de-
Graaf inequalities (1.21) hold for these generalized versions of trace distance and puri-
fied distance as well [Tom15]. These generalized measures reflect the interpretation of
subnormalized states as “partial states” in the sense of being the result of a probabilistic
protocol that aborts sometime.
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One of the main reasons why the fidelity and the purified distance are so handy in
practice is Uhlmann’s theorem.
Theorem 1.8 (Uhlmann’s theorem, [Uhl85]). Let ρA, σA be quantum states. Then
F (ρA, σA) = max
ρAE ,σAE
F (ρAE , σAE) , (1.22)
where the maximum is taken over all purifications ρAE of ρA and σAE of σA.
Both metrics introduced above are non-increasing under quantum channels, and there-
fore in particular under the partial trace,
δ(ρAB, σAB) ≥δ(ρA, σA), and
P (ρAB, σAB) ≤ P (ρA, σA) ⇐⇒ F (ρAB, σAB) ≤ F (ρA, σA). (1.23)
This property is also called monotonicity under the partial trace. Forgetting the eigen-
bases of two states does not increase their trace distance.
Lemma 1.9. [NC00, Box 11.2] We have
δ(ρ, σ) ≥ δ(spec(ρ), spec(σ)),
where spec(A) denotes the ordered spectrum of a Hermitian matrix A.
The trace norm naturally induces a norm on Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)), the com-
pletely bounded trace norm or diamond norm. The diamond norm of a map Λ ∈
Hom (End (HA) ,End (HB)) is defined as
‖Λ‖ = sup
ρAE
‖Λ⊗ idE(ρ)‖1. (1.24)
By the monotonicity of the trace distance under partial trace, there is always a pure
optimizer. Via the operational interpretation of the trace distance, the diamond norm
has a corresponding interpretation. Suppose we are given a quantum channel that is
promised to be equal to Λ1 or Λ2 with probability
1
2 each. Then the optimal success
probability of guessing which one it is, when we are allowed to use it once on part of an
arbitrary quantum state, is
psucc =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
‖Λ1 − Λ2‖
)
. (1.25)
Another measure of similarity between quantum channels is the so called entanglement
fidelity,
F (Λ1,Λ2) = F (ηΛ1 , ηΛ2). (1.26)
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We write F (Λ) := F (Λ, id). The entanglement fidelity with respect to the identity can
be easily related to the diamond norm.
Lemma 1.10. For a quantum channel Λ ∈ CPT PA→A,
1− F (Λ)2 ≤ ‖Λ− id‖/2 ≤ |A|
√
1− F (Λ)2. (1.27)
Proof. For the first inequality we bound
‖Λ− id‖ ≥‖Λ(φ+AA′)− φ+AA′‖1
≥2 (1− F (Λ(φ+AA′), φ+AA′)2)
=2
(
1− F (Λ)2) . (1.28)
Here we used the definition of the diamond norm in the first, and a strengthened Fuchs
van de Graaf inequality from Exercise 9.21 in [NC00] in the second inequality.
For the other inequality, let |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′ be a pure quantum state such that ‖Λ − id‖ =
‖(Λ− id)(|ψ〉〈ψ|)‖1. Let |ψ〉AA′ =
√|A|ψ′1/2A U ′A |φ+〉AA′ . Now we bound
‖Λ− id‖ = ‖(Λ− id)(|ψ〉〈ψ|)‖1
=|A|
∥∥∥ψ′1/2A (Λ− id)(∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣)ψ′1/2A ∥∥∥
1
≤|A|‖ψ′1/2A ‖2∞
∥∥Λ(φ+AA′)− φ+AA′∥∥1
≤2|A|
√
1− F (Λ)2. (1.29)
For the first inequality we used Ho¨lder’s inequality twice, and the second inequality is a
Fuchs van de Graaf inequality. Finally we use that ‖ψ′1/2A ‖2∞ = ‖ψ′A‖∞ ≤ ‖ψ′A‖1 = 1.
If the CJ states of two quantum channels are close, the channels are also close in diamond
norm. The approximation gets worse by a dimension factor, however.
Lemma 1.11. Let Λ
(i)
A→B, i = 0, 1 be CPTP maps such that
‖ηΛ(0) − ηΛ(1)‖1 ≤ ε.
Then the two maps are also close in diamond norm,∥∥∥Λ(0)A→B − Λ(1)A→B∥∥∥ ≤ |A|ε.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is a simple application of the Ho¨lder inequality. Let
|ψ〉AA′ =
√|A|ψ1/2A′ VA′ |φ+〉AA′ be an arbitrary pure state with VA′ a unitary. Then we
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have∥∥∥(Λ(0)A→B − Λ(1)A→B)(|ψ〉〈ψ|)∥∥∥
1
=|A|
∥∥∥ψ1/2A′ VA′(ηΛ(0) − ηΛ(1))V †A′ψ1/2A′ ∥∥∥
1
≤|A|
∥∥∥ψ1/2A′ ∥∥∥2∞ ‖VA′‖2∞ ‖ηΛ(0) − ηΛ(1)‖1 ≤ |A|ε. (1.30)
1.3 Entropies
This section introduces the Shannon and von Neumann entropies, which are central to
information theory, as well other notions of entropy used in this thesis.
1.3.1 The Shannon and von Neumann Entropies
From the conception of information theory by Claude Shannon [Sha48] on, entropies have
played an important role, in particular the Shannon entropy. The Shannon entropy of a
probability distribution pX : X → [0, 1] of a classical system X is defined as
H(X)p = H(pX) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log(p(x)). (1.31)
For a binary distribution p : {0, 1} → [0, 1], the Shannon entry only depends on a single
parameter, p(0) due to the normalization of the probability distribution. One therefore
defines the binary entropy function
h(q) = −q log q − (1− q) log(1− q), (1.32)
such that H(p) = h(p(0)) in the example.
For a joint distribution p : X × Y → [0, 1] of two classical systems X and Y , the
conditional entropy of X given Y is defined as
H(X|Y )p =
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)H(pX|Y (·|y)) = H(XY )p −H(Y )p, (1.33)
where pX|Y (x|y) = pXY (x,y)pY (y) and pY is the Y -marginal of pXY . The conditional entropy is
nonnegative, as it is a convex combination of Shannon entropies, which are nonnegative.
This fact is called the monotonicity inequality,
H(X|Y )p ≥ 0 (1.34)
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While there are many more useful properties of the Shannon entropy worth mentioning,
we will move on to the the quantum generalization of the Shannon entropy. This is
because this thesis is mainly concerned with the quantum case, and whenever needed,
the classical results can be stated within the quantum formalism by restricting it to
classical states.
The von Neumann entropy is defined as the Shannon entropy of the spectrum of a
quantum state, or, equivalently, H(ρ) = −trρ log ρ. Note that the von Neumann entropy
is denoted by the same letter, H, as the Shannon entropy. This is only a very slight
abuse of notation, as any probability distribution corresponds to a diagonal quantum
state in a canonical way. To emphasize which marginal of a state the von Neumann
entropy is evaluated on, we often write H(AB)ρ = H(ρAB) and H(B)ρ = H(ρB) etc.
By the Schmidt decomposition, the spectra of the two marginals ρA and ρB of a pure
state ρAB are the same, therefore their entropies are as well, H(A)ρ = H(B)ρ.
1.3.2 The quantum relative entropy
Another entropic quantity is the the quantum relative entropy [Ume62],
D(ρ‖σ) = trρ(log ρ− log σ). (1.35)
The quantum relative entropy has the flavor of a distance measure, as it is nonnegative
and D(ρ‖σ) = 0 if and only if ρ = σ. It is, however, not symmetric under the exchange
of its argument, so it is not a metric on the set of quantum states. Another important
property of the quantum relative entropy that is expected from any reasonable distance
measure on the set of quantum states is contraction under CPTP maps,
D(Λ(ρ)‖Λ(σ)) ≤ D(ρ‖σ), (1.36)
for all quantum channels Λ. This is referred to as the data processing inequality of the
Relative entropy.
Despite not being a metric, the quantum relative entropy can be related to the trace
distance.
Lemma 1.12 (Pinskers inequality, see [OP93]). For quantum states ρAB and σAB,
D(ρA||σA) ≥1
2
‖ρA − σA‖21. (1.37)
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1.3.3 Information measures and entropy inequalities
In analogy to the classical quantities, the quantum conditional entropy, the quantum
mutual information, and the quantum conditional mutual information, of a quantum
state ρABC , are defined by
H(A|B)ρ =H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ (1.38)
I(A : B)ρ =H(A)ρ +H(B)ρ −H(AB)ρ (1.39)
I(A : B|C)ρ =H(AC)ρ +H(BC)ρ −H(ABC)ρ −H(C)ρ. (1.40)
It turns out that the latter two quantities are nonnegative. This fact is referred to as
subadditivity and strong subadditivity [LR73], respectively. Like the monotonicity (1.34)
of the Shannon entropy, these inequalities are examples of entropy inequalities, which
will be the topic of Chapter 2, and can both be derived from the properties of the Relative
entropy. For subadditivity it is sufficient to observe that I(A : B)ρ = D(ρAB‖ρA ⊗ ρB)
and to conclude the inequality from the nonnegativity of the quantum relative entropy.
Strong subadditivity, on the other hand, follows from the data processing inequality,
Equation (1.36). The quantum conditional mutual information can be expressed as a
difference of mutual informations, I(A : B|C)ρ = I(A : BC)ρ − I(A : C)ρ. Using
the expression for the quantum mutual information in terms of the quantum relative
entropy, it is easy to see that I(A : B|C) ≥ 0 is equal to Equation (1.36) for ρ = ρABC ,
σ = ρA ⊗ ρBC , and Λ = trC .
The monotonicity inequality (1.34) that holds for the Shannon entropy does not hold
for the von Neumann entropy, as can be seen looking at any entangled bipartite pure
state. It does, however, hold for all separable states [NK01].
The (conditional) quantum mutual information fulfills the following chain rule,
I(A : BC|D) = I(A : B|D) + I(A : C|BD), (1.41)
which holds for trivial D as well. Using this equation and strong subadditivity yields an
alternative form of the strong subadditivity inequality,
I(A : BC|D) ≥ I(A : B|D). (1.42)
Let ΛB→C be a quantum channel and VB→CE a Stinespring dilation of Λ. Then the above
inequality yields the data processing inequality for the conditional quantum mutual
information,
I(A : C|D)Λ(ρ) ≤ I(A : B|D)ρ (1.43)
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for all ρABD.
The von Neumann information measures are continuous functions of the quantum state
they are evaluated on. Explicit continuity bounds are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.13 (Fannes-Audenaert inequality, Alicki-Fannes inequality, [Fan73, Aud07,
AF04, Wil13]). Fck LaTeX!
Let ρABC and ρ
′
ABC be tripartite quantum states such that
‖ρABC − ρ′ABC‖1 ≤ ε. (1.44)
Then the following continuity bounds hold for entropic quantities:
|H(A)ρ −H(A)ρ′ | ≤ε
2
log (|A| − 1) + h
(ε
2
)
|H(A|B)ρ −H(A|B)ρ′ | ≤4ε log (|A|) + 2h(ε)
|I(A : B)ρ − I(A : B)ρ′ | ≤5ε log (min(|A|, |B|)) + 3h(ε)
|I(A : B|C)ρ − I(A : B|C)ρ′ | ≤8ε log (min(|A|, |B|)) + 4h(ε). (1.45)
1.3.4 Re´nyi entropies
What the Neumann entropy is for quantum information theory in the setting of many
independent, identically distributed (IID) copies of a task, are quantum Re´niy-entropic
quantities for one-shot quantum information theory. From the sprawling zoo of quantum
Re´nyi entropies, the species that are introduced here are those that will be used in
Chapter 3. In this subsection, we will use subnormalized states.
The most widely used quantum Re´nyi entropies are the conditional min- and max-
entropy. They are defined with the help of a Re´nyi variant of the relative entropy, the
max-relative entropy.
Definition 1.14 (Max-relative entropy). The max-relative entropy of a state ρ ∈ S≤(H)
with respect to a state σ ∈ S(H) is defined as
Dmax(ρ‖σ) = min
{
λ ∈ R
∣∣∣2λσ ≥ ρ} .
The conditional min- and max-entropy are defined as follows.
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Definition 1.15 (Conditional min- and max-entropy, [Ren, TCR10]). The conditional
min-entropy of a positive semidefinite matrix ρAB ∈ End (HA ⊗HB) is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
σ
max
{
λ
∣∣∣2−λ1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB}
= max
σ
(−Dmax (ρAB∥∥1A ⊗ σB)) ,
where the maximum is taken over all normalized quantum states. The conditional max-
entropy is defined as the dual of the conditional min-entropy in the sense that
Hmax(A|B)ρ = −Hmin(A|C)ρ,
where ρABC is a purification of ρAB.
The conditional max-entropy can be expressed in terms of the fidelity.
Lemma 1.16 ([KRS09]). We have
Hmax(A|B)ρ = max
σ∈S(HB)
2 log
√
|A|F (ρAB, τA ⊗ σB),
where |A| = dimHA.
The unconditional min- and max-entropy are defined as their conditional counterparts
with a trivial conditioning system.
Lemma 1.17. [KRS09] The min and max-entropy are given by
Hmin(ρ) = − log ‖ρ‖∞ and Hmax(ρ) = 2 log tr√ρ.
Here, ‖X‖∞ denotes the operator norm of X.
As many information processing tasks allow for a small error, and to be able to take the
IID limit, it is often necessary to optimize certain protocols over a small ball around the
actual input state. On the other hand, min- and max entropies can change much faster
with the quantum state they are evaluated on than the von Neumann entropy. While
the latter changes only by an amount of order ε log d−ε log ε when a quantum state on a
d-dimensional hilbert space changes by ε, the former can change by an amount of order
εd. Therefore one defines so-called smoothed versions of the min- and max-entropy (as
well as for other Re´nyi-entropic quantities).
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The smooth conditional min- and max-entropies are defined by maximizing and mini-
mizing over a ball of sub-normalized states ρ˜AB, respectively,
Hεmin(A|B)ρ = max
ρ˜∈Bε(ρ)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜
Hεmax(A|B)ρ = min
ρ˜∈Bε(ρ)
Hmax(A|B)ρ˜.
As an auxiliary quantity we also need the unconditional Re´nyi entropy of order 0.
Definition 1.18. For a quantum state ρA ∈ S(HA) the Re´nyi entropy of order 0 is
defined by
H0(A)ρ = log rk(ρA),
where rk(X) denotes the rank of a matrix X. As in the case of the max-entropy, the
smoothed version is defined by minimizing over an epsilon ball,
Hε0(A)ρ = min
ρ˜∈Bε(ρ)
H0(A)ρ˜.
The smoothed 0-entropy is almost equal to the smoothed max-entropy.
Lemma 1.19. [RW04, Lemma 4.3] We have
H2εmax(ρ) ≤ H2ε0 (A)ρ ≤ Hεmax(ρ) + 2 log(1/ε).
1.4 Representation theory
Group representation theory is the theory of group homomorphisms from a group G
to the general linear group GL(n,F) of n × n matrices over a field F. In this section
we will review some basics about complex (i.e. F = C) representations of finite and
compact groups. This is to prepare the reader for Chapters 3 and 4 which make use of
this beautiful theory.
Let G and H be groups. A group homomorphism from G to H is a map φ : G→ H such
that φ(gg′) = φ(g)φ(g′) for all g, g′ ∈ G. A group homomorphism that is invertible is
called a group isomorphism. A representation of G is a group homomorphism φ : G →
GL(n,C). Via the defining action of GL(n,C) on V = Cn, φ defines an action of G on
V for this action we write g |v〉 := g. |v〉 := φ(g) |v〉 for |v〉 ∈ V . Two representations
φ on V and ψ on W are equivalent, if there exists an isomorphism X ∈ Hom (V,W )
such that Xφ(g) = ψ(g)X for all g ∈ G. X is called an intertwiner. A representation
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φ is called unitary if φ(g) is unitary for all γ ∈ G. Every representation of a finite
or compact group is equivalent to a unitary representation, so we will only consider
unitary representations. If clear from context, we will call V a representation without
mentioning φ.
A representation φ on V is called reducible, if there exists a decomposition V ∼= V1 ⊕ V2
such that φ(g) = φ1(g) ⊕ φ2(g) for all g ∈ G, otherwise it is called irreducible. It turns
out that every representation of a finite or compact group can be expressed as a direct
sum of irreducible representations.
Theorem 1.20 (Maschke’s Theorem). Let V be a representation of G. Then there exists
a decomposition
V =
⊕
i
Vi ⊗Mi (1.46)
where the Vi are pairwise inequivalent irreducible representations of G, Mi are complex
vector spaces called multiplicity spaces, and this decomposition is unique up to isomor-
phism.
Schur’s lemma shows that homomorphisms between irreducible representations of a
group G have a very simple structure.
Lemma 1.21 (Schur’s Lemma). Let V and W be irreducible representations of a group
G, and let X ∈ Hom (V,W ) be an intertwiner. Then X is either an isomorphism, or
X = 0. If V = W (as representations), then X = λ1 for some λ ∈ C.
As a corollary, we can characterize the algebra of matrices that commutes with a general
representation.
Corollary 1.22. Let
V =
⊕
i
Vi ⊗Mi (1.47)
be a decomposition of a representation V of a group G into irreducible representations.
Let X ∈ End (V ) commute with the action of G, i.e. gX = Xg. Then X has the form
X =
⊕
i
1Vi ⊗XMi (1.48)
for some matrices Xi ∈ End (Mi).
One way to produce matrices that commute with a certain representation is by applying
the twirl corresponding to the representation. For a representation V of a finite group
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G, We define TV ∈ End (End (V )) by
TV (X) = 1|G|
∑
g∈G
gXg†. (1.49)
It is easy to see that gTV (X) = TV (X)g for all g ∈ G, so Corollary 1.22 applies. The twirl
can be defined for compact groups as well. The normalized sum over group elements is
here replaced by the integral over the group using the Haar measure.
Two particularly important representations in quantum information theory are the nat-
ural representations of the symmetric group Sn and the special unitary group SU(d)
on the Hilbert space H = (Cd)n. Sn acts by permuting the tensor copies of Cd, i.e.
pi.
⊗n
i=1 |φi〉 =
⊗n
i=1 |φpi−1(i)〉 for pi ∈ Sn and |φ〉i ∈ Cd, and SU(d) acts diagonally, i.e.
by U. |ψ〉 = U⊗n |ψ〉 for |ψ〉 ∈ H and U ∈ SU(d). These two representation commute, i.e.
pi.(U. |ψ〉) = U.(pi. |ψ〉). This implies that the two representations define a representation
of the product group Sn× SU(d). What is more, the algebras generated by the two rep-
resentations are double commutants. In other words, the decomposition of the resulting
representation of Sn×SU(d) into irreducible representations is multiplicity-free, i.e. the
spaces Mi from equation (1.46) when decomposing the Sn representation into irreducible
representations, are irreducible representations of SU(d), and vice versa,
H =
⊕
Λ`(n,d)
[λ]⊗ Vλ. (1.50)
Here, the direct sum is over all Young diagrams λ ` (n, d) with n boxes and at most d
rows, which index the irreducible representations [λ] of Sn and the polynomial irreducible
representations Vλ of SU(d), respectively. The fact that the representations of Sn and
SU(d) on H are double commutants, as well as the decomposition (1.50), are known as
Schur-Weyl duality. A good introduction to Schur-Weyl duality can be found in [Chr06].
Two special terms in the direct sum decomposition (1.50) are the symmetric subspace∨n Cd and the antisymmetric subspace ∧n Cd. They are irreducible SU(d) representa-
tions, and the corresponding one-dimensional Sn-representations are the trivial and the
sign representation, respectively.
As a last remark, note that U(d) is isomorphic to U(1) × SU(d), i.e. any irreducible
representation of U(d) is specified by (and is the product of) a pair of irreducible rep-
resentations of the Abelian group U(1) (the determinant) and SU(d). Therefore the
difference between U(d) and SU(d) is immaterial in quantum information theory: the
U(1)-part cancels whenever conjugating a matrix with a unitary.
Chapter 2
Entropy inqualities
Entropy is a fundamental quantity in information theory and thermodynamics, both
classical and quantum. When applying the concept of entropy to information theoretic
problems like, for example, channel coding, entropy inequalities provide fundamental
limits to information processing. Entropy inequalities are linear inequalities relating the
Shannon or von Neumann entropies of different overlapping marginals of a quantum state
or probability distribution. Basic facts such as the impossibility of increasing correlations
of a system A with another system B by acting on A alone can be compactly expressed
in terms of entropy inequalities. In more complex communication scenarios like that of
classical network coding, even so-called non-Shannon type inequalities constrain the rate
region for communication through a network. The conic geometry of the set of possible
entropies implies that entropy inequalities are, in fact, the only constraints on such rate
regions.
While for four or more random variables, infinite families of unconstrained entropy in-
equalities are known, finding such inequalities beyond strong subadditivity for the von
Neumann entropy has been an open question for many years. One reason why the clas-
sical non-Shannon type inequalities resist quantum proof so far is that the only known
classical proof technique relies crucially on the ability of copying a random variable.
This makes a direct quantum generalization impossible due to the no-cloning theorem.
This chapter of my thesis is dedicated to presenting a new constrained inequality for
the von Neumann entropy of four party quantum states. In the first section I will
introduce the classical and quantum entropy cones and review some previous results,
before presenting the new inequality and its properties in the second section. In this
Chapter we omit the subscript for entropic quantities that indicates which state it is
evaluated on.
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2.1 Entropy cones
In this section, the entropy vector formalism and some important results about the
classical and quantum entropic regions are introduced. More thorough introductions to
the topic can be found in [Yeu08, Maj14].
2.1.1 The entropy vector formalism
A multi-party quantum state ρ ∈ S
(⊗
i∈[n]Hi
)
has 2n − 1 marginals, one for each
∅ 6= I ⊂ [n]. Each of these marginals has a von Neumann entropy, and these entropies
are not independent. In particular, they are subject to entropy inequalities like the
strong subadditivity inequality, Equation (1.40). The different marginal entropies can
be collected in one real vector,
h(ρ) = (H(ρI))I⊂[n] ∈ R2
n
. (2.1)
Here ρI = trIcρ denotes the marginal of ρ that includes the subsystems in I ⊂ [n],
and we include the empty set for notational convenience, while adopting the convention
H(ρ∅) = 0. Note that we use the same letter for the entropy vector of a multi-party
quantum state and for the binary entropy function. There should be, however, no danger
of confusion, as quantum states are denoted by Greek letters and probabilities by Latin
letters. We can now define the set of all quantum entropy vectors,
Γn =
h(ρ)
∣∣∣∣∣ρ ∈ S
⊗
i∈[n]
Hi
 for some Hilbert spaces Hi
 . (2.2)
A subset of Γn is the set of all classical entropy vectors,
Σn =
h(ρ)
∣∣∣∣∣ρ ∈ S
⊗
i∈[n]
Hi
 classical for some Hilbert spaces Hi
 . (2.3)
A priori these subsets of R2
n
seem to have a complicated structure: they are the images
of the non-linear entropy function. It turns out, however, that their closures are convex
cones. In the following I will give an overview of the convex geometric properties of
these two cones. To this end, we need some notions from convex geometry as they are
introduced in, e.g., [Bar02].
Definition 2.1 (Convex cone). Let V be a real vector space. A convex set C ⊂ V is
called a convex cone, if it is scale invariant, i.e. for all v ∈ V and r ∈ R, rv ∈ V .
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Figure 1: A convex cone and its dual
The dual of a convex cone is defined via the inner product on the underlying real vector
space.
Definition 2.2 (Dual cone). Let C ⊂ V be a convex cone. Its dual cone C◦ is defined
as the set of vectors that have nonnegative inner product with all vectors in the primal
cone C,
C◦ =
{
v ∈ V
∣∣∣(v, w) ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ C} . (2.4)
The double dual of a convex cone is equal to its closure.
Lemma 2.3. Let C ⊂ V be a convex cone. Then C◦ is closed, and (C◦)◦ = C.
As a consequence, the set of closed convex cones is bijectively mapped into itself by the
dualization map, in other words, a closed convex cone is completely specified by its dual.
We are now ready to explore the convex geometry of the entropic sets. Let us first state
the fact that Γn and Σn are convex cones
Theorem 2.1 (Zhang and Yeung, [ZY97]; Pippenger, [Pip03]). The topological closure
of the set of classical entropy vectors, Σn, is a convex cone, and so is the closure of the
set of quantum entropy vectors, Γn.
Γn and Σn are called the quantum and classical entropy cones, respectively. As closed
convex cones, according to Lemma 2.3, they are completely characterized by their dual
cones. But what are these dual cones, Σ
◦
n and Γ
◦
n? Taking a closer look, we see that
they are the sets of valid entropy inequalities. As an example, let n = 2 and take
the subadditivity inequality, I(1 : 2) ≥ 0 for all ρ ∈ S (H1 ⊗H2). We can express
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this inequality as an inner product, (f, h(ρ)) ≥ 0, with f ∈ R4, f{1} = f{2} = 1 and
f{1,2} = −1.
For a general n-party quantum state ρ, note that by definition h(ρ) ∈ Γn ⊂ Γn. There-
fore, for any vector f ∈ Γ◦n,
0 ≤(f, h(ρ))
=
∑
I⊂[n]
fIH(ρI),
i.e. f defines a linear entropy inequality.
Theorem 2.1 shows that the closures of the entropic sets Σn and Γn have a simple
geometric structure. But nevertheless, these sets themselves could be quite complicated.
It turns out, however, that the only differences between the entropic sets and their
closures, i.e. the entropy cones, are situated on the boundary of the latter.
Theorem 2.4 (Matu´sˇ, Theorem 1 in [Mat07]). The relative interior of the entropy cones
Σn and Γn is contained in the coresponding entropic set, i.e.
ri(Σn) ⊂ Σn and
ri(Γn) ⊂ Γn.
Note that Theorem 1 in [Mat07] is stated for Σn only, but the proof given there works
for Γn as well.
2.1.2 The Shannon and von Neumann cones
In Chapter 1, we already came across some quantum entropy inequalities, the most
improtant of which is the strong subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy [LR73],
I(A : B|C) = H(AC) +H(BC)−H(ABC)−H(C) ≥ 0 (2.5)
for all tripartite quantum states ρABC . For an n party state ρ, there is therefore a
(strong) subadditivity inequality for any pair of nonempty subsets ∅ 6= I, J ⊂ [n],
(∆[I, J ], h(ρ)) :=I(I \ J : J \ I|I ∩ J)
=H(I) +H(J)−H(I ∪ J)−H(I ∩ J) ≥ 0. (2.6)
Another quantum entropy inequality is obtained when considering strong subadditivity
for a four party pure state ρABCD. Using the fact that the entropies of complementary
Entropy inqualities 27
marginals of a pure state are equal, i.e. H(AB) = H(CD), H(ACD) = H(B) etc., we
obtain
0 ≤I(B : D|C)
=H(BC) +H(CD)−H(BCD)−H(C)
=H(BC) +H(AB)−H(A)−H(C)
=H(B|A) +H(B|C). (2.7)
Because every mixed quantum state has a purification, this inequality, which is called
weak monotonicity, holds for arbitrary quantum states. For an n party quantum state
ρ, there hence is a weak monotonicity inequality for any pair of subsets I, J ⊂ [n] with
nonempty intersection,
(E[I, J ], h(ρ)) :=H(I ∩ J |I \ J) +H(I ∩ J |J \ I)
=H(I) +H(J)−H(I \ J)−H(J \ I) ≥ 0. (2.8)
The transformation that yields weak monotonicity from strong subadditivity is, in fact,
part of the Sn+1-symmetry of Γn that was described in [Maj14].
In the following we allow us at times to write I(A : B|C)h(ρ) := I(A : B|C)ρ etc. and
extend this notation to arbitrary vectors outside the quantum entropy region.
The entropy inequalities (2.6) and (2.8) are elements of Γ
◦
n, and hence their conic hull is
a subcone of Γ
◦
n. The closed convex cone Ξn ⊃ Γn such that Ξ◦n is the conic hull of the
vectors ∆[I, J ] and E[I, J ] for all suitable I, J ⊂ [n], is called the von Neumann cone.
Elements of Ξ◦n are called von Neumann type inequalities.
In the classical case, the monotonicity inequality, H(A|B)σ ≥ 0 for a classical state σAB,
implies and therefore replaces the weak monotonicity inequality (2.7). For an n party
classical state σ, for each pair of sets J ⊂ I ⊂ [n], there is a monotonicity inequality
(m[I, J ], h(σ)) :=H(I|J) ≥ 0. (2.9)
The closed convex cone Θn ⊃ Σn such that Θ◦n is the conic hull of the vectors ∆[I, J ]
and m[I, J ] for all suitable I, J ⊂ [n], is called the Shannon cone, elements of Θ◦n are
called Shannon type inequalities.
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2.1.3 Non-Shannon type and Non-von-Neumann type inequalities
While the Shannon type inequalities were proven by Claude Shannon in his seminal work
[Sha48] in 1948, and the strong subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy was proven
by Elliot Lieb and Mary Beth Ruskai in 1973 [LR73], it was not until 1997 that Zhen
Zhang and Raymond W. Yeung discovered the first non-Shannon type inequality [ZY97].
This inequality, however, does not hold unconditionally, but only under some additional
assumptions called “constraints”. In other words, this inequality only shows that some
part of the boundary of Θn is not part of Σn. A year later, the two authors discovered
an unconstrained non-shannon type inequality as well [ZY98], thereby showing that
Σn ( Θn.
While constrained non-von-Neumann type inequalities have been found by Noah Linden
and Andreas Winter [LW05] and Cadney et al. [CLW12], no unconstrained non-von-
Neumann type inequality is known to date, and hence the inclusion Γn ⊂ Ξn is not
known to be strict. In the following section we will formally define constrained and
unconstrained non-von-Neumann type inequalities. The constrained inequality for the
von Neumann entropy by Linden and Winter [LW05] will be explained in detail, as well
as the techniques used to prove it.
2.1.3.1 Constrained and unconstrained inequalities.
The Shannon and von Neumann type inequalities that we have seen in the last section
are all unconstrained, i.e. they hold for all entropy vectors. As mentioned above, the
first non-shannon type inequality, as well as the only known non-von-Neumann type
inequalities are constrained in the sense that they only hold for entropy vectors satis-
fying some aditional equations. More formally, a constrained non-von-Neumann type
inequality for n party quantum states is a tuple of k + 1 vectors f, g1, ..., gk ∈ R2n such
that the following holds. For all vectors v ∈ Γn with (gi, v) = 0 for i = 1, ..., k, the
inequality (f, v) ≥ 0 holds. Moreover, f 6∈ Ξ◦ + R{g1, ..., gk}. As such an inequality
can only possibly cut out a lower-dimensional slice of Γn, its existence is not enough to
conclude that Γn ( Ξn
An unconstrained non-von-Neumann inequality for n party quantum states, on the other
hand, is a vector f ∈ R2n such that f ∈ Γ◦n \ Ξ◦n, implying Γ◦n ) Ξ◦n. Dualizing, this
yields Γn ( Ξn, by Lemma 2.3.
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2.1.3.2 The Linden-Winter inequality and exact quantum Markov chains.
In [LW05] Linden and Winter prove the following constrained inequality for the von
Neumann entropy.
Theorem 2.5. Let ρABCD be a quadripartite quantum state such that I(C : A|B) =
I(C : B|A) = I(A : B|D) = 0. Then
I(C : D) ≥ I(C : AB), (2.10)
and this inequality is independent from the von Neumann type inequalities.
The proof relies heavily on a characterization result for exact quantum Markov chains,
i.e. tripartite quantum states ρABC such that I(A : C|B) = 0. In analogy to the notation
for classical Markov chains we say A − B − C is an exact quantum Markov chain in ρ,
if we want to emphasize which conditional quantum mutual information vanishes.
Theorem 2.6 (Hayden et al. [HJPW04]). Let ρABC be a tripartite quantum state that
is an exact quantum markov chain, i.e. I(A : C|B) = 0. Then there is an orthogonal
direct sum decomposition
HB =
k−1⊕
i=0
H
B
(i)
a
⊗H
B
(i)
c
(2.11)
such that
ρ =
k−1⊕
i=0
piρAB(i)a
⊗ ρ
B
(i)
c C
. (2.12)
for some probability distribution p = {pi}k−1i=0 and quantum states ρAB(i)a and ρB(i)c C .
It is instructive to put this decomposition into a form more intuitive to the (quantum)
information theorist. To this end, let Bγ be a quantum system with |Bγ | ≥ dimH(i)Bγ , and
V
(i)
γ ∈ Hom
(
H(i)Bγ ,HBγ
)
be an isometry, for all i = 0, ..., k−1 and γ = a, c. Furthermore,
let KB be a classical register with |KB| = k. Now we can define an isometry VB→KBBaBc
by setting VB→KBBaBc |ψ〉 = |i〉KB ⊗
[(
V
(i)
a ⊗ V (i)c
)
|ψ〉
]
for |ψ〉 ∈ H
B
(i)
a
⊗H
B
(i)
c
⊂ HB.
Applying this local isometry to the B system of ρABC as in the theorem yields
ρˆKBABaBcC = VB→KBBaBcρABC (VB→KBBaBc)
† =
k−1∑
i=0
pi |i〉〈i|KB ⊗ ρˆ
(i)
ABa
⊗ ρˆ(i)BcC , (2.13)
where ρˆ
(i)
ABa
= V
(i)
a ρAB(i)a
(
V
(i)
a
)†
, and ρˆ
(i)
BcC
is defined analogously.
Another way to look at the characterization Theorem 2.6 is, that the vanishing quantum
conditional mutual information I(A : C|B) implies that there exists a quantum channel
Entropy inqualities 30
RB→BC such that ρABC = RB→BC(ρAB), i.e. the system C can be recovered from B
alone when lost.
An important step in the proof of Theorem 2.5 as it appears in [LW05] is to observe
what Theorem 2.6 implies for a state ρABC where both A−B − C and B − A− C are
exact quantum Markov chains in ρ. In this case, using the isometry discussed above, ρ
can be assumed to have the form
ρKAKBAbAcBaBcC =
k−1∑
i=0
l−1∑
j=0
pij |i, j〉〈i, j|KAKB ⊗ ρ
(i,j)
AbBa
⊗ ρ(i)Ac ⊗ ρ
(j)
Bc
⊗ ρ(i,j)C . (2.14)
The fact that C is product with Ac and Bc given i, j follows from the fact that C can be
recovered from either A or B. The same argument shows that ρ
(i,j)
C can only depend on
i because of the Markov condition B −A−C, and at the same time it can only depend
on j because of the Markov condition A−B − C. Hence there exists an extension of ρ
to a register Kˆ such that
ρKAKBKˆC =
k−1∑
i=0
l−1∑
j=0
pij |k(i, j)〉〈k(i, j)|Kˆ |i, j〉〈i, j|KAKB ⊗ ρ
k(i,j)
C ,
and k(i, j) = f(i) = g(j) for some functions f and g. In other words, the register Kˆ can
be created locally from A as well as from B. Let us denote the two copies of Kˆ created
from A and B by KˆA and KˆB, respectively.
2.1.3.3 Other constrained inequalities for Γ4.
In [CLW12], the authors prove several additional families of constrained inequalities.
We record the ones that apply to the four party case here for comparison with the new
inequality that will be proven in the next section.
Theorem 2.7 (Cadney, Linden and Winter; three and four party versions of Theorems
1’, 5, 5’ [CLW12]). Let ρABCD be a four party quantum state with I(A : C|B) = I(B :
C|A) = 0. Then the inequalities
I(A : B|D) + I(A : B|CD) +H(D|ABC)− I(AB : C) ≥ 0 (2.15)
I(A : B|D) + I(A : B|C) + I(C : D)− I(C : AB) ≥ 0 (2.16)
I(A : B|D) + I(A : B|C) + I(A : B|CD)
+H(D) +H(C) +H(CD|AB)− 2I(AB : C) ≥ 0 (2.17)
2I(A : B|C) +H(C) +H(C|AB)− I(AB|C) ≥ 0 (2.18)
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hold.
Cadney et al. also exhibit the vector v ∈ R16 with components
I ∅ A B C D AB AC AD BC BD CD ABC
vI 0 5 5 2 4 6 5 5 5 5 6 6
I ABD ACD BCD ABCD
vI 6 5 5 4
.
Table 2.1
This vector respects all von Neumann type inequalities. Furthermore, it fulfils the
constraints of Theorem 2.5 and therefore also the constraints of Theorem 2.7. It also
respects the inequalities from the latter but it violates the inequality from the former
Theorem. This shows that inequality (2.10) is not implied by the inequalities in Theorem
2.7.
2.2 Generalized Linden Winter inequality
In [LW05], Linden and Winter make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 2.8. There exist constants κ1, κ2 and κ3 such that for all four party quan-
tum states ρABCD,
κ1I(A : C|B) + κ2I(B : C|A) + κ3I(A : B|D) + I(C : D)− I(C : AB) ≥ 0. (2.19)
Such an inequality could, were it true, be seen as a “robust version” of Theorem 2.5
in the sense that when the constraints are fulfilled approximately, then the inequality
(2.10) would only be violated by a little bit. Note that the conjectured inequality is
unconstrained, i.e. it would show that Γn ( Ξn.
The following theorem is a step towards proving Conjecture 2.8 in that it treats the case
of ρABCD with A−B − C and B −A− C exact quantum Markov chains.
Theorem 2.9. Let ρABCD be a four party quantum state with I(A : C|B) = I(B :
C|A) = 0. Then the inequality
I(C : AB) ≤ I(C : D) + I(A : B|D) (2.20)
holds, and is independent of the Shannon type inequalities as well as the inequalities
from Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 2.7.
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Proof. Let us first prove that the inequality holds. The constraints imply that the state
can be extended to the perfectly correlated registers KˆA and KˆB that are locally created
from A and B, respectively, as described below Equation (2.14). Let MA
A→AKˆA and
MB
B→BKˆB be the maps that create the registers KˆA and KˆB from A and B, respectively,
without disturbing the state ρABC . Define the state
σABCDKˆAKˆB = M
A ⊗MB(ρABCD). (2.21)
Note that ρABC = σABC as discussed above, but also ρCD = σCD, as M
A ⊗MB only
acts on the systems AB.
For the following argument, we reintroduce the notation of subscripts for entropic quan-
tities that indicate the state they are evaluated on. We begin by observing that
I(C : AB)ρ = I(C : AB)σ
= I(C : ABKA)σ
= I(C : KˆA)σ + I(C : AB|KˆA)σ
= I(C : KˆA)σ. (2.22)
The first equality holds because ρABC = σABC . The second equality is due to the fact
that the register KˆA can be created and discarded without disturbing ρABC = σABC .
The third equality is the chain rule (1.41), and the last equality follows from the fact
that C can be recovered from the register KˆA with respect to AB, i.e. AB − KˆA −C is
an exact quantum Markov chain in σ. We go on by bounding
I(C : KˆA)σ ≤ I(C : KˆAD)σ
= I(C : D)σ + I(C : KˆA|D)σ. (2.23)
The inequality is the alternative form of strong subadditivity (1.42), and the equality is
another application of the chain rule (1.41). The last term can be bounded further,
I(C : KˆA|D)σ = H(KˆA|D)σ −H(KˆA|CD)σ
≤ H(KˆA|D)σ, (2.24)
where the inequality is due to the fact that the conditional entropy of classical systems
is nonnegative, even when conditioning on a quantum system. For the last step, notice
that KˆA and KˆB are perfectly correlated, i.e. H(KˆA|S) = I(KˆA : KˆB|S) with respect
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to any conditioning system. Therefore we get
H(KˆA|D)σ = I(KˆA : KˆB|D)σ
≤ I(A : B|D)ρ (2.25)
by a final application of the data processing inequality (1.43). Putting together Equa-
tions (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), and (2.25) shows that the inequality (2.20) holds.
Let us now prove that the inequality is independent. Let v ∈ R16 be the vector in
Table 2.1 and v′ = h(|ψ〉〈ψ|C ⊗ σABD) for a pure state |ψ〉〈ψ|C and some state σ with
I(A : B|D)σ 6= 0. For ε > 0, w = v′ + εv′′ fulfills the constraints I(A : C|B)W =
I(B : C|A)W = 0. It also fulfils all inequalities from Theorem 2.7 and all von Neumann
type inequalities. This is because v does according to [CLW12], and v′ is an actual
quantum entropy vector fulfilling the constraints of Theorem 2.7. It also trivially fulfills
the constrained inequality from Theorem 2.5: it is not applicable, as w does not have
I(A : B|D)w = 0. On the other hand, it violates the inequality 2.20 for ε small enough,
showing that the latter is not implied by the other known inequalities.
Summary of Chapter 2
• A new constrained quantum entropy inequality, Equation (2.20) was proven.
• It is independent from previously known non-von-Neumann type inequalities, as
well as from the von Neumann type inequalities.
• The new inequality is a step towards proving the unconstrained quantum entropy
inequality that was conjectured in [LW05].

Chapter 3
One-shot quantum Shannon
theory
Quantum Shannon theory, the theory of quantum information transmission and quantum
data compression, is arguably the corner stone of quantum information theory. Starting
from the work of Alexander Holevo in the 70’s [Hol73, Hol79], quantum Shannon theory
in the setting of many independent, identically distributed copies of a resource (IID)
has been developed to an impressive extent. In recent years, there has been a rising
interest in the so called one-shot setting, where the theoretical challenge is to characterize
the resource requirements to carry out a certain task only once. This is particularly
interesting in the quantum case, as the first quantum information processing devices
capable of performing some of the protocols proposed by quantum Shannon theory are,
and will be, small scale and therefore not be able to approach the asymptotic regime.
In this chapter we will be concerned with two uniquely quantum topics in information
theory. The first one is the decoupling technique [HOW07]. Due to the existence and
equivalence of purifications and the Stinespring dilation (a kind of purification for maps),
this technique can be used to achieve optimal coding results by decoupling a quantum
system from a reference system it contains information about. In other words, the trans-
mission of the correlated parts of a quantum system is, counterintuitively, achieved by
finding a map that destroys these correlations. Here, catalytic decoupling, a general-
ization of this technique, is presented. This generalization is necessary to make the
decoupling technique fit for one-shot quantum Shannon theory, as the standard decou-
pling technique fails to give optimal protocols in this setting [BCT16, DH11]. Catalytic
decoupling on the other hand achieves optimal one-shot results in state merging, i.e.
quantum source coding with side information.
35
One-shot quantum Shannon theory 36
The second topic is quantum Teleportation [BBC+93]. In this protocol, quantum in-
formation can be transmitted from one party to another using only a classical commu-
nication channel and an entangled resource state that the two players share. Together
with superdense coding [BW92], it shows the interconvertibility of quantum and classical
communication, if one has a sufficient number of ebits at hand. A variant of quantum
teleportation is the task of port based teleportation. While regular teleportation requires
the receiver to perform a unitary correction operation, in port based teleportation he
only has to select one of several output ports, a classical operation. This task, however,
has steep resource requirements. The known protocols use an amount of entanglement
exponential in the size of the system that is teleported. This fact puts port based tele-
portation in the one-shot corner of quantum Shannon theory as well: this task becomes
harder when bundling many IID quantum systems into one larger system compared to
teleporting them one by one. Here we explore different approaches to bound the resource
requirements for port based teleportation from below, in the most general setting. As a
byproduct of efforts towards this goal, a lower bound on the size of the program register
for approximate universal programmable quantum processors is derived, as well.
3.1 Decoupling
In this section, the decoupling technique and its applications are described, as well as
the problems that arise when trying to apply it to one-shot quantum source coding
problems. Subsequently, the known results that overcome these difficulties are reviewed.
In Subsection 3.1.2, these techniques are unified and simplified into a new generalized
decoupling paradigm: catalytic decoupling.
3.1.1 Standard decoupling and one-shot coherent quantum state merg-
ing
3.1.1.1 Coherent quantum state merging
To understand how the decoupling technique is used in quantum information theory,
let us have a look at one of first problems where decoupling has been applied, coherent
quantum state merging, or fully quantum Slepian Wolf (FQSW) coding [ADHW09]. This
task can be described as follows. One player, Alice, wants to send a quantum system A
to another player, Bob, who already has a quantum system B that is possibly correlated
with A. Let their joint quantum state be ρAB. To do this, the two have a perfect qubit
quantum channel, that they want to use as few times as possible to complete the task.
To make sure that they do not cheat in that Bob just creates a fresh copy of ρAB locally
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and claims Alice had sent it, and because we cannot compare Alice’s initial and Bob’s
final copy of the A system directly, let ρABR be a purification of ρAB and imagine R in
the hands of a Referee. Now we require that the final state of a FQSW protocol is close
to the initial state, including the reference system R, except that Bob has both systems
A and B.
A trivial protocol is for Alice to send all of A, using the qubit channel log |A| times. But
this can be highly suboptimal. If, e.g., ρAB is pure, the protocol where Alice and Bob
discard their systems and Bob prepares a fresh copy of ρAB works, making no use of the
quantum channel at all. This is analogous to the classical Slepian Wolf coding scenario
when the two players have fully correlated random variables. The question is therefore:
How much quantum communication is necessary to complete the described task for a
given state ρAB, allowing for a small error ε > 0?
It is not necessary to specify at this point whether we are looking at the IID or one-shot
scenario, The following reasoning applies to both.
It turns out we can construct an optimal protocol using decoupling. A quantum channel
ΛA→A′ is said to ε-decouple A from R in ρAR, if P (ΛA→A′(ρAR), σA′ ⊗ σR) ≤ ε for some
quantum state σ. In most applications of decoupling, Λ is a unitary followed by either
a partial trace over a subsystem of A, or a projective measurement. For the purpose of
constructing a FQSW protocol, we will use the former.
Let ρABR be a pure state and Alice wants to send A to Bob who holds B. Looking at
the marginal ρAR, let HA ∼= HA1 ⊗ HA2 be a decomposition of A into two subsystems
and let UA be a unitary such that
P (ρˆA1R, σA1 ⊗ σR) ≤ ε, (3.1)
where ρˆA1A2R = UAρARU
†
A and therefore by the triangle inequality
P (ρˆA1R, σA1 ⊗ ρR) ≤ 2ε. (3.2)
Now consider the following protocol. Alice applies the unitary UA. Instead of applying
the partial trace over A2, she sends it to Bob. Now Alice’s and the referee’s joint state
is ρA1R. By Equation (3.2) and Uhlmann’s theorem, there exists a purification σA1A2BR
of σA1 ⊗ ρR such that
P (ρˆA1A2BR, σA1A2BR) ≤ 2ε. (3.3)
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But all purifications are isometrically equivalent, therefore there exists an isometry
VA2B→ABA1 such that
P
(
ρˆABRA1A1 , ηA1A1 ⊗ ρABR
)
≤ 2ε, (3.4)
where ρˆABRA1A1 = VA2B→ABA1 ρˆA1A2BR
(
VA2B→ABA1
)†
, and ηA1A1 is a purification of
σA1 . Therefore, to finish the protocol, Bob applies V , and the final state of the protocol,
ρˆ, is 2ε-close to the target state (plus a state ηA1A1 that Alice and Bob now share).
The communication cost of this protocol is log |A2|, as Alice sends the system A2 to
Bob. We call A2 the remainder system, and define a quantity R
ε(A : R)ρ which is the
logarithm of the minimal |A2| for ε-decoupling A from R in ρ. More formally, we make
the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Minimal remainder system sizes for standard decoupling). Let ρAE ∈
S(HA ⊗ HE) be a bipartite quantum state and 1 ≥ ε ≥ 0 an error parameter. The
minimal remainder system size Rε(A : E)ρ for decoupling A from E in ρAE up to an
error ε is defined as the minimal number r such that there exists a unitary UA ∈ U(HA)
and a decomposition HA ∼= HA1⊗HA2 with log |A2| = r, as well as states ωA1 ∈ S(HA1)
and ω˜E ∈ S(HE) with the following property:
P
(
trA2 (UA ⊗ 1E) ρAE
(
U †A ⊗ 1E
)
, ωA1 ⊗ ω˜E
)
≤ ε.
How small we can choose the remainder system, while still achieving decoupling? This
question is answered by decoupling theorems.
3.1.1.2 A standard decoupling theorem
For the one-shot scenario, Dupuis, Berta, Wullschleger and Renner have proven a de-
coupling theorem for general CPTP maps, for which the partial trace special case of the
partial trace can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3.2 (One-shot decoupling by partial trace, [DBWR14, BCR11, MBD+17]).
For a bipartite quantum state ρAB, let A = A1A2 be a decomposition such that
Rε(A : E)ρ .
1
2
(
Hε
′
max(A)ρ −Hε
′
min(A|E)ρ
)
with ε′ =
ε
5
. (3.5)
Then there exists a unitary UA such that
P (ρˆA1R, τA1 ⊗ ρR) ≤ ε. (3.6)
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The main proof technique that is used in decoupling theorems like the above is the
probabilistic method. Instead of exhibiting a unitary that achieves the desired task, it is
shown that a random protocol achieves the task on average. In the case of decoupling,
it is shown that applying a random unitary and subsequently taking the partial trace
over A2, yields a state which has distance at most ε from the desired product state on
average.
An important caveat about the above decoupling theorem is, that it achieves more than
what we asked for. With the application to FQSW in mind, we only ask for the final
state of the decoupling protocol being close to any product state. The above theorem,
however, also randomizes the remaining part of A. As a consequence, it requires A2 to
be large even for states ρAR = ρA ⊗ ρR that are already decoupled, if ρA is far from τA.
This means that the theorem yields a protocol for FQSW that can be highly suboptimal
depending on the input state. As an example, suppose ρABR = |0〉〈0|A⊗|0〉〈0|B⊗|0〉〈0|R.
There are no correlations present in this state whatsoever, Bob can just prepare a |0〉〈0|-
state and Alice discards hers. The protocol described above together with Theorem 3.2,
however, will use log |A|2 qubits of communication.
3.1.1.3 Optimal one-shot coherent quantum state merging
There are two works that overcome this problem. In [BCR11], Berta, Christandl and
Renner get around this problem by using embezzling states.
Definition 3.3 (Embezzling state [vDH03]). A state |µ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB is called a universal
(d, δ)-embezzling state if for any state |ψ〉 ∈ HA′ ⊗ HB′ with dimHA = dimHB ≤ d
there exist isometries Vψ,X : HX → HX ⊗HX′, X = A,B such that1
P (Vψ,A ⊗ Vψ,B |µ〉 , |µ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉) ≤ δ.
Such embezzling states exist for all parameters.
Proposition 3.4. [vDH03] Universal (d, δ)-embezzling states exist for all d and ε.
The quantum communication cost of coherent state merging is expressed in terms of a
Re´nyi version of the mutual information, the max-mutual information,
Iεmax(E : A)ρ := minρ¯
Imax(E : A)ρ¯ with (3.7)
Imax(E : A)ρ¯ := min
σA
Dmax(ρ¯AE‖σA ⊗ ρ¯E), . (3.8)
1The original concept was defined using the trace distance instead of the purified distance [vDH03].
We use the purified distance here as it fits our task, the definitions are equivalent up to a square according
to Equation (1.21).
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Here, the minimum in the first equation is taken over subnormalized states that are
ε-close to ρ, and the minimum in the second equation is taken over all quantum states
σA.
More precisely, Berta et al. prove the following theorem
Theorem 3.5 (Berta, Christandl and Renner, [BCR11]). Let ρABR be a quantum state,
where Alice has A, Bob has B and R is in the hands of a referee. Using a universal
(|A|, δ)-embezzling state, coherent state merging with error ε+ ε′+ δ|A|+ |A|−1/2 can be
achieved with communication cost
c =
1
2
Iε
′
max(A : R)ρ + 2 log
1
ε
+ log log |A|. (3.9)
Also, any protocol with error ε and communication cost
c <
1
2
Iεmax(A : R)ρ (3.10)
must fail.
Another work that overcomes the problem of suboptimality of Theorem 3.2 in the one-
shot setting is the work by Anshu, Devabathini and Jain [ADJ14]. The main topic of the
paper being quantum state redistribution, they tighten the above achievability result for
state merging in the following way as a side result.
Theorem 3.6 (Anshu, Devabathini and Jain, [ADJ14]). Let ρABR be a quantum state,
where Alice has A, Bob has B and R is in the hands of a referee. If arbitrary entangled
resource states between Alice and Bob are available, coherent quantum state merging with
error ε can be achieved with communication cost
c =
1
2
[Iεmax(R : A)ρ + log log I
ε
max(R : A)ρ] +O
(
log
1
ε
)
. (3.11)
To prove this result, they use a lemma called the convex split lemma.
Lemma 3.7 ([ADJ14]). Let ρ ∈ S(HA ⊗ HE) and σ ∈ S(HE) be quantum states,
k = Dmax(ρAE‖ρA ⊗ σE) and 0 < δ < 16 . Define
n =

1 k ≤ 3δ⌈
8·2k log( kδ )
δ3
⌉
else.
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(
UA ·U†A
)
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⊗
A1
Figure 2: Schematic representation of a) standard and b) catalytic decoupling: tracing
out a system A2 leaves the remaining state decoupled. While there is no ancilla for
standard decoupling as in a), catalytic decoupling as in b) allows to make use of an
additional, already decoupled system A′. The basic question is how large we have to
choose the system A2 such that the remaining system A1 is decoupled from E.
For the state
τAE1...En =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ρAEj ⊗
(
σ⊗(n−1)
)
Ejc
(3.12)
E is decoupled from A in the following sense:
I(A : E1...En)τ ≤ 3δ as well as P (τA ⊗ τE1...En , τAE1...En) ≤
√
6δ,
where Ejc denotes {Ei}i 6=j.
3.1.2 Catalytic decoupling
This section presents results that were obtained together with Mario Berta, Fre´de´ric
Dupuis, Renato Renner and my supervisor Matthias Christandl and were published in
[MBD+17]. Parts of this publication are used here unaltered.
3.1.2.1 Definition
A natural question to ask is if decoupling can be achieved more efficiently, using a
unitary and a partial trace, in the presence of an already uncorrelated ancilla system
(see Figure 2). We call this generalized notion of decoupling catalytic decoupling. This
generalization is inspired by both results on one-shot coherent quantum state merging,
[BCR11, ADJ14]. Indeed, in both works, the protocol uses a large amount of extra
entanglement, which is handed back almost unaltered. In the first work, i.e. Theorem
3.5, an embezzling state is needed, while applying Theorem 3.6 requires a purification of
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σ
⊗(n−1)
E from Lemma 3.7. The main contribution that the following results constitute is
not so much of a technical, but more of a conceptual nature. Catalytic decoupling unifies
the two mentioned techniques, and brings one-shot coherent quantum state merging
home into the set of problems that can be solved optimally using a decoupling theorem.
Let us formally define catalytic decoupling. We say that a bipartite quantum state
ρAE is ε-decoupled catalytically by the ancilla state σA′ and the partial trace map
TA¯→A1(·) = trA2 [·] with A¯ ≡ AA′ ∼= A1A2 if there exists unitary operation UA¯ such that,
min
ωA1⊗ωE
P
(TA¯→A1(UA¯ρA¯EU †A¯), ωA1 ⊗ ωE) ≤ ε (3.13)
where ρA¯E = ρAE ⊗ σA′ . (3.14)
Again, we call the A1-system the decoupled system and the A2-system the remainder
system. The term catalytic means that the share of the initially uncorrelated ancilla
system A′, that becomes part of the decoupled system A1, stays decoupled (see Figure
2).
Now we are interested in the minimal size of the remainder system A2 in order to achieve
ε-decoupling catalytically. We denote the minimal remainder system size for catalytically
decoupling A from E in a state ρAE by R
ε
c(A : E)ρ. Formally, we make the following
Definition 3.8 (Minimal remainder system size for catalytic decoupling). Let ρAE ∈
S(HA ⊗ HE) be a bipartite quantum state and 1 ≥ ε ≥ 0 an error parameter. The
minimal remainder system size Rεc(A : E)ρ for catalytically decoupling A from E in ρAE
up to an error ε is defined as the minimum over all finite-dimensional ancilla Hilbert
spaces HA′ and all ancilla states σA′ ∈ S(HA′) of the minimal remainder system size
for (standard) decoupling AA′ from E in ρAE ⊗ σA′. As a formula
Rεc(A : E)ρ = minσA′
Rε(AA′ : E)ρ⊗σ, (3.15)
where the minimum is taken over all quantum states on arbitrary finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces. The minimum in Equations (3.15) always exists. This is because any
remainder system size is the logarithm of an integer greater than or equal to one i.e. the
minimum is taken over a discrete set that is bounded from below (by zero). Clearly, we
have Rεc(A : E)ρ ≤ Rε(A : E)ρ, as we can always choose a trivial ancilla.
When arbitrary entangled resources are available, catalytic decoupling can be used to
devise a protocol for coherent quantum state merging in exactly the same way that
standard decoupling can. The only difference is, that Alice and Bob initially share
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a pure entangled resource state σA′B′ that is a purification of σA′ . The initial state
now being ρABR⊗σA′B′ where Alice holds systems AA′, Bob holds systems BB′ and the
referee has system R. Alice divides her system according to the subdivision AA′ = A1A2
as given by the catalytic decoupling protocol, applies the unitary UA¯ and sends system
A2 to Bob. Now the situation is exactly the same as at the corresponding stage in
the standard-decoupling-based protocol: The joint state of Alice and the referee is ε-
decoupled, and the overall state is still pure. Therefore Bob can use Uhlmann’s theorem
in the exact same way as before to find a decoding isometry and complete the coherent
state merging protocol.
3.1.2.2 Converse
As a first step, we want to prove a converse bound, showing in advance that the achiev-
ability results derived from the embezzling and the convex split technique are almost
optimal. To this end, we need a few lemmas about the max-mutual information.
The max-mutual information has a data processing inequality.
Lemma 3.9 (Lemma B.17 in [BCR11]). For all bipartite quantum states ρAB and quan-
tum channels ΛA→A′, ΓB→B′, the smooth max-mutual information fulfills the data pro-
cessing inequality
Imax(A : B)ρ ≥ Imax(A′ : B′)Λ⊗Γ(ρ). (3.16)
The max-mutual information is invariant under local isometries.
Lemma 3.10. For a bipartite quantum state ρAB and isometries VA→A′ , WB→B′,
Iεmax(A : B)ρ = I
ε
max(A
′ : B′)ρ˜,
where ρ˜A′B′ = V ⊗WρABV † ⊗W †.
Proof. The data processing inequality implies Iεmax(A : B)ρ ≥ Iεmax(A′ : B′)ρ˜. Now
define quantum channels ΛA′→A, ΓB′→B such that Λ(V XV †)=X and Γ(WYW †) = Y .
Using the data processing inequality for these maps as well implies Iεmax(A : B)ρ ≤
Iεmax(A
′ : B′)ρ˜.
Tensoring a local ancilla does not change the max-mutual information.
Lemma 3.11. Let ρAB, σC be quantum states. The smooth max-mutual information is
invariant under adding local ancillas,
Iεmax(A : B)ρ = I
ε
max(A : BC)ρ⊗σ.
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Proof. According to Lemma 3.16, the max-mutual information decreases under local
CPTP maps. Adding and removing an ancilla are such maps, which implies the claimed
invariance.
The max mutual information also has the non-locking property.
Lemma 3.12 (Lemma B.12 in [BCC+10]). For a tripartite quantum state ρABC ,
Iεmax(A : BC)ρ ≤ Iεmax(A : B)ρ + 2 log |C|. (3.17)
There are several ways to define the max-mutual information [CBR14], one of the alter-
native definitions will be useful for catalytic decoupling.
Definition 3.13. An alternative definition of the max-mutual information of a quantum
state ρAB is given by
Imax(A : B)ρ,ρ = Dmax(ρ‖ρA ⊗ ρB).
The smooth version Iεmax(A : B)ρ,ρ is defined analogously to I
ε
max(A : B)ρ,
Iεmax(A : B)ρ,ρ = min
ρ˜∈Bε(ρ)
Imax(A : B)ρ˜,ρ˜.
This alternative definition has some disadvantages, in particular the non-smooth ver-
sion is not bounded from above for a fixed Hilbert space dimension. The two different
smooth max-mutual informations, however, are quite similar, in particular they can be
approximated up to a dimension independent error.
Lemma 3.14 ([CBR14], Theorem 3). For a bipartite quantum state ρAB,
Iε+2
√
ε+ε′
max (A : B)ρ . Iε+2
√
ε+ε′
max (A : B)ρ,ρ . Iε
′
max(A : B)ρ, (3.18)
where the notation . hides errors of order log(1/ε).
We are now ready to prove the a converse bound for the minimal remainder system size
for catalytic decoupling.
Theorem 3.15. The minimal remainder system size for catalytic ε-decoupling is lower
bounded by half the smooth max-mutual information,
Rεc(A : E)ρ ≥
1
2
Iεmax(A : E)ρ (3.19)
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Proof. A catalytic decoupling protocol is specified by an ancilla state σA′ , a decomposi-
tion AA′ = A1A2 and a unitary UAA′ . The decoupling condition reads
P (ρˆA1E , γA1 ⊗ γE) ≤ ε (3.20)
for some quantum state γ, with ρˆ = V (ρ⊗ σ)V †. This implies Iεmax(A1 : E)ρˆ = 0, as
γA1 ⊗ γE is a point in the minimization that defines Iεmax(A1 : E)ρˆ. Now we bound
Iεmax(A : E)ρ =I
ε
max(AA
′ : E)ρ⊗σ
=Iεmax(AA
′ : E)ρˆ
≤Iεmax(A1 : E)ρˆ + 2 log |A2|
=2 log |A2|. (3.21)
In the first equality we have used Lemma 3.11, and Lemma 3.10 implies the second
equality. The inequality is Lemma 3.12, and the last equality is due to the decoupling
condition as discussed above. This finishes the proof.
3.1.2.3 Achievability
In the following we will show that the smooth max-information is achievable up to lower
order terms. In fact, we will give two proofs, one abstracted from each of the two state
merging results, Theorems 3.5 and 3.6. We begin with a proof based on the latter.
Theorem 3.16 (Catalytic decoupling). Let ρˆAE ∈ S(HA ⊗ HE) be a quantum state.
Then for any 0 < δ ≤ ε, catalytic decoupling with error ε can be achieved with remainder
system size
log |A2| ≤ 1
2
(
Iε−δmax(E : A)ρˆ +
{
log log Iε−δmax(E : A)ρˆ
}
+
)
+O(log 1
δ
),
where we define {x}+ to be equal to x if x ∈ R≥0 and 0 otherwise.
Proof. Let γ = ε − δ. Take ρ ∈ Bγ(ρˆ) such that Imax(E : A)ρ = Iγmax(E : A)ρˆ. Let σA
be the minimizer in
k = Imax(E : A)ρ = min
σA∈S(HA)
Dmax
(
ρAE
∥∥σA ⊗ ρE) .
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If k ≤ δ22 the state is already decoupled according to Lemma 3.7 and the statement is
trivially true, so let us assume k > δ
2
2 . We want to use Lemma 3.7 so let
n =
⌈
8 · 2k log ( kδ′ )
δ′3
⌉
with δ′ = δ
2
6 , HA′ = H
⊗(n−1)
A ⊗ HA¯ with HA¯ ∼= Cn and define the state ρ˜A(2)...A(n)A¯ =
σ⊗(n−1) ⊗ τA¯, where τA¯ = 1A¯/|A¯| denotes the maximally mixed state on HA¯. We can
now define a unitary that permutes the A-systems conditioned on A¯ and thus creates
an extension of the state τ from Equation (3.12) when applied to ρAE ⊗ ρ˜A′ ,
U
(1)
AA′ =
n∑
j=1
(1j)A(1)...A(n) ⊗ |j − 1〉〈j − 1|A ,
where (1j)A(1)...A(n) is the transposition (1j) ∈ Sn under the representation Sn # H⊗nA
of the symmetric group that acts by permuting the tensor factors, and (11) = 1Sn . Now,
we are almost done, as Lemma 3.7 implies that
P (ξEA(1)...A(n) , ξE ⊗ ξA(1)...A(n)) ≤ δ,
where ξ = U
(1)
AA′ρAE⊗ ρ˜A′
(
U
(1)
AA′
)†
. The register A¯, however, is still a factor of two larger
than the claimed bound for |A2|. We can win this factor of two by using superdense
coding, as A¯ is classical. Let us therefore slightly enlarge HA¯ such that dim(HA¯) = m2
for m = d√ne. We now rotate the standard basis of HM into a Bell basis
|ψkl〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
s=0
e
2piiks
m |s〉 ⊗ |s+ l mod m〉
of HA¯1 ⊗HA¯2 , with HA¯i ∼= Cm. That is done by the unitary
U
(2)
A¯
: HA¯ → HA¯1 ⊗HA¯2 with U
(2)
A¯
=
m−1∑
k,l=0
|ψkl〉〈mk + l| .
As trA¯2 |ψkl〉〈ψkl| = τA¯1 for all k, l ∈ {0, ...,m − 1}, the unitary VAA′→A1A2 = U
(2)
A¯
U
(1)
AA′
and the definitions HA2 = HA¯2 and HA1 = H⊗nA ⊗HA¯1 achieve P (ηA1E , ηA1 ⊗ ρE) ≤ δ,
with η = VAA′→A1A2ρ ⊗ ρ˜V †AA′→A1A2 . Using the triangle inequality for the purified
distance we finally arrive at
P
(
ξˆA1E , ηA1 ⊗ ρE
)
≤ γ + δ = ε,
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for ξˆ = VAA′→A1A2 ρˆ⊗ ρ˜V †AA′→A1A2 . The size of the remainder system is
log |A2| = 1
2
log n ≤ 1
2
(
Iγmax(E : A)ρˆ + {log log Iγmax(E : A)ρˆ}+
)
+O
(
log
1
δ
)
.
Using the alternative definition of the max-mutual information, Definition 3.13, and the
notation from the above theorem and proof, we can prove in the same way that
P (ξˆA1E , ηA1 ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε
with ξˆ = VAA′→A1A2 ρˆAE ⊗ ρ⊗nA V †AA′→A1A2 and η = VAA′→A1A2ρAE ⊗ ρ⊗nA V
†
AA′→A1A2 in
this case, and n defined in the same way as above, just with k = Iεmax(A : E)ρˆ,ρˆ. This
achieves a stronger notion of decoupling, as the catalyst can be approximately handed
back in the same state, except the A2 part, which is lost in the partial trace,
ηA1 = ρ
⊗n
A ⊗ τA¯1 .
By Lemma 3.14 this still implies
log |A2| = 1
2
log n
≤ 1
2
(
Iε−δmax(E : A)ρˆ,ρˆ +
{
log log Iε−δmax(E : A)ρˆ,ρˆ
}
+
)
+O
(
log
1
δ
)
≤ 1
2
(
Iε−2δ−2
√
δ
max (E : A)ρˆ +
{
log log Iε−2δ−2
√
δ
max (E : A)ρˆ
}
+
)
+O
(
log
1
δ
)
≤ 1
2
(
Iε−δ
′
max (E : A)ρˆ +
{
log log Iε−δ
′
max (E : A)ρˆ
}
+
)
+O
(
log
1
δ′
)
,
having defined δ′ = 2δ + 2
√
δ.
The second proof makes use of standard decoupling. The following standard decoupling
theorem is slightly different from Theorem 3.2 in that it has the non-smooth log |A| term
instead of the smooth max-entropy term, and is more convenient for the proof we are
about to commence.
Lemma 3.17. [BCR11, Theorem 3.1], [DBWR14, Table 2] Let ρAE ∈ S(HA ⊗HE) be
a quantum state. Then, there exists a decomposition HA ∼= HA1 ⊗HA2 with
log(|A2|) ≤ 1
2
(log(|A|)−Hmin(A|E)ρ) + 2 log 1
ε
+ 1,
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such that
P
(
ρA1E ,
1A1
|A1| ⊗ ρE
)
≤ ε.
The difference between the bound given here and the bound from [BCR11, Theorem 3.1]
stems from the fact that we define decoupling using the purified distance. We are now
ready for the alternative achievability proof for catalytic decoupling.
Theorem 3.18 (Non-smooth catalytic decoupling from standard decoupling and embez-
zling states). Let ρAE ∈ S(HA ⊗HE) be a quantum state. Then, ε-catalytic decoupling
can be achieved with remainder system size
log |A2|≤ 1
2
Imax(A;E)ρ + logH0(A)ρ +O
(
log
(
1
ε
))
.
In addition, if we allow for the use of isometries instead of unitaries, the ancilla system’s
final state is ε close to its initial state.
Proof. For notational convenience let |ρ〉AER be a purification of ρ. Also in slight abuse of
notation we replace HA by supp(ρA) so that |A| ≤ 2H0(A)ρ . The idea is to decompose the
Hilbert space HA into a direct sum of subspaces where the spectrum of ρA is almost flat.
Let Q =
⌈
log |A|+ 2 log (1ε)− 1⌉ and define the projectors Pi, i = 0, ..., Q+ 1 such that
PQ+1 projects onto the eigenvectors of ρA with eigenvalues in
[
0, 2−(Q+1)
]
and Pi projects
onto the eigenvectors of ρA with eigenvalues in
[
2−(i+1), 2−i
]
for i = 0, ..., Q. We can
now write the approximate state |ρ¯〉AER = 1√α(1A−PQ+1) |ρ〉AER , α = tr(1A−PQ+1)ρ
as a superposition of states with almost flat marginal spectra on A,
|ρ¯〉 =
∑√
pi |ρ(i)〉 ,
with pi = trρ¯Pi and |ρ(i)〉 = 1√piPi |ρ〉. This decomposition corresponds to the direct
sum decomposition
HA ∼=
Q+1⊕
i=0
HA(i) ,
where HA(i) = supp(Pi). Note that we have P (ρ, ρ¯) =
√
1− α and
1− α ≤ |A|2−(log |A|+2 log( 1ε)) = ε2,
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i.e. P (ρ, ρ¯) ≤ ε. Now, we have a family of states, {ρ(i)
A(i)E
} to each of which we apply
Lemma 3.17. This yields decompositions HA(i) ∼= HA(i)1 ⊗HA(i)2 such that
P
(
ρ
(i)
A
(i)
1 E
, τ
A
(i)
1
⊗ ρ(i)E
)
≤ ε (3.22)
and
log(|A(i)2 |) ≥
1
2
(
log(|A(i)|) +Hmin(A|E)ρ(i)
)
+ 2 log
(
1
ε
)
+ 1,
where τA =
1A
|A| is the maximally mixed state on a quantum system A.
At this stage of the protocol the situation can be described as follows. Conditioned on
i, A
(i)
1 is decoupled from E. If ρ
(i)
E 6= ρ(j)E and
∣∣A(i)∣∣ 6= ∣∣A(j)∣∣ however, there are still
correlations left between A1 and E. To get rid of this problem, we hide the maximally
mixed states of different dimensions in an embezzling state by “un-embezzling” them.
Let us therefore first isometrically embed all these states in the same Hilbert space. To
do that, define
d2 = max
i
∣∣∣A(i)2 ∣∣∣ and d1 = max
(
max
i
∣∣∣A(i)1 ∣∣∣ ,
⌈∣∣A(Q+1)∣∣
d2
⌉)
.
Now, let HA˜α ∼= Cdα and choose isometries U
(α,i)
A
(i)
α →A˜α
for α = 1, 2, define U
(i)
A(i)→A˜1⊗A˜2 =
U
(1,i)
A
(i)
1 →A˜1
⊗ U (2,i)
A
(i)
2 →A˜2
for i = 1, ..., Q. In addition, choose an isometry UQ+1
A(Q+1)→A˜1⊗A˜2 .
Let |µ〉A′B′ ∈ HA′ ⊗HB′ be a (d1, ε)-embezzling state, and let σA′ = trB′ |µ〉〈µ|. Define
the isometries V¯
(i)
A′→A′A˜1 that would embezzle a state
τ
(i)
A˜i
= U
(1,i)
A
(i)
1 →A˜1
τ
A
(i)
1
(
U
(1,i)
A
(i)
1 →A˜1
)†
from σA′ . Taking some state |0〉A˜1 ∈ HA˜1 we can pad these embezzling isometries to
unitaries V
(i)
A′A˜1
such that
P
(
V
(i)
A′A˜1
σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1
(
V
(i)
A′A˜1
)†
, σA′ ⊗ τ (i)A˜i
)
≤ ε. (3.23)
We can combine the above isometries and unitaries now to un-embezzle the states that
are approximately equal to τ
A
(i)
1
conditioned on i. Define A˜3 ∼= CQ+1 and
W I
A→A˜1A˜2A˜3 =
∑
i
U
(i)
A(i)→A˜1⊗A˜2Pi ⊗ |i〉A˜3 , W
II
A′A˜1A˜3
=
∑
i
(
V
(i)
A′A˜1
)† ⊗ |i〉〈i|A˜3 .
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The final state of our decoupling protocol is
ρfA1A2E = W
IIW IρAE ⊗ σA′
(
W I
)† (
W II
)†
,
where we omitted the subscripts on the W s for compactness and have defined A1 = A
′A˜1
and A2 = A˜2A˜3. Let us show that this protocol actually decouples A1 from E. We
bound, omitting the subscripts on unitaries and isometries,
P
(
ρfA1E , σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
=
∑
i
piP
((
V (i)
)†
U (1,i)σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
(
U (1,i)
)†
V (i), σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
=
∑
i
piP
(
U (1,i)σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
(
U (1,i)
)†
, V (i)σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1 ⊗ ρE
(
V (i)
)† )
≤
∑
i
piP
(
U (1,i)σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
(
U (1,i)
)†
, σA′ ⊗ τ (i)A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
+
∑
i
piP
(
σA′ ⊗ τ (i)A˜1 ⊗ ρE , V
(i)σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1 ⊗ ρE
(
V (i)
)† )
≤
∑
i
piP
(
U (1,i)σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
(
U (1,i)
)†
, σA′ ⊗ τ (i)A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
+ ε.
The first inequality is the triangle inequality, the second one is Equation (3.23). It
remains to bound the first summand,
∑
i
piP
(
U (1,i)σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
(
U (1,i)
)†
, σA′ ⊗ τ (i)A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
=
∑
i
piP
(
σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
, σA′ ⊗
((
U (1,i)
)†
τ
(i)
A˜1
U (1,i)
)
⊗ ρE
)
=
∑
i
piP
(
σA′ ⊗ ρ(i)
A
(i)
1 E
, σA′ ⊗ τA˜(i)1 ⊗ ρE
)
≤
∑
i
piP
(
ρ
(i)
A
(i)
1 E
, τ
A˜
(i)
1
⊗ ρE
)
≤ε,
where the first inequality is the triangle inequality again, and the second one is Equation
(3.22). This shows that we achieved 2ε-decoupling, i.e.
P
(
ρfA1E , σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
≤ 2ε. (3.24)
We also have to bound log |A2|, i.e. we need to make sure that
max
i=1,...,Q
(
H0(A)ρ(i) −Hmin(A|E)ρ(i)
)
≤ Imax(E;A)ρ +O
(
log
(
1
ε
))
.
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This is shown in [BCR11] in the last part of the proof of Theorem 3.10. Thereby the
size of the remainder system is bounded by
log |A2| = 1
2
Imax(A;E)ρˆ + logH0(A)ρˆ +O
(
log
(
1
ε
))
.
If we only want to use unitaries, we can complete all involved isometries to unitaries by
adding an appropriate additional pure ancilla system.
As an easy corollary we can derive a bound on the remainder system that involves the
smooth max-mutual information.
Theorem 3.19 (Catalytic decoupling). Let ρˆAE ∈ S(HA ⊗ HE) be a quantum state.
Then, ε-catalytic decoupling can be achieved with remainder system size
log |A2|≤ 1
2
Iε−δmax(A;E)ρ + logH0(A)ρ +O
(
log
(
1
δ
))
.
In addition, if we allow for the use of isometrics instead of unitaries, the ancilla systems
final state is ε close to its initial state.
Proof. Let ρˆ ∈ Bη(ρ) with η = ε− δ such that
Iηmax(A : E)ρ = Imax(A : E)ρˆ. (3.25)
Define ρ′ = ΠρˆΠ, where Π is the orthogonal projector onto the support of ρ. It follows
from Uhlmann’s theorem that P (ρ, ρ′) ≤ P (ρ, ρˆ). As the max-mutual information is
non-increasing under projections (cf. [BCR11, Lemma B.19]), it follows that
Iηmax(A : E)ρ = Imax(A : E)ρ′ (3.26)
as well. Applying Theorem 3.18 to ρ′ and an application of the triangle inequality yields
the claimed bound.
If we accept a slightly worse smoothing parameter for the leading order term, i.e. the
max-mutual information, we can smooth the second term as well and replace the Re´nyi-0
entropy by the max-entropy.
Corollary 3.20. Let ρAE ∈ S(HA ⊗HE) be a quantum state. Then, ε-catalytic decou-
pling can be achieved with remainder system size
log |A2|≤ 1
2
Iε
′
max(A;E)ρ + logH
ε′2/2
max (A)ρ +O(log ε′),
where ε′ = ε/6.
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Proof. To get the bound involving smooth entropy measures we will find a state ρˆ ∈
B2ε′(ρ) such that Imax(E;A)ρˆ ≤ Iε′max(E;A)ρ and H0(A)ρˆ ≤ Hε
′2/2
0 (A)ρ. Let ρ
′
AE ∈
Bε′(ρAE) such that Imax(E;A)ρ′ = I
ε′
max(E;A)ρ. Let ΠA be a projection of minimal
rank such that H
ε′2/2
0 (A)ρ ≥ H0(A)ρ′′ , with ρ′′ = ΠAρAEΠA ∈ Bε′(ρAE). To see why
such a projection exists, note that Lemma 1.9 implies that there exists a state ρ′′A such
that
H0(A)ρ′′A = H
ε′,tr
0 (A)ρ ≤ Hε
′2/2
0 (A)ρ (3.27)
and [ρA, ρ
′′
A] = 0, where the inequality is due to the Fuchs van de Graaf inequality.
For the case of commuting density matrices, i.e. the classical case, it is clear that the
density matrix in a given trace distance neighborhood of ρ, that has minimal rank, is
just equal to ρ with the smallest eigenvalues set to zero. This implies that ρ′′A can be
chosen to have the form ρ′′A = ΠAρAΠA. It is easy to see that P (ρAE , ρ
′′
AE) ≤ ε′ where
ρ′′AE = ΠAρAEΠA: Pick a purification |ρ′′〉AER = ΠA |ρ〉AER and observe that
F (ρAE , ρ
′′
AE) = max|σ〉AER
∣∣〈σ〉 ρ′′∣∣ = max
|σ〉AER
|〈σ|Π |ρ〉| = trΠρ = F (ρA, ρ′′A),
where the fist equation is Uhlmann’s theorem and the third equation follows from the
saturation of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. We also use that [ρA, ρ
′′
A] = 0 in the last
equation. Now, we define ρˆ = ΠAρ
′ΠA and bound
P (ρˆAE , ρAE) =P (ΠAρ
′
AEΠA, ρAE)
=P (ρ′AE ,ΠAρAEΠA)
=P (ρ′AE , ρ
′′
AE) ≤ P (ρ′AE , ρAE) + P (ρAE , ρ′′AE) ≤ 2ε′. (3.28)
The second equation follows easily by Uhlmann’s theorem. According to [BCR11,
Lemma B.19] the max-mutual-information decreases under projections, i.e. we have
Imax(E;A)ρˆ ≤ Imax(E;A)ρ′ = Iε′max(E;A)ρ.
Our choice of ΠA gives
H
ε′2/2
0 (A)ρ ≥ H0(A)ρ′′A = log rk(ΠA) ≥ H0(A)ρˆ,
where the first inequality is Equation (3.27). Now, we apply Theorem 3.18, to ρˆAE . Let
ρ
(f)
A1A2E
be the final state when applying the resulting protocol to ρAE . Then, we get
P
(
ρ
(f)
A1E
, σA′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A˜1 ⊗ ρE
)
≤ 6ε′
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by using Equations (3.28), (3.24) , the triangle inequality and the monotonicity of the
purified distance under CPTP maps.
3.1.2.4 Equivalence between catalytic decoupling and catalytic erasure of
correlations
Before the conception of the decoupling technique as we know it, Groisman, Popescu
and Winter proposed an operational interpretation of the quantum mutual information
[GPW05]. They show, that the quantum mutual information I(A : B) is equal to the
rate of noise that has to be applied to a system A in the form of a random unitary
channel to render it independent from B.
We begin by formally define what we mean by a random unitary channel.
Definition 3.21. A CPTP map Λ : End (H) → End (H) is called a random unitary
channel, or a mixture of N unitaries, if it has a Kraus representation where all N Kraus
operators are multiples of unitaries, i.e.
Λ(X) =
N∑
i=1
piUiXU
†
i . (3.29)
The results from [GPW05] concern the asymptotic setting, i.e. the case where the task
is to efficiently locally erase the correlations in the limit of many IID copies of a state
ρAB, and can be summarized in the following way:
Theorem 3.22 (Local erasure of correlations, [GPW05]). Let ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗HB) be a
bipartite quantum state. For all ε > 0 there exists n ∈ N and a mixture of N unitaries
Λ : End
(H⊗nA )→ End (H⊗nA ) with logN ≤ n(I(A : B)ρ + ε) such that∥∥Λ⊗ idBnρ⊗nAB − Λρ⊗nA ⊗ ρ⊗nB ∥∥1 ≤ ε. (3.30)
Conversely, if Λ′ : End (HA′) → End (HA′) is a mixture of N ′ unitaries such that it
ε-decorrelates a state ρ′ ∈ S(HA′ ⊗HB′), i.e.
‖Λ⊗ idB′σA′B′ − ΛρA′ ⊗ ρB′‖1 ≤ ε, (3.31)
then
logN ≥ I(A′ : B′)σ + 3ε log |A′|+ 1. (3.32)
It turns out that the tasks of decoupling and the local erasure of correlations using
mixtures of unitaries are equivalent as soon as we allow for ancillas, which provides a
one shot generalization of the above result.
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Theorem 3.23. The correlations of a state ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗ HB) can be erased by a
mixture of N ≤ 22k unitaries up to an error of ε if and only if ε-decoupling is possible
with remainder system size log |A2| ≤ k, if we allow appending an ancilla system in an
arbitrary product state to A in both tasks.
Proof. First assume that we have a mixture of 22k unitaries
Λ : End (HA) → End (HA)
X 7→
22k∑
i=1
piUiXU
†
i (3.33)
that ε-decorrelates A from B. Now take an ancilla state
ρ˜M =
22k∑
i=1
pi |i〉〈i| ∈ S(HM ), HM = C2k (3.34)
and define the controlled unitary
U =
22k∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ |i〉〈i| . (3.35)
This unitary achieves decoupling in the sense that
‖ξAB − ξA ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ ε, with
ξABM = UρAB ⊗ σMU †. (3.36)
But M is classical, so we can apply superdense coding as in the proof of Theorem 3.16
to split HM ∼= HM ′ ⊗HM ′′ such that∥∥∥∥ξABM ′ − ξA ⊗ ρB ⊗ 1|M ′|1M ′
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε, (3.37)
with log |M ′′| ≤ k.
Conversely assume that we have an ancilla ρ˜T and a unitary UAT→A1A2 such that
‖ξA1B − ξA1 ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ ε (3.38)
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where ξA1A2B = UAT→A1A2ρAB ⊗ ρ˜TU †AT→A1A2 and log |A2| ≤ k. Let |A2| = N . We
define the generalized pauli operators
Σ =
N∑
j=0
e
2piij
N |j〉〈j|
Ξ =
N∑
j=0
|j〉〈(j + 1) mod N | (3.39)
on HA2 . A short calculation shows that
1
N2
N−1∑
i,j=0
ΞiΣjXΣ−jΞ−i = tr(X)1A2 (3.40)
for any X ∈ End (HA2) and therefore the mixture of N2 unitaries
Λ : HA ⊗HT → HA1 ⊗HA2
X 7→ 1
N2
N−1∑
i,j=0
VijXV
†
ij ,
Vij =
(
1A1 ⊗ ΞiΣj
)
UAT→A1A2 (3.41)
ε-decorrelates AT from B.
Corollary 3.24 (Catalytic erasure of correlations). The correlations of a state ρAB
can be erased catalytically up to an error ε by locally acting on A with a mixture of N
unitaries, with
logN ≤ Iεmax(E : A)ρˆ + (log log Iεmax(E : A)ρˆ)+ +O(log ε). (3.42)
3.2 Bounds on the resource requirements of port based
teleportation
Port based teleportation [IH08, IH09] is a variant of quantum teleportation, where the
receiver, instead of applying a non-trivial correction unitary, only has to select one
of several output ports. While having tremendous resource requirements compared to
standard teleportation, it has some advantages. First, one can imagine a receiver that,
while being able to make use of a certain piece of quantum information, is incapable
of Pauli computation on his register. Then port based teleportation can still be used,
as selecting one of many pieces of memory is a classical operation. But second, and
more importantly, port based teleportation has a kind of covariance property : If Bob
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wants to apply any operation to the output of the teleportation protocol, he can do so
before Alice has even started sending it, by just applying the operation to every output
port. Because of this property, port based teleportation is useful for instantaneous non-
local computation [BK11] and, using the resulting instantaneous non-local computation
protocol, for breaking any scheme for position-based quantum cryptography [BCF+14].
A disadvantage of PBT is, that it cannot be done perfectly with finite resources, i.e. any
PBT protocol, in practice, has to be approximate.
A protocol for port based teleportation was given in the original work by Satoshi Ishizaka
and Tohya Hiroshima [IH08, IH09], a proof for achievability for all input dimensions was
given in [BK11]. The error bounds given in these works, are, however, given in terms
of the entanglement fidelity, while channel simulation tasks are most naturally defined
using a worst case error measure.2
Furthermore, the protocol for port-teleporting a d-dimensional quantum state that was
exhibited in [IH08] uses many maximally entangled states as a resource. Also it can
be shown that optimizing Alice’s measurement for the port based teleportation task is
equivalent to a state discrimination problem when using the entanglement fidelity as
a figure of merit. In the protocol from [IH08], the pretty good measurement (PGM)
[Hol78, HW94], also called square root measurement, is employed. There are, however,
only few situations where the PGM is known to be optimal, and the “pretty good”
property [BK02] is not enough to conclude any optimality property for port based tele-
portation in arbitrary dimensions. An important question is therefore, whether the
resource requirements can be significantly reduced if a more general resource state and
the optimal measurement are used.
In the following sections, port based teleportation and its relation to universal pro-
grammable processors will be introduced. The symmetries of the port based telepor-
tation problem are explored, leading to a diamond norm error bound for the standard
protocol for PBT. Then different techniques for finding lower bounds on the number of
ports are explored, that are necessary to achieve port based teleportation with a given
error ε. As a side result, a new lower bound on the dimension of the program register
of an ε-approximate universal programmable quantum processor is proven.
3.2.1 Port Based teleportation
Let us first formally define the task of standard teleportation. We give a slightly gener-
alized definition that highlights the task that has to be achieved, allows for errors and
2As clear already from the title of Bennett et al.’s seminal paper [BBC+93], teleportation is about
transfering unknow quantum states.
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thereby prepares the definition of port based teleportation.
Definition 3.25 (Teleportation, [BBC+93]). A (d, ρA′B′ , ε)-teleportation protocol is a
protocol that simulates the identity channel id ∈ End (End (Cd)) with diamond norm
error ε, using the resource state ρA′B′ as well as local operations and classical commu-
nication (LOCC).
The standard protocol for (2, |φ+〉〈φ+| , 0)-teleportation is well known and described for
example in [NC00]. It can be roughly described in a few sentences. Alice makes a joint
measurement on the input qubit and her part of the resource state. Her measurement
consists of the projectors onto the elements of the so called Bell basis, {|φ+〉 , |φ−〉 , |ψ+〉 , |ψ−〉},
where |φ−〉 = σz ⊗ 1 |φ+〉, |ψ+〉 = σx ⊗ 1 |φ+〉, |ψ−〉 = σxσz ⊗ 1 |φ+〉, and σi, i = x, y, z
are the Pauli matrices. She sends the outcome to Bob, who then applies 1, σz, σx, or
σzσx, respectively, depending on the measurement outcome he gets from Alice. As a
result, Alice succeeds in sending one qubit to Bob using 2 bits of classical communication
and one ebit of entanglement.
In some sense the dual protocol to teleportation is superdense coding [BW92]. In this
protocol, Alice can send 2 classical bits using one ebit and one qubit of quantum commu-
nication. While teleportation uses classical communication and entanglement to imple-
ment an ideal quantum channel, superdense coding does the opposite: it uses quantum
communication and entanglement to implement an ideal classical channel.
The optimality of the error-free protocol for quantum teleportation can be seen by, e.g.
assuming the existence of an improved protocol, concatenating it with superdense coding
and using the non-locking inequality for the quantum mutual information,
I(A : BC)ρ ≤ I(A : B)ρ + 2 logC. (3.43)
In Subsection 3.2.4, we will prove a lower bound on the classical communication required
for imperfect teleportation.
A family of teleportation tasks can be defined by restricting the set of local operations
that Bob can perform on his part of the entangled resource.
Definition 3.26 (Generalized [SHO13] and port based teleportation [IH08, IH09]). Let
HA, HA′ and HB′ be finite dimensional Hilbert spaces, and G ⊂ CPT PB′→A. An
(|A|, ρA′B′ , ε)-G-teleportation protocol is a protocol, where Alice initially has an input
register HA and the A′ register of a resource state ρA′B′, while Bob has B′. Now Alice
performs a measurement on her systems and sends a classical message to Bob. If Bob can
now apply a channel U ∈ G such that the whole protocol simulates the identity channel
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idA up to diamond norm error ε, the protocol is successful. The size of the message is
called the communication cost of the protocol.
The special case of HB′ = H⊗NB and G = {trBic |i = 1, ..., N} is called port based
teleportation (PBT). The systems Bi are called ports. The task of port-teleporting a
d-dimensional quantum system with error ε is denoted (d, ε)-port based teleportation.
Note that in the case of port based teleportation, the only information that Bob can
actually use is which output port to choose. Also if a certain port is never chosen, it
can be removed from the resource state. This implies, that the communication cost is
equal to the logarithm of the number of ports c = logN . A protocol for port based
teleportation with input register A and N ports is completely specified by a resource
state ρA′BN and an N -outcome POVM {(Ei)A0A′}Ni=1. The quantum channel resulting
from the protocol is
ΛA0→B(XA) =
N∑
i=1
trA0A′Bic (Ei)A0A′ (XA0 ⊗ ρA′BN ) . (3.44)
Here, Bic = B1...Bi−1Bi+1...BN denotes all B systems except the ith one, and it is
understood that Bi is renamed for B in each summand.
A variant of PBT is probabilistic PBT, where the goal is to teleport a state perfectly
but allowing for a certain failure probability. This thesis is exclusively concerned with
the deterministic task.
port based teleportation has been shown to be achievable for all dimensions and arbi-
trarily small nonzero error.
Theorem 3.27 (Achievability of port based teleportation, [IH08, IH09, BK11]). Let
d ∈ N and ε > 0. Then there exists a port based teleportation protocol that achieves an
entanglement fidelity of F =
√
1− ε2 for N =
⌈
d2
ε2
⌉
.
See [BK11] for a proof of this theorem. Note the difference of a square root between our
definition of the entanglement fidelity and the one in [BK11]. The explicit protocol this
result is based on uses N maximally entangled states as a resource. The expression for
the entanglement fidelity of the resulting protocol can be related to a state discrimination
problem, which is solved using the pretty good measurement. In the following sections
we will prove that the above achievability result can be strengthened to give error bounds
in terms of the diamond norm, using the same protocol.
One-shot quantum Shannon theory 59
3.2.2 The symmetries of port based teleportation
A priori, one can imagine that the optimal port based teleportation protocol uses a com-
plicated resource state and a complicated POVM on Alice’s side. Intuitively, however,
the symmetries of the problem should help: A port based teleportation protocol should
work equally well for all input states, so there should be a unitary symmetry in the
problem. Also it is not important at which of the N ports Bob receives the message, i.e.
one should be able to choose the resource state invariant under permutations. In this
subsection we prove precise statements reflecting these facts.
Let us begin by proving a Lemma about purifications of quantum states with a given
symmetry. The special case for the standard representation of SN on
(
Cd
)⊗N
of this
lemma was used in [CKMR07].
Lemma 3.28. Let ρA be a quantum state that is invariant under a unitary representation
φ of a group G. Then there exists a purification |ρ〉〈ρ|AA′ such that |ρ〉AA′ is invariant
under φ⊗ φ∗, where φ∗ is the dual representation of φ, i.e. φ∗(g) = φ(g).
Proof. This lemma follows easily from the mirror lemma. We show that |ρ〉AA′ =
ρ
1/2
A |φ+〉AA′ is invariant under φ ⊗ φ∗. As φ is a unitary representation, the invari-
ance of ρA implies the invariance of f(ρ)A for all functions f : [0, 1] → R, in particular
ρ
1/2
A is invariant. Therefore we get
φ(g)A ⊗ φ(g)A′ |ρ〉AA′ =φ(g)A ⊗ φ(g)A′ρ1/2A |φ+〉AA′
=φ(g)Aρ
1/2
A φ(g)
†
A |φ+〉AA′
=ρ
1/2
A |φ+〉AA′
= |ρ〉AA′ . (3.45)
Here we have used the mirror lemma in the second row and the invariance of ρ
1/2
A in the
third row.
We also need the concept of ε-coverings.
Definition 3.29. Let (X, d) be a metric space. A subset D ⊂ X is called ε-covering, if
for all x ∈ X there exists a y ∈ D such that d(x, y) ≤ ε.
If X is compact as a topological space, there exists a finite ε-cover for every ε > 0. An
example is the unitary group U(HA) with the metric induced by the operator norm. In
this case, an ε-covering can be used to approximate the Haar twirl.
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Lemma 3.30. Let D ⊂ U(HA) be an ε-covering of U(HA). Let ν : U(HA) → D
be a function such that ‖ν(U) − U‖∞ ≤ ‖V − U‖∞ for all V ∈ D, M(V ) =
{
U ∈
U(HA)|ν(U) = V
}
and p(V ) = µ(M(V )), where µ is the Haar measure on U(HA)
normalized to one. Then the N -twirl
T (N)D (X) =
∑
V ∈D
p(V )V ⊗NX
(
V †
)⊗N
(3.46)
constructed from D is 2Nε-close to the Haar N -twirl
T (N)Haar(X) =
∫
U(HA)
U⊗NX
(
U †
)⊗N
dU (3.47)
in diamond norm.
Proof. We bound∥∥∥T (N)D (ρAB)− T (N)Haar(ρAB)∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥∑
V ∈D
p(V )V ⊗NX
(
V †
)⊗N − ∫
U(HA)
U⊗NX
(
U †
)⊗N
dU
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
U(HA)
(
ν(U)ρAB
(
ν(U)†
)⊗N − U⊗NX (U †)⊗N) dU∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∫
U(HA)
∥∥∥∥ν(U)ρAB (ν(U)†)⊗N − U⊗NX (U †)⊗N∥∥∥∥
1
dU
≤
∫
U(HA)
(∥∥∥∥(ν(U)⊗N − U⊗N) ρAB (ν(U)†)⊗N∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥U⊗NρAB ((ν(U)†)⊗N − (U †)⊗N)∥∥∥∥
1
)
dU
≤
∫
U(HA)
(∥∥ν(U)⊗N − U⊗N∥∥∞ ∥∥∥∥ρAB (ν(U)†)⊗N∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥U⊗NρAB∥∥1 ∥∥∥∥(ν(U)†)⊗N − (U †)⊗N∥∥∥∥∞
)
dU
≤2Nε. (3.48)
The first two inequalities are due to the triangle inequality for the trace norm, and the
third inequality is Ho¨lder’s inequality.
Now we can prove that any protocol for port based teleportation can be transformed
into one that uses a resource state that is invariant under permutations of the ports as
well as under the unitary action U⊗N ⊗ U⊗N .
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Proposition 3.31. Let ρA′BN be the resource state of an (d, ρA′BN , ε)-PBT protocol,
where d = |B|. Let further HA ∼= HB. Then there is another protocol performing at
least as good as the original one, that uses a resource state |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN with |ψ〉ANBN ∈∨N (HA ⊗ HB) that is a purification of a symmetric Werner state, i.e. in addition to
the SN -invariance it is invariant under U
⊗N ⊗ U⊗N ,
U⊗N ⊗ U⊗N |ψ〉ANBN = |ψ〉ANBN ∀U ∈ U(HA). (3.49)
Proof. Let ρ˜ABN IR be a purification of the state
ρ˜ABN I =
∑
τ∈SN
τBNρABN τ
†
BN
⊗ |τ〉〈τ |I , (3.50)
where τBN is the standard action of SN on H⊗NB that permutes the tensor factors. As
ρ˜BN is permutation invariant, according to Lemma 3.28 there exists another purification
|ψ〉 ∈ ∨N (HA⊗HB). But all purifications are equivalent, therefore the following protocol
achieves the same performance than the preexisting one: Alice and Bob start sharing
|ψ〉ANBN as an entangled resource. Alice applies the isometry that creates ρ˜ABN IR from
ψ, then she measures I in the standard basis. Suppose the outcome is τ . Then she
goes on to execute the original protocol, except that she applies τ to the index she is
supposed to send to Bob after her measurement, which obviously yields the same result
as the original protocol.
Let now D ⊂ U(HB) be a δ-net. Using the same technique as for the symmetric group,
we begin by defining the state vector
|ψ′〉JANBN =
∑
V ∈ D
√
p(V ) |V 〉J ⊗ V ⊗NB |ψ〉ANBN , (3.51)
with HJ = CD. Let |ψ′′〉ANBN be another purification of ψ′BN . As before, there is a
protocol for port based teleportation using the resource state |ψ′′〉〈ψ′′|ANBN . First, Alice
applies the isometry that transforms ψ′′
ANBN
into ψ′
JANBN
. Then she measures J in the
computational basis. On outcome V , she applies V † to her input state and proceeds
with the initial protocol. This modified protocol achieves the same error ε.
Let (δn)n∈N be a sequence such that δn > 0 for all n and limn→∞ δn = 0. For each
n, the above gives a new protocol using a resource state
∣∣ψ(n)〉〈ψ(n)∣∣
ANBN
such that
‖ψ(n)
BN
− T (n)Haar(ψBN )‖1 ≤ 2Nδn. This follows from Lemma 3.30. Each of these protocols
Pn is completely specified by the resource state and the N -outcome POVM. These ob-
jects live in compact subsets of normed finite dimensional vector spaces, so there exists a
converging subsequencePnk . The limit protocol uses a resource state
∣∣ψ(∞)〉〈ψ(∞)∣∣
ANBN
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such that ψ
(∞)
BN
= T
(n)
Haar(ψBN ), i.e. in particular U
⊗N
B ψ
(∞)
BN
(
U †B
)⊗N
= ψ
(∞)
BN
. An appli-
cation of Lemma 3.28 finishes the proof.
The same result can also be proven using designs, when using exact designs (see e.g.
[SZ84, Kan15] for existence results) it is not necessary to consider the limiting procedure.
Symmetric Werner states, which the present proposition shows to be sufficient as resource
states for port based teleportation, can be explicitly parameterized. Using Schur-Weyl
duality for the AN and BN marginals and the U⊗N ⊗U⊗N invariance, any such resource
state vector |ψ〉 ∈ ∨n Cd can be written as
∑
λ`(n,d)
zλ |φ+〉[λ]A[λ]B ⊗ |φ+〉(Vλ)A(Vλ)B (3.52)
which is to be understood in the context of the decomposition
((
Cd
)⊗N)⊗2 ∼=
 ⊕
Λ`(n,d)
[λ]⊗ Vλ
⊗2
∼=
⊕
Λ,µ`(n,d)
([λ]A ⊗ [µ]B)⊗
(
(Vλ)A ⊗ (Vµ)B
)
. (3.53)
The numbers zλ ∈ C fulfil the normalization condition
∑
λ`(n,d) |zλ|2 = 1.
Having proven that the resource state can be assumed to be symmetric, we can go on to
prove that the POVM elements can be taken to have a number of symmetries as well.
Proposition 3.32. Let {(Ei)A0AN }Ni=1 be the POVM for a (|A|, |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN , ε)-port
based teleportation protocol where ψ has the symmetries from Theorem 3.31. Then there
is another POVM {(E′i)A0AN }Ni=1 achieving the same diamond norm error ε as the orig-
inal POVM {(Ei)ANBN }Ni=1, such that
τAN
(
E′i
)
A0AN
τ †
AN
=
(
E′τ(i)
)
A0AN
(3.54)
for all τ ∈ SN , and
UA0 ⊗ U⊗NA
(
E′i
)
A0AN
UTA0 ⊗
(
U †A
)⊗N
=
(
E′i
)
A0AN
. (3.55)
In addition, the resulting channel Λ′ is unitarily covariant, i.e.
Λ′A0→B(X) = U
†
BΛ
′
A0→B(UA0XU
†
A0
)UB. (3.56)
Proof. Because of the permutation invariance of the resource state, for any permu-
tation τ ∈ SN , the channel resulting from the protocol with the modified POVM
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{
τAN
(
Eτ−1(i)
)
A0AN
τ †
AN
}N
i=1
is equal to the one resulting from the original protocol.
Therefore Alice can just as well pick a permutation at random and use the correspond-
ing POVM.
Now define the modified POVM
{(
UA0 ⊗ U⊗NA
)
(Ei)A0AN
(
UTA0 ⊗
(
U †A
)⊗N)}N
i=1
, and
denote the resulting channel by ΛU . We calculate
ΛUA0→B(XA)
=
N∑
i=1
trA0A′Bic
(
UA0 ⊗ U⊗NA
)
(Ei)A0AN
(
UTA0 ⊗
(
U †A
)⊗N)
(XA0 ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN )
=
N∑
i=1
trA0A′Bic (Ei)A0AN
((
UTA0XA0UA0
)⊗ ((U †A)⊗N |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN U⊗NA ))
=
N∑
i=1
trA0A′Bic (Ei)A0AN
((
UTA0XA0UA0
)⊗ (U⊗NB |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN (UTB)⊗N))
=
N∑
i=1
trA0A′Bic (Ei)A0AN
((
UTA0XA0UA0
)⊗ (UBi |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN UTBi))
=UBΛ
(
UTA0XA0UA0
)
UTB . (3.57)
Here we used the cyclicity of the trace in the second line, the U⊗N ⊗U⊗N -invariance of
|ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN in the third line, and the cyclicity of the trace again in the fourth line. The
diamond norm is unitarily invariant, and the identity commutes with unitary conjuga-
tion, i.e. the above calculation shows that
∥∥ΛUA0→B − idA0→B∥∥ = ‖ΛA0→B − idA0→B‖ . (3.58)
Therefore we define
(
E′i
)
A0AN
=
∫
U(HA)
∑
τ∈SN
(
UA0 ⊗ U⊗NA
)
τAN
(
Eτ−1(i)
)
A0AN
τ †
AN
(
UTA0 ⊗
(
U †A
)⊗N)
dU.
(3.59)
The channel resulting from the protocol using this POVM is
∫
U(HA) Λ
U
A0→BdU . An
application of the triangle inequality finishes the proof,∥∥∥∥∥
∫
U(HA)
ΛUA0→BdU − idA0→B
∥∥∥∥∥

≤
∫
U(HA)
∥∥ΛUA0→B − idA0→B∥∥ dU. (3.60)
The maximizer for the diamond norm distance of unitarily covariant channels is the
maximally entangled state.
One-shot quantum Shannon theory 64
Lemma 3.33. Let Λ
(i)
A→A, i = 1, 2 be unitarily covariant maps. Then∥∥∥Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣AA′)∥∥∥1 . (3.61)
Proof. Let |ψ〉AA′ be a state such that∥∥∥Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′)∥∥∥1 . (3.62)
Let furthermore P be the analogue of the Pauli group in |A| dimensions that is generated
by the operators from Equation (3.39). It is easy to check that this group is finite, like
the Pauli group. Define a mixed state
ρAA′I =
∑
V ∈P
p(V )VA |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′ V †A ⊗ |V 〉〈V |I . (3.63)
ρ achieves the diamond norm distance as well, as∥∥∥(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(ρAA′I)∥∥∥
1
=
∑
V ∈D
p(V )
∥∥∥(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(VA |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′ V †A)∥∥∥
1
=
∑
V ∈D
p(V )
∥∥∥VA(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′)V †A∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′)∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A∥∥∥ . (3.64)
Here we used the unitary covariance of the channels in the second line and the unitary
invariance of the trace norm in the third line. Let now |ρ〉〈ρ|AA′IJ be a purification of
ρAA′I . ρA = τA, and all purifications are isometrically equivalent, so there exists an
isometry WA′→A′IJ such that ρ = W |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′W †. By the monotonicity of the trace
distance under partial trace and its invariance under isometries we therefore get∥∥∥Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥(Λ(1)A→A − Λ(2)A→A)(∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣AA′)∥∥∥1 . (3.65)
Together the above Lemma and the two propositions imply that Theorem 3.27 holds for
diamond norm error ε as well:
Theorem 3.34. Let d ∈ N and ε > 0. Then there exists a (|A|, |φ+〉〈φ+|⊗NA , ε)-port
based teleportation protocol for N =
⌈
4d2
ε2
⌉
.
Proof. According to the proofs of Propositions 3.31 and 3.32, the protocol achieving
Theorem 3.27 can be transformed into one resulting in a unitarily covariant channel
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Λ, keeping the same error and the same number of ports. It is easy to see that these
constructions achieve the same when the error is measured in terms of the entanglement
fidelity. But the identity is unitarily covariant as well, therefore we get
‖Λ− id‖ =
∥∥(Λ− id)(∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣)∥∥
1
≤2
√
1− F (Λ)2
≤2ε, (3.66)
where the first inequality is a Fuchs van de Graaf inequality. Replacing ε by ε/2 yields
the claimed result.
In fact, a closer look at the protocol used to prove Theorem 3.27 in [IH08, IH09, BK11],
reveals that it already has all the necessary symmetries, i.e. the protocol based on maxi-
mally entangled states and the pretty good measurement itself is a (|A|, |φ+〉〈φ+|⊗NA , ε)-
port based teleportation protocol for N =
⌈
d2
4ε2
⌉
.
3.2.3 Approximate universal programmable quantum processors
In this subsection, we first introduce the concept of programmable quantum processors
(PQPs) [NC97] and describe how they can be built from a port based teleportation
scheme as done in [IH08]. We go on to improve the known lower bounds on the size of
the program register necessary for an ε-approximate programmable quantum processor.
An errorless universal programmable quantum processor for a quantum system D is a
unitary G ∈ U(HD⊗HP ) for some Hilbert space HP such that for all U ∈ U(HD) there
exists a state vector |U〉P ∈ HP such that G |ψ〉D ⊗ |U〉P = (UD |ψ〉D)⊗ |U ′〉P for some
state vector |U ′〉P . More formally, we make the following
Definition 3.35. Let HD, HP be Hilbert spaces. A unitary G ∈ U(HD ⊗HP ) is called
an ε-universal programmable quantum processor (ε-uPQP), if the following holds:
For each U ∈ U(HD) there exists a state |U〉P ∈ HP such that
‖trPG((·)D ⊗ |U〉〈U |P )G† − U(·)DU †‖ ≤ ε. (3.67)
The register D is called the data register, the register P is called the program reg-
ister. If the above condition is only true for a subset S ⊂ U(HD), G is called an
ε-S-programmable quantum processor
Note that the restriction to unitary processors is without loss of generality: the Stine-
spring dilating register of any CPTP processor can be included in the program register.
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Also it is easy to see by a standard argument that the maximum fidelity is reached for
pure program states, therefor this does not limit generality either.
Nielsen and Chuang prove in [NC97] that a perfect universal programmable quantum
processor is impossible using a finite-dimensional program register. This is essentially a
consequence of the linearity of quantum mechanics and the fact that the set of possible
programs, i.e. the projective unitary group PU(HD) = U(HD)/U(1), is infinite. Let
us review the impossibility proof by Nielsen and Chuang, both because it is beautifully
simple and because the bounds on the program register size in the approximate case
follow from the same reasoning.
Theorem 3.36 (Nielsen and Chuang, [NC97]). A universal zero error PQP with finite
dimensional program register does not exist.
Proof. If G ∈ U(HD⊗HP ) is a zero error uPQP, then we have that for all UD ∈ U(HD)
there exists a state |U〉P ∈ HP such that for all |ψ〉D ∈ HD there exists |U ′ψ〉P ∈ HP
with
G |ψ〉D ⊗ |U〉P = UD |ψ〉D ⊗ |U ′ψ〉P . (3.68)
Taking the inner product between Equation (3.68) for states |ψ〉D and |φ〉D with 〈ψ|φ〉 6=
0 we get |U ′ψ〉P = |U ′φ〉 =: |U ′〉, i.e. the resulting state on the program register only
depends on the program. Taking the inner product between Equation (3.68) for state
|ψ〉 and unitaries U, V ∈ U(HD) we get
〈U |V 〉P = 〈ψ|U †DVD |ψ〉D
〈
U ′|V ′〉
P
. (3.69)
Supposing 〈U ′|V ′〉P 6= 0 this implies U †DVD = z1 for some z ∈ C, as the left hand
side does not depend on |ψ〉. This shows that if U and V differ by more than a global
phase, then we have 〈U |V 〉P = 0. As the projective unitary group is infinite for |D| ≥
2, |U(HD)/U(1)| = ∞, any program register for a universal PQP has to be infinite-
dimensional.
Any port based teleportation scheme can be used to construct a universal programmable
quantum processor.
Proposition 3.37 ([IH08]). Any (d, |ψ〉〈ψ|ANBN , ε)-port based teleportation scheme can
be used to construct a ε-uPQP with program register dimension |P | = (N+d2−1N ).
Proof. Let us assume we have a PBT protocol that uses an entangled state |ψ〉 ∈ HA′B′ ,
where HX′ = H⊗NX for X = A,B, and let G ∈ U(HAA′BB′) be the unitary that executes
the Stinespring dilation of the entire PBT protocol. In particular the final partial trace is
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just not applied and instead the output port is swapped with the first port. Then G com-
mutes with
(
U⊗N
)
B′ for all U ∈ U(HB). Setting HP = HA′B′ and |U〉 =
(
U⊗N
)
B′ |ψ〉
we see that G acts as an ε-uPQP. According to Proposition 3.31 the program register
can be chosen to have dimension |P | = dim∨N (HA′ ⊗HB′) = (N+d2−1N ).
This connection between PBT and uPQPs is how Ishizaka and Hiroshima showed in
[IH08] that perfect port based teleportation is impossible with finite resources. There-
fore, a lower bound on the size of the program register of an ε-uPQP yields a lower
bound on the number of ports necessary for ε-PBT.
Hillery et al. derived such a bound [HZB06]. They use, however, the entanglement
fidelity as an error measure for their definition of an approximate PQP. The entanglement
fidelity is an average case error measure, while for a processor arguably a worst-case error
measure should be applied to ensure composability. Their result is the following:
Theorem 3.38 (Hillery, Ziman and Buzˇek [HZB06]). Let G ∈ U(HD ⊗ HP ) be a
PQP capable of executing a set of unitaries M ⊂ U(HD) with error ε in the fol-
lowing sense: For all U ∈ M the entanglement fidelity is greater than3 √1− ε2, i.e.
P (trPG |φ+〉〈φ+|DE ⊗ |U〉〈U |P G†, UD |φ+〉〈φ+|DE U †D) ≤ ε. Then the overlap of the pro-
gram states satisfies
〈U |V 〉P ≤ min
(
1,
ε2d+ ε
√
d
η
) ∣∣trU †V ∣∣
d
+ 2ε+ ε2, (3.70)
where η = 1−minψ | 〈ψ|UV † |ψ〉 |2 and d = |D|.
Let us prove a lemma that relates the quantity η in the above theorem to the operator
norm distance on the projective unitary group PU(HD) = U(HD)/U(1).
Lemma 3.39. For U, V ∈ U(d) we have
min
z,|z|=1
‖U − zV ‖∞ ≥
√
2
(
1−min
ψ
| 〈ψ|UV † |ψ〉 |
)
=
√
2
(
1−
√
1− η
)
(3.71)
with equality whenever the origin is not in the convex hull of the eigenvalues of UV † in
C.
Proof. Let UV † = Wdiag(λ0, ..., λd−1)W † and let the eigenvalues λi be ordered along
the unit circle in a way that the arc from λ0 to λd−1 containing the eigenvalues has
minimal length. Then we have
‖U − zV ‖∞ =
∥∥∥UV † − z1∥∥∥
∞
, (3.72)
3The square root comes from the fact, that in [HZB06] a different definition of the fidelity is used.
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a) b)
c)
Figure 3: Example of the geometric considerations from the proof of Lemma 3.39.
a) The purple arc is the minimal arc that contains all eigenvalues λi of UV
†. in other
words, λ0 and λd−1 (which is λ6 in the example) are the pair of eigenvalues with the
largest distance. The eigenvalues are ordered anticlockwise along the unit circle. We
can take the corresponding angles φi to be in [0, 2pi) without loss of generality, as we
are dealing with the projective unitary group. b) The minimizer of the minimization
in (3.74) is clearly the point on the unit circle in the middle between λ0 and λd−1. c)
For creating the shortest vector by means of convex combination, one has to take the
”most diametral” pair of vecors and add half of each.
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and
UV † − z1 = Wdiag(λi − z)W †. (3.73)
The λi are roots of unity, i.e. λi = e
iφi for some φi ∈ R, and W.L.O.G. φi ≥ φi+1. It
follows from basic geometric considerations (see Figure 3) that
min
z,|z|=1
‖U − zV ‖2∞ = min
z,|z|=1
max
i
|λi − z|2
=
∣∣∣√λ0 −√λd−1∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣ei(φ0−φd−1)/2 − 1∣∣∣2
= 2− 2 cos((φ0 − φd−1)/2). (3.74)
Now consider the other expression. Using the eigendecomposition UV † =
∑
i e
iφi |ψi〉〈ψi|
we get
min
ψ
| 〈ψ|UV † |ψ〉 |2 = min
p
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
pie
iφi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (3.75)
where the minimum on the right hand side is taken over all probability distributions on
{0, ..., d−1}. If 0 is in the convex hull of the eiφi , the minimum is 0. Otherwise, it again
follows from basic geometric considerations (see Figure 3) that the optimal probability
distribution is pi = (δi0 + δi(d−1))/2, i.e.
min
ψ
| 〈ψ|UV † |ψ〉 |2 = 1
4
∣∣∣eiφ0 + eiφd−1∣∣∣2
= cos2((φ0 − φd−1/2). (3.76)
If 0 is in the convex hull of the eiφi , then the right hand side of the inequality (3.71) is
equal to
√
2, and the left hand side is not less than that according to Equation (3.74).
It is easy to prove that ‖[U ] − [V ]‖∞ := minz,|z|=1 ‖U − zV ‖∞ defines a metric on
PU(HD). PU(HD) is isomorphic to SU(d), and this metric is invariant. Note that
in general ‖[U ] − [V ]‖∞ < ‖U det(U)−1/d − V det(V )−1/d‖∞, i.e. zopt 6= det(U †V )1/d.
However, 2‖[U ] − [V ]‖∞ ≥ ‖U det(U)−1/d − V det(V )−1/d‖∞. One can define a metric
constructed from any Schatten p-norm in the same way, and
|trU†V |
d = 1 −
‖[U ]−[V ]‖22
2d .
Expressed in these terms, whenever 0 does not lie in the convex hull of the eigenvalues
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of UV †, the bound of Theorem 3.38 reads
〈U |V 〉P ≤ min
(
1,
εd+
√
εd
γ(1− γ/4)
)(
1− ‖[U ]− [V ]‖
2
2
2d
)
+ 2
√
ε+ ε
≤ εd+
√
εd
ζ(U, V )
+ 2
√
ε+ ε,with (3.77)
ζ(U, V ) =
‖[U ]− [V ]‖2∞(1− ‖[U ]− [V ]‖2∞/4)
1− ‖[U ]−[V ]‖222d
(3.78)
where γ = ‖[U ]− [V ]‖2∞
We want to use the dimension bounds on the program registers of approximate universal
PQPs to get good bounds on the communication cost of PBT. To this extent we need a
clean bound of the inner product in terms of some metric on PU(HD) that is equivalent
to the Euclidean metric on the underlying space End (HD). Then we can express the
asymptotic size of maximal subsets of PU(HD) with a certain minimal pairwise distance
in terms of the real dimension of the group, dimR(PU(HD)) = d2 − 1. The function
ζ(U, V ) from Equation 3.78, however, is not a metric. Bounding it by the operator norm
induced metric yields
ζ(U, V ) ≥ 1
2
‖[U ]− [V ]‖2∞, (3.79)
and thereby
〈U |V 〉P ≤
2(εd+
√
εd)
‖[U ]− [V ]‖2∞
+ 2
√
ε+ ε (3.80)
whenever 0 does not lie in the convex hull of the eigenvalues of UV †.
Let us forget about our application for a second: Suppose we are interested in an ap-
proximate PQP, most generally able to implement unitaries from a subset S ⊂ U(HD).
If we allow an error ε in diamond norm, then it might make sense to try to implement
a ε/2-PQP for a diamond norm ε/2-net in S when having a bound similar to Equation
(3.70) in mind. Therefore it would be nice to have a clean bound referring to a metric
on PU(HD) that can be related to the diamond norm in this case as well.
There exists a closed expression for the diamond norm difference of two unitaries:
Theorem 3.40 (Johnston et al., [JKP09], Theorem 26). Let U ∈ U(Cd), and define
Φ(X) = X − UXU †. Then ‖Φ‖ is equal to the diameter of the smallest disk that
contains all eigenvalues of U , i.e. if the convex hull of the eigenvalues λ0, ..., λd−1 of U
does not contain the origin, then we have
‖Φ‖ = |λ0 − λd−1|, (3.81)
One-shot quantum Shannon theory 71
Figure 4: The two cases for the diamond norm distance of two unitary channels. If
and only if the convex hull of the eigenvalues contains the origin, then the smallest disk
containing all eigenvalues is the unit disc.
and ‖Φ‖ = 2 otherwise, where we assumed in the first case that the eigenvalues of U
are ordered along the unit circle such that the arc from λ0 to λd−1 containing all the
eigenvalues has minimal length.
See figure 4 for an example of the geometry of the eigenvalues. It follows as an easy
corollary from the above and the proof of Lemma 3.39 that the diamond norm difference
of two unitaries is related to the operator norm difference of their cosets in PU(HD) by
a simple formula.
Corollary 3.41. Let U, V ∈ U(HD) and define φW (X) = WXW † for W = U, V . Then
‖φU − φV ‖ = 2‖[U ]− [V ]‖∞
√
1− ‖[U ]− [V ]‖2∞/4 (3.82)
if the origin is not in the complex hull of the eigenvalues of UV † in C, and ‖φU−φV ‖ = 2
otherwise.
Proof. Suppose first that the smallest disk containing all eigenvalues of UV † is the unit
disc, i.e. the convex hull of the eigenvalues of UV † contains the origin. Then The
statement is true by Theorem 3.40. Let eiφ0 , ..., eiφd−1 be the eigenvalues of UV † ordered
as in the Proof of Lemma 3.39, and φi ≥ φi+1. Assume now (φ0 − φd−1) < pi. Then we
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get by Theorem 3.40 that
‖φUV † − id‖ = 2 sin((φ0 − φd−1)/2)
= 2
√
1− cos2((φ0 − φd−1)/2)
= 2
√
1−
(
1− ‖[U ]− [V ]‖
2∞
2
)2
= 2‖[U ]− [V ]‖∞
√
1− ‖[U ]− [V ]‖
2∞
4
(3.83)
where we used Equation (3.74) in the third line.
We go on to derive a bound on the inner product of program states in terms of ‖[U ]−
[V ]‖∞ that improves over (3.80) in that it gets rid of the dimension dependence.
Lemma 3.42. Let G ∈ U(HD ⊗ HP ) be an ε-universal PQP, and |ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 ∈ HD
orthonormal. Then we have that for any U ∈ U(HD)
P (|U ′ψ1〉 , |U ′ψ2〉) ≤ 2
(
ε+
√
2ε
)
, (3.84)
where |U ′ψi〉 is the vector that exists by Uhlmann’s theorem such that
P (G |ψi〉D |U〉P , UD |ψi〉D |U ′ψi〉P ) ≤ ε. (3.85)
Proof. As G is a ε-uPQP, there exists, again by Uhlmann’s theorem, a vector |U ′ψ1+ψ2〉
such that
P
(
1√
2
G(|ψ1〉D + |ψ2〉D) |U〉P ,
1√
2
(U |ψ1〉D + U |ψ2〉D) |U ′ψ1+ψ2〉P
)
≤ ε. (3.86)
On the other hand we have
G |ψi〉D |U〉P =
√
1− ε′2UD |ψi〉D |U ′ψi〉P + ε′ |Rψi〉DP (3.87)
for some normalized states |Rψi〉DP , i = 1, 2 and ε′ ≤ ε. It follows that
1√
2
G(|ψ1〉D + |ψ2〉D) |U〉P
=
1√
2
(√
1− ε′2UD
(
|ψ1〉D |U ′ψi〉P
+ |ψ2〉D |U ′ψi〉P
)
+ ε′
(|Rψ1〉DP + |Rψ2〉DP )
)
, (3.88)
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and therefore
1
2
∣∣∣(〈ψ1|D + 〈ψ2|D) 〈U |P G†DPUD (|ψ1〉D |U ′ψi〉P + |ψ2〉D |U ′ψi〉P)∣∣∣ ≥ 1− ε′√1− ε′2 . (3.89)
We bound
d
(
1√
2
G(|ψ1〉D + |ψ2〉D) |U〉P , UD
1√
2
(
|ψ1〉D |U ′ψi〉P + |ψ2〉D |U ′ψi〉P
))
≤
√
1− (1− ε
′)2
1− ε′2
=
√
1− 1− ε
′
1 + ε′
≤
√
1− 1− ε
1 + ε
≤
√
2ε. (3.90)
The second-to-last inequality holds as the function x 7→ 1−x1+x is monotonically increasing
on [0, 1]. By the triangle inequality for the purified distance we can combine Equations
(3.86) and (3.90) to get
1
2
(∣∣〈U ′ψ1 |U ′ψ1+ψ2〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈U ′ψ2 |U ′ψ1+ψ2〉∣∣) ≥
√
1−
(
ε+
√
2ε
)2
. (3.91)
Define γ1 ∈ [0, pi/2), i = 1, 2 such that cos γi =
∣∣∣〈U ′ψi |U ′ψ1+ψ2〉∣∣∣. Then we have√
1−
(
ε+
√
2ε
)2 ≤ 1
2
(cos γ1 + cos γ2)
= cos(γ1 + γ2) cos(γ1 − γ2), (3.92)
where the last line is a trigonometric identity. By the triangle inequality for the purified
distance and another trigonometric identity we get
| 〈U ′ψ1 |U ′ψ2〉 |2 ≥ 1− (√1− cos2 γ1 +√1− cos2 γ1)2
= 1− (sin γ1 + sin γ2)2
= 1− 4 sin2(γ1 + γ2) cos2(γ1 − γ2) (3.93)
= 1− 4 cos2(γ1 − γ2) + 4 cos2(γ1 + γ2) cos2(γ1 − γ2)
≥ −3 + 4
(
1−
(
ε+
√
2ε
)2)
≥ 1− 4
(
ε+
√
2ε
)2
. (3.94)
The second-to-last inequality is due to Equation (3.92) and the fact that cos2(γ1−γ2) ≤
1.
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Theorem 3.43. Let G ∈ U(HD ⊗ HP ) be an ε-uPQP and let |Ui〉P ∈ HP , i = 1, 2 be
the program states of Ui ∈ U(HD) such that [U †1U2] is not too far from the coset of the
identity in PU(HD) in the sense that the convex hull of the eigenvalues of U †1U2 does
not contain the origin. Then
| 〈U1|U2〉 | ≤
2
(√
2+ 7+ 2
√
23/2 + 32
)
‖[U1]− [U2]‖∞
+ 2ε+ ε2. (3.95)
for all ζ ∈ (0, 1), where δ = 2ε+ ε2 and ε˜ = 14 (ε+√2ε).
Proof. Let λ0, ..., λd−1 be the eigenvalues of U
†
1U2 ordered along the unit circle such
that the arc from λ0 to λd−1 containing all the λi has minimal length, and such that
λd−1/λ0 = eiφ, φ ∈ [0, pi]. G is an ε-uPQP, so for all |ψ〉D ∈ HD there exist vectors
|U ′i,ψ〉P ∈ HP and |RUi,ψ〉DP ∈ HDP such that
G |ψ〉D |Ui〉P =
√
1− ε′(ψ,Ui)2Ui |ψ〉D |U ′i,ψ〉P + ε′(ψ,Ui) |RUi,ψ〉DP , (3.96)
where ε′(ψ,Ui) ≤ ε. Let |ψ0〉D and |ψd−1〉D be eigenvectors for the eigenvalues λ0 and
λd−1. As 〈ψ0|ψd−1〉 = 0, Lemma 3.42 implies that there exist 0 ≤ δi ≤ 2(ε +
√
2ε) and
states |SUi〉P such that
|U ′i,ψ0〉 =
√
1− δ2i |U ′i,ψd−1〉+ δi |SUi〉 . (3.97)
We can now write down an expression for the desired inner product,
〈U1|U2〉 = 〈ψi| 〈U1|G†G |ψi〉 |U2〉
=
√
(1− ε′(ψ,U1)2) (1− ε′(ψ,U2)2)
〈
U ′1,ψi |U ′2,ψi
〉 〈ψi|U †1U2 |ψi〉+ ηi
= αi
〈
U ′1,ψi |U ′2,ψi
〉
λi + ηi, (3.98)
where we defined 1 ≥ αi ≥ 1− ε2 and ηi ∈ C with
|ηi| ≤ε′(ψ,U1)
√
1− ε′(ψ,U2)2 + ε′(ψ,U2)
√
1− ε′(ψ,U2)2 + ε′(ψ,U1)ε′(ψ,U2) ≤ 2ε+ ε2
=:δ. (3.99)
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We can use this to write down an expression for the quotient of the extremal eigenvalues
of U †1U2,
λd−1
λ0
=
(〈U1|U2〉 − ηd−1)α0
〈
U ′1,ψ0 |U ′2,ψ0
〉
(〈U1|U2〉 − η0)αd−1
〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉
=
(〈U1|U2〉 − ηd−1)α0
(〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉
+ γ
)
(〈U1|U2〉 − η0)αd−1
〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉 , (3.100)
where the last step follows from Equation (3.97) and we defined γ ∈ C with
|γ| ≤ δ1
√
1− δ22 + δ2
√
1− δ21 + δ1δ2
≤ 4
(
ε+
√
2ε
)(
1 + ε+
√
2ε
)
:= ε˜. (3.101)
We can W.L.O.G. assume that both 〈U1|U2〉 and
〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉
are real, otherwise
we can just cancel the phase from the fraction in Equation (3.100) and redefine ηi and
γ, without changing there magnitude. Now let
〈U1|U2〉 − ηd−1 =r1eiφ1 ,
〈U1|U2〉 − η0 =r2e−iφ2 , and〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉
+ γ =r3e
iφ3 , (3.102)
with ri ∈ R≥0 and φi ∈ (−pi, pi]. Furthermore let λd−1/λ0 = eiφ with φ ∈ (−pi, pi]. With
these definitions we have φ = φ1 + φ2 + φ3 mod 2pi.
We assume now that for some x > δ to be determined later we have
〈U1|U2〉 ≥ x and〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉
≥ |γ|. (3.103)
Basic trigonometry shows that
sin(|φ1|/2) ≤ |ηd−1|
2 〈U1|U2〉 ,
sin(|φ2|/2) ≤ |η0|
2 〈U1|U2〉 and
sin(|φ3|/2) ≤ |γ|
2
〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉 . (3.104)
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As the sine is concave on [0, pi], we can bound the sum of the three sines as
(sin(|φ1|/2) + sin(|φ2|/2) + sin(|φ3|/2)) ≥ 3 sin
( |φ1|+ |φ2|+ |φ3|
6
)
≥ 3
∣∣∣∣sin(φ6
)∣∣∣∣
= 3 sin
(
φ
6
)
, (3.105)
where the last step follows by our choice of ordering for the eigenvalues λi. Putting
things together we get
3 sin
(
φ
6
)
≤ (sin(|φ1|/2) + sin(|φ2|/2) + sin(|φ3|/2))
≤ |η0|+ |ηd−1|
2 〈U1|U2〉 +
|γ|
2
〈
U ′1,ψd−a |U ′2,ψd−1
〉
≤ |η0|+ |ηd−1|
2 〈U1|U2〉 +
|γ|αd−1
2 |〈U1|U2〉 − ηd−1|
≤ |η0|+ |ηd−1|
2 〈U1|U2〉 +
|γ|αd−1
2 (|x| − |ηd−1|) , (3.106)
where the inequalities are Equations (3.105), (3.104), (3.98) and (3.103). Solving for
〈U1|U2〉, which we want to bound, yields
〈U1|U2〉 ≤ |η0|+ |ηd−1|
3 sin
(
φ
6
)
− |γ|αd−12(|x|−|ηd−1|)
≤ 2δ
3 sin
(
φ
6
)
− ε˜2(x−δ)
. (3.107)
Considering both the case where the assumption (3.103) holds and where it does not we
get
〈U1|U2〉 ≤ max
x, 2δ
3 sin
(
φ
6
)
− ε˜2(x−δ)
 . (3.108)
The two arguments of the maximum are monotonically increasing and decreasing respec-
tively for x ∈ (x0,∞), where x0 is the value of x such that the denominator vanishes,
so there is at exactly one intersection point of the two in this range considering the
boundary values. This will give the optimal bound. Defining α = 3 sin
(
φ
6
)
and solving
the equation
x =
2δ
α− ε˜2(x−δ)
, x ∈ (x0,∞) (3.109)
for x yields
x =
√
(2(α+ 2)δ + ε˜)2 − 32αδ2 + 2(α+ 2)δ + ε˜
4α
. (3.110)
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Now we bound this quantity by utilizing
√
x2 + y ≤ x+ y2x ,
x ≤
2(2(α+ 2)δ + ε˜)− 16αδ22(α+2)δ+ε˜
4α
=
2(α+ 2)δ + ε˜− 4δ + 16δ2+4δε˜2(α+2)δ+ε˜
2α
≤ 2αδ + ε˜+
16δ2+4δε˜
4δ+ε˜
2α
=
ε˜+ 8δ
2α
+ δ, (3.111)
where the last equation is obtained by expressing the ε˜ in the fraction in the numerator
in terms of δ. Plugging in the expressions for ε˜ and δ in terms of ε yields
〈U1|U2〉 ≤
2
(√
2+ 7+ 2
√
23/2 + 32
)
α
+ 2ε+ ε2. (3.112)
It remains to bound α in terms of the operator norm distance of [U ] and [V ]. For
β ∈ [0, pi/2] and r ≥ 1 the sine obeys the inequality sin(rβ) ≤ r sinβ. Therefore we have
α = 3 sin
(
φ
6
)
= 2
(
3
2
sin
(
φ
6
))
≥ 2 sin
(
φ
4
)
=
∣∣∣√λd−1/λ1 − 1∣∣∣
= ‖[U1]− [U2]‖∞ . (3.113)
The last equality is Equation (3.74).
The plan from now on is as follows: The operator norm distance is a an invariant
metric on the projective unitary group. Therefore we can bound the maximum number
of unitaries N entr (PU(d)) that have pairwise distance at least r by a volume argument
using the Weyl integration formula. Then we bound the number of almost orthogonal
vectors in a given finite-dimensional Hilbert space in terms of the dimension and the
maximal value of the inner product, using results from [Alo09]. This will give an explicit
lower bound on the dimension of the program register of a uPQP. Let us start with a
few definitions.
Definition 3.44. Let (X, d) be a metric space, let E ⊂ X, and let r > 0.
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a) b)
c) d)
e)
Figure 5: Candidates for the optimizations defining a) Npackε , b) N
int
ε , c) N
ext
ε , d)
Nentε , and e) N
ent
2ε .
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• The packing number Npackr (E) is the largest number n of disjoint closed balls cen-
tered at points x1, . . . , xn ∈ E .
• The internal covering number N intr (E) is the smallest number n of points x1, . . . , xn ∈ E
such that the closed balls B(x1, r), . . . , B(xn, r) cover E.
• The external covering number N extr (E) is the smallest number n of points x1, . . . , xn ∈ X
such that the closed balls B(x1, r), . . . , B(xn, r) cover E.
• The metric entropy N entr (E) is the largest number of points x1, . . . , xn ∈ E Such
that d(xi, xj) ≥ r for all i 6= j.
See Figure 5 for examples. It is easy to see that these numbers ar roughly the same.
Proposition 3.45.
N ent2r (E) ≤ Npackr (E) ≤ N extr (E) ≤ N intr (E) ≤ N entr (E). (3.114)
Proof. The inequalities are obvious except for Npackr (E) ≤ N extr (E). To see why this is
true, consider a packing of r-balls centered at x1, ..., xk and a cover of r-balls B1, ..., Bl.
Suppose k > l. Then there exists an index 1 ≤ i ≤ l and two indices 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ k such
that xj1 , xj2 ∈ Bi, which is a contradiction.
For calculating the volume of an ε-ball in PU(HD) we need the Weyl integration formula
[Sim96].
Theorem 3.46 (Weyl integration formula). Let f : U(d) → R be a class function, i.e.
f(V UV †) = f(U) for all U, V ∈ U(d). Then the integral of f over the Haar measure
can be reduced to an integral over a maximal torus T (d) ⊂ (d) (diagonal subgroup),∫
U(d)
f(U)d
=
1
d!(2pid)
∫
T (d)
f(diag(eiφ1 , eiφ2 , ..., eiφd))
∏
1≤i<j≤d
∣∣∣eiφi − eiφj ∣∣∣2 dφ1dφ2...dφd. (3.115)
We can use this to bound the volume of the operator norm ball of radius ε in PU(d).
Lemma 3.47. Let 0 < ε < pi/2. The Haar measure of Bε([V ]) ⊂ PU(d), the ball
centered at [V ] of radius ε when distance is measured in the operator norm metric, is
bounded by
µ(Bε([U ])) ≤ (4ε)
d2−1
(pi)dd!
, (3.116)
where µ denotes the normalized Haar measure on PU(d).
One-shot quantum Shannon theory 80
Proof. We start by observing that the operator norm metric is invariant, so we can just
as well consider the ball around the identity. The integral over PU(d) can be expressed
as an integral over U(d),
µ(Bε([V ])) =
∫
PU(d)
ϑ (ε− ‖[U ]− [1]‖∞) d[U ]
=
∫
PU(d)
ϑ
(
ε− min
z∈C, |z|=1
‖zU − 1‖∞
)
d[U ]
=
1
2pi
∫
U(d)
ϑ
(
ε− min
z∈C, |z|=1
‖zU − 1‖∞
)
dU, (3.117)
where ϑ denotes the Heaviside step function and the last step follows, because by
construction minz ‖zU − 1‖∞ = minz ‖zz′U − 1‖∞ for all z′ ∈ C, |z′| = 1, and
U(d) ∼= PU(d) × U(1). The integrand in the last expression is a class function, as
the operator norm is unitarily invariant. Therefore we can apply Weyl’s integration
formula, Theorem 3.46, to get
µ(Bε([V ])) =
1
(2pi)d+1d!
·
∫
[−pi,pi)n
ϑ
(
ε− min
z∈C, |z|=1
‖zdiag(eiφ1 , ..., eiφd)− 1‖∞
) ∏
1≤i<j≤d
∣∣∣eiφi − eiφj ∣∣∣2 dφ1dφ2...dφd.
(3.118)
The integrand does not depend on the phase of U , so a coordinate transformation and
integrating over the phase yields
µ(Bε([V ])) =
1
(2pi)dd!
·
∫
S1
ϑ
(
ε− min
z∈C, |z|=1
‖zdiag(eiφ1 , ..., eiφd)− 1‖∞
) ∏
1≤i<j≤d
∣∣∣eiφi − eiφj ∣∣∣2 dφ1dφ2...dφd,
(3.119)
with S1 = {φ ∈ [−pi, pi)|
∑
φi = 0}. Define two subsets S2, S3 ⊂ S1 by
S2 =
{
φ ∈ S1
∣∣∣2 sin(|φi|/2) ≤ 2ε} and
S3 =
{
φ ∈ S1
∣∣∣2 sin(|φi − pi|/2) ≤ 2ε} = S2 + (pi, ...., pi). (3.120)
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If φ is in neither of the two sets, the integrand is zero. Therefore we get
µ(Bε([V ])) =
2
(2pi)dd!
·
∫
S2
ϑ
(
ε− min
z∈C, |z|=1
‖zdiag(eiφ1 , ..., eiφd)− 1‖∞
) ∏
1≤i<j≤d
∣∣∣eiφi − eiφj ∣∣∣2 dφ1dφ2...dφd,
(3.121)
having used that the integrand is translation invariant and therefore the integral over
S3 is equal to that over S2. Now we can bound this in a straightforward manner. In S2,∣∣eiφi − eiφj ∣∣ ≤ 4ε, so
µ(Bε([V ])) ≤ 2
(2pi)dd!
∫
S2
(4ε)d(d−1)dφ1dφ2...dφd
≤ 2(4ε)
d(d−1) (4 arcsin(ε))d−1
(2pi)dd!
≤ (4ε)
d2−1
(pi)dd!
, (3.122)
where we used in the last line that arcsin(x) ≤ 2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ pi/2.
As a corollary we can bound N ent(PU(d)).
Lemma 3.48.
N entε (PU(d)) ≥
(pi)dd!
(4ε)d2−1
. (3.123)
for 0 < ε < pi/2.
Proof. According to Proposition 3.45 we get
N entε (PU(d)) ≥ N intε (PU(d))
≥ 1
µ(Bε(1))
, (3.124)
and using Lemma 3.47 concludes the proof.
We also need a bound on the number of almost orthogonal unit vectors in a finite
dimensional Hilbert space. This can be found in [Alo09] for the real case.
Theorem 3.49 ([Alo09], Theorem 2.1). There exists a universal constant η such that
the following holds: Let A ∈ Rn×n such that Aii = 1 and |Aij | ≤ ε for all i 6= j. For
1√
n
≤ ε < 12 the rank of A can be lower bounded bounded as
rk (A) ≥ η log n
ε2 log (1/ε)
. (3.125)
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As a corollary we can bound the number of almost orthogonal vectors in a given Eu-
clidean space.
Corollary 3.50. There exists a universal constant η such that the following holds: Let
d ∈ N and S ⊂ Rd such that for all v, w ∈ S we have that |(v, w)| ≤ ε, where (·, ·)
denotes the standard inner product in Rd and 1√
d
≤ ε < 12 . Then the cardinality of S
can be upper bounded by
|S| ≤ ε− 1η ε2d. (3.126)
For 0 ≤ ε < 1d the best bound is
|S| ≤ d, (3.127)
and for 1d ≤ ε < 1√d we get
|S| ≤ 2d. (3.128)
Proof. For 1√
n
< ε < 1/2, applying Theorem 3.49 to the Gram matrix of the vectors in
S directly yields the result, with the constant η being the same as in Theorem 3.49. For
0 ≤ ε < 1n the observation that the Gram matrix can now only have positive eigenvalues
yields the result, and the remaining case follows from Lemma 2.2 in [Alo09].
This also yields a bound for the complex analogue.
Lemma 3.51. Let S ⊂ Cd be a set of unit vectors such that for v, w ∈ S we have
|(v, w)| ≤ ε (3.129)
for 1√
2d
≤ ε < 12 . Then S cannot be too large,
|S| ≤ ε− 2η ε2d. (3.130)
For 0 ≤ ε < 12d the best bound is
|S| ≤ 2d, (3.131)
and for 12d ≤ ε < 1√2d we get
|S| ≤ 4d. (3.132)
Proof. Using the usual isomorphism Cn ∼= R2n as R-vector spaces, and observing that
Re 〈·|·〉 maps to the standard inner product on R2n under this isomorphism, together
with the fact that |Re(z)| ≤ |z| for all z ∈ C, reduces the complex to the real case and
an application of Corollary 3.50 concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove the dimension lower bound on the program register of an
approximate uPQP.
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Theorem 3.52. Let d ∈ N and ε > 0 such that 8δ1 + δ2 < 12 with
δ1 = 2
(√
2+ 7+ 2
√
23/2 + 32
)
and δ2 = 2ε+ε
2. For any ε-universal programmable quantum processor G ∈ U(HD⊗HP )
with |D| = d the program register has dimension at least
|P | ≥ 1
2(4δ1 + δ2)2
min
1,((pid
e
)d
(4δ1 + δ2)
2
) 2
d2+1
 . (3.133)
There exists a universal constant η > 0 such that for
8δ1 + δ2 >
[(
pid
e
)−d
2−d
2+1
]η
(3.134)
the alternative bound
|P | ≥ ηd log
(
pid
e
)
+ d2 − 1
2δ24 log
1
δ4
(3.135)
holds.
Proof. Using Theorem 3.42 we get
| 〈U1|U2〉 | ≤ δ1‖[U1]− [U2]‖∞
+ δ2 (3.136)
for all U1, U2 ∈ U(d), where we defined δ1 = 2
(√
2+ 7+ 2
√
23/2 + 32
)
and δ2 =
2ε+ ε2. According to Lemma 3.48, applied for ε = δ3, there exists a set S ⊂ Ud with
|S| ≥ pidd!(4δ3)−(d2−1) (3.137)
such that ‖[U1]− [U2]‖∞ ≥ δ3 for all U1, U2 ∈ S. Define S′ ⊂ HP by
S′ =
{|U〉P ∣∣U ∈ S} . (3.138)
Suppose now first that K := |P | < 1
2(4δ1+δ2)2
. Then we have by this assumption that
4δ1 + δ2 <
1√
2K
. We set δ3 =
δ1
√
2K
1−δ2
√
2K
. Applying Lemma 3.51 yields
|S′| ≤ 4K, (3.139)
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i.e.
4K ≥ pidd!
(
1− δ2
√
2K
4δ1
√
2K
)(d2−1)
⇐⇒ (2K) d
2+1
2 ≥ 1
2
pidd!
(
1− δ2
√
2K
4δ1
)(d2−1)
≥ 1
2
pidd!
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
)(d2−1)
. (3.140)
bounding d! ≥ (de)d we get
K ≥ 1
2
(
pid
e
) 2d
d2+1
(4δ1 + δ2)
−2 d2−1
d2+1 . (3.141)
In summary,
K ≥ 1
2(4δ1 + δ2)2
min
1,((pid
e
)d
(4δ1 + δ2)
2
) 2
d2+1
 . (3.142)
Suppose now that K > 1
2(8δ1+δ2)2
. We set δ3 =
1
8 and use 3.48 to get a set S ⊂ Ud with
|S| ≥ pidd!2d2−1 (3.143)
such that ‖[U1]− [U2]‖∞ ≥ 18 for all U1, U2 ∈ S. On the other hand Lemma 3.51 shows
that
|S′| ≤ δ−
2
η
δ24K
4 , (3.144)
with δ4 = 8δ1 + δ2. Combining the two bounds and using d! ≥
(
d
e
)d
yields
K ≥ ηd log
(
pid
e
)
+ d2 − 1
2δ24 log
1
δ4
. (3.145)
This bound is only meaningful if it exceeds the assumption, i.e. if
8δ1 + δ2 >
[(
pid
e
)−d
2−d
2+1
]η
. (3.146)
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3.2.4 Lower bounds on the number of ports for ε-port based telepor-
tation
In this subsection, three lower bounds on the number of ports necessary for (d, ε)-port
based teleportation are presented. The first one follows from a bound on the amount
of classical communication needed for approximate teleportation without restrictions on
Bob’s correction unitaries. The second one follows from the bound on the size of the
program register of an approximate universal programmable quantum processor, and
is here only recorded to show that the reasoning of Nielsen and Chuang can be made
approximate. It is made obsolete by the third bound, which uses the non-signaling
principle to conclude that Bob’s marginal cannot change when Alice’s measurement is
applied.
To the best of my knowledge, the only lower bound for the number of ports necessary
for (d, ε)-port based teleportation that has appeared in the literature is
Theorem 3.1 ([Ish15]). port based teleportation of a d-dimensional quantum system
with entanglement fidelity F =
√
1− ε2 requires at least
N ≥ 1
4(d− 1)ε2 (3.147)
ports.
This bound diverges with ε→ 0, but it vanishes for large dimensions unless ε = o(d− 12 ).
3.2.4.1 The communication bound
We begin with the bound on the classical communication required for any kind of tele-
portation. This bound is proven in three steps. First, we bound the smooth max-mutual
information of the maximally entangled state. Then we use this bound together with a
lower bound on the communication cost of coherent state merging to derive a bound on
the quantum communication cost of approximately sending half a maximally entangled
state when arbitrary entanglement assistance is at hand. Finally, we use superdense
coding to conclude a bound on the communication cost of approximate teleportation.
A bound for teleportation with a certain allowed diamond norm error follows – and is
tight because any channel from a teleportation protocol can be made unitarily covariant
with the techniques from Subsection 3.2.2.
Proposition 3.53. Let
|φ+〉AB =
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉AB ∈ HA ⊗HB (3.148)
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be the standard maximally entangled state, with HA ∼= HB ∼= Cd. Then
2 log
⌈
d(1− ε2)⌉ ≥ Iεmax(A : B)φ+ ≥ 2 log (d(1− ε2)) (3.149)
Proof. Let ρ ∈ End (HA ⊗HB) be a normalized state such that Iεmax(A : B)φ+ =
Imax(A : B)ρ. Let |ρ〉ABE be a purification of ρ. According to Uhlmann’s theorem
there exists a pure state |α〉E such that√
1− ε2 ≤ F (φ+, ρ) = 〈φ+|AB 〈α|E |ρ〉ABE , (3.150)
as any phase of the right hand side can be included in |α〉. Let
|ρ〉ABE =
d−1∑
i=0
√
pi |φi〉A ⊗ |ψi〉BE (3.151)
be the Schmidt decomposition of |ρ〉 with respect to the bipartition A : BE. Let UA be
the unitary such that UA |i〉A = |φi〉A. By the mirror lemma we get
|φ+〉AB = UAU †A |φ+〉AB
= UAU¯B |φ+〉AB
=
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|φi〉A |ξi〉B , (3.152)
where |ξi〉B = U¯B |i〉B and U¯ denotes the complex conjugate in the computational basis.
Hence we have
1− ε2 ≤ 〈φ+|AB 〈α|E |ρ〉2ABE
= Re 〈φ+|AB 〈α|E |ρ〉2ABE
=
(
d−1∑
i=0
√
pi
d
Re 〈ξi|B 〈α|E |ψi〉BE
)2
≤ 1
d
d−1∑
i=0
(Re 〈ξi|B 〈α|E |ψi〉BE)2
≤ 1
d
d−1∑
i=0
Re 〈ξi|B 〈α|E |ψi〉BE . (3.153)
Here the second inequality is the Cauchy Schwarz inequality and the third one follows
from the fact that Re 〈ξi|B 〈α|E |ψi〉BE ≤ 1.
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We are now ready to bound the max-mutual information of ρ. Let λ = Imax(A : B)ρ =
Iεmax(A : B)φ+ . Then by definition there exists a state σB such that
2λ =
∥∥∥∥ρ− 12A ⊗ σ− 12B ρABρ− 12A ⊗ σ− 12B ∥∥∥∥
∞
(3.154)
Let |φσ〉 =
√
dσ
1
2
B |φ+〉, a normalized vector. Then we bound
2λ =
∥∥∥∥ρ− 12A ⊗ σ− 12B ρABρ− 12A ⊗ σ− 12B ∥∥∥∥
∞
≥ 〈φσ| ρ−
1
2
A ⊗ σ
− 1
2
B ρABρ
− 1
2
A ⊗ σ
− 1
2
B |φσ〉
= tr 〈φσ| ρ−
1
2
A ⊗ σ
− 1
2
B |ρ〉〈ρ|ABE ρ
− 1
2
A ⊗ σ
− 1
2
B |φσ〉
≥ 〈φσ|AB 〈α|E ρ
− 1
2
A ⊗ σ
− 1
2
B |ρ〉〈ρ|ABE ρ
− 1
2
A ⊗ σ
− 1
2
B |φσ〉AB |α〉E
= d
∣∣∣∣〈φ+|AB ρ− 12A 〈α|E |ρ〉ABE∣∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
〈ξi|B 〈α|E |ψi〉BE
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥
(∑
i
Re 〈ξi|B 〈α|E |ψi〉BE
)2
≥ d2(1− ε2)2. (3.155)
For the other inequality let d′ = dd(1− ε2)e and
|φ+d′〉 =
1√
d′
d′−1∑
i=0
|ii〉AB ∈ HA ⊗HB. (3.156)
Then we have
Imax(A : B)φ+
d′
= 2 log d′ = 2 logdd(1− ε2)e (3.157)
| 〈φ+|φ+d′〉 |2 = d′/d ≥ 1− ε2. (3.158)
As a corollary we can bound the necessary quantum communication for simulating the
identity channel with a given entanglement fidelity.
Corollary 3.54. Let EAA′→B, DBB′→A be quantum channels such that there exists a
state ρA′B′ achieving
F (D ◦ E((·)⊗ ρA′B′)) =
√
1− ε2, (3.159)
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dimHA = d and dimHB = d′. Then
d′ ≥ d (1− ε2) . (3.160)
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 3.53 together with the lower bound on the
communication cost of one-shot state splitting from [BCR11], i.e. the converse direction
of Theorem 3.5.
Via superdense coding this implies a lower bound on imperfect teleportation as well.
Corollary 3.55. If in the above corollary E is a qc-channel, then
d′ ≥ d2 (1− ε2)2 . (3.161)
Proof. This follows as any protocol with a lower classical communication in conjunction
with superdense coding would violate Corollary 3.54.
Lemma 1.10 shows that the lower bounds hold for protocols with diamond norm error
2ε as well, and they are essentially as tight for the diamond norm as they are for the
entanglement fidelity. This is because some extra entanglement can be used to create a
random bit string shared by Alice and Bob. Alice then applies an element of the Pauli
group to her input according to the shared random string, and Bob applies it again to
his output.
As pointed out in Subsection 3.2.1, the only kind of information that Alice can send to
Bob in port based teleportation is which port to select. This implies that we have a
lower bound on the number of ports necessary in PBT as an immediate corollary-
Corollary 3.56. Any protocol for (d, ε)-port based teleportation uses at least
N ≥ d2 (1− ε2)2 (3.162)
output ports.
3.2.4.2 The bound based on approximate universal programmable quantum
processors
Here we record the fact that one can get a lower bound on the number of ports from the
connection to approximate universal programmable quantum processors that diverges
for ε→ 0 uniformly in the dimension. This bound is superseded by the last bound that
is proven in Theorem 3.58.
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Theorem 3.57. Any ε-PBT scheme for teleporting a d-dimensional state with 8δ1+δ2 <
1
2 uses at least
N ≥ 1
2
(
log
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
)
− 1
)
(3.163)
output ports, where δ1 = 2
(√
2+ 7+ 2
√
23/2 + 32
)
and δ2 = 2ε+ ε
2.
Proof. According to Proposition 3.37 the existence of a (d, ε)-PBT scheme using N out-
put ports implies the existence of a ε-uPQP with program register size |P | = (N+d2−1N ).
According to Theorem 3.52 this implies that
(
N + d2 − 1
N
)
≥ 1
2(4δ1 + δ2)2
min
1,((pid
e
)d
(4δ1 + δ2)
2
) 2
d2+1
 . (3.164)
Using
(
e
k
)k+1/2
k! = O(1) and taking the logarithm we get
N log
(
N + d2 − 1
N
)
+ (d2 − 1) log
(
N + d2 − 1
d2 − 1
)
≥ 2 log
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
)
− 1 + 2
d2 + 1
min
(
0, d log
(
pid
e
)
− 2 log
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
))
≥ 2d
2 − 1
d2 + 1
log
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
)
− 1
≥ log
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
)
− 1. (3.165)
In the last line we used d ≥ 2. This can be safely assumed, as otherwise teleportation is
trivially possible without communication. Therefore we can bound
N log
(
N + d2 − 1
N
)
+ (d2 − 1) log
(
N + d2 − 1
d2 − 1
)
≤ N + (d2 − 1) log
(
N
d2 − 1
(
1 +
1
1− ε2 −
1
N
))
≤ 2N, (3.166)
where we used the bound on N from Corollary 3.56 in the first line and the upper bound
on ε and log x ≤ x for all x > 0 in the second line. Combining the bounds we get
N ≥ 1
2
(
log
(
1
4δ1 + δ2
)
− 1
)
. (3.167)
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3.2.4.3 The non-signaling bound
The results of this section have been obtained in collaboration with Florian Speelman
and Matthias Christandl.
In the setting of PBT, non-signaling prevents perfect success as well. If Alice performs
her measurement, but does not communicate the outcome, then Bob can at least guess
the outcome. This gives him a chance of being right of 1/N , where N is the number of
ports. On the other hand, Bob still has the marginal of the original resource state, as
Alice only acted locally. For an intuitive understanding, let us imagine that perfect PBT
were possible. Alice and Bob share a standard maximally entangled state φ+, and Alice
begins to teleport her half to Bob, but does not communicate the measurement outcome.
Bob picks a random port and measures whether his part of the preshared entangled state
and the port are in a maximally entangled state. This gives him a success probability of
pideal =
1
N
+
N − 1
N
1
d2
. (3.168)
However, his part of the maximally entangled state and any of his ports are W.L.O.G.
in the maximally mixed state, i.e. preal =
1
d2
4. This immediately implies the no-go result
of [IH08]. Let us derive a quantitative statement.
Theorem 3.58. Let d ≥ 2 and 1√
2
≥ ε > 0. Any (d, ε)-PBT protocol uses at least
N ≥ d
2
√
2ε
(3.169)
output ports.
Proof. Consider an N -port ε-PBT protocol, and the situation described above, where
Alice and Bob initially share an extra maximally entangled state |φ+〉A¯B¯ and Alice wants
to teleport her share to Bob. Let ρMBN B¯ be the state after Alice’ss measurement, but
before Bob receives the outcome information. By assumption the protocol has error at
most ε in diamond norm, i.e. there exists a state σBN−1 such that
F (ρ, ρideal) ≥
√
1− ε/2
=:
√
1− δ2 (3.170)
where
(ρideal)MBN B¯ =
N∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|M ⊗
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
BiB¯
⊗ σBic . (3.171)
4We can assume that the resource state is locally maximally mixed by Proposition 3.31.
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This follows from Uhlmann’s theorem: Given M = i, the BiB¯ marginals of the state
fulfill the proposed fidelity lower bound, but this marginal is pure in the ideal case, so
Uhlmann’s theorem immediately implies the existence of the state σ. We can assume
that σ does not depend on the port i by Proposition 3.31. On the other hand,
ρBnB¯ = ψBN ⊗ τB¯, (3.172)
where ψBN is Bob’s marginal of the resource state ψANBN used in the protocol. We imag-
ine now that Bob chooses a port i at random and performs the measurement |φ+〉〈φ+|BiB¯
vs. 1BiB¯ − |φ+〉〈φ+|BiB¯. According to Equation (3.172), the probability of getting the
outcome + is preal = 1/d
2. On the other hand we know that he would have a probability
pideal =
1
N
+
N − 1
N
1
d2
(3.173)
if he was measuring on the state ρideal. By Equation (3.170) and the fact that the fidelity
is non-decreasing under CPTP maps, we have
√
prealpideal +
√
(1− preal)(1− pideal) ≥
√
1− δ2. (3.174)
Define angles αs ∈ [0, pi/2] by the equation pi = sin2 αi, for i = real, ideal. Using a
trigonometric angle sum identity we get
√
1− δ2 ≤ sinαreal sinαideal + cosαreal cosαideal
= cos(αreal − αideal), (3.175)
and therefore
sin(αideal − αreal) ≤ δ. (3.176)
Note that preal < pideal and therefore αreal < αideal. We can bound the difference of the
probabilities as follows,
pideal − preal = sin2(αideal)− sin2(αreal)
=
cos(2αreal)− cos(2αideal)
2
= sin(αideal + αreal) sin(αideal − αreal)
≤δ sin(αideal + αreal). (3.177)
Here we used trigonometric identities in the second and third equality, and the inequality
is Equation (3.176). To bound the sine term, we use yet another trigonometric identity
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to get
sin(αideal + αreal) = sin(αideal) cos(αreal) + sin(αideal) cos(αreal)
≤√pideal +√preal (3.178)
where we used the definition of αi and pi and cosx ≤ 1 for all x ∈ R.
Combining the last two inequalities yields
√
pideal −√preal ≤ δ. (3.179)
Plugging in the expressions for pideal and preal yields
N ≥ d− 1/d
dδ2 + 2δ
. (3.180)
If d2(1 − δ2)2 > d/(4δ), then the result follows from Corollary 3.55. For the remaining
case let d2 ≤ d/(4δ). Then we can bound
d− 1/d
dδ2 + 2δ
≥ 4(d− 1/d)
9δ
≥ d
3δ
≥ d
4δ
≥ d
2
√
2ε
, (3.181)
where we used d ≥ 2 in the second inequality. This finishes the proof.
We conclude this chapter with a corollary that combines the bounds of Corollary 3.56
and Theorem 3.58 in one statement.
Corollary 3.59. Let d ≥ 2 and 1√
2
≥ ε > 0. Any (d, ε)-PBT protocol uses at least
N ≥ d ·max
(
1
2
√
2ε
, d(1− ε2)2
)
(3.182)
output ports.
This constitutes a significant improvement over previous bounds. In particular, this
constitutes the first bound that diverges uniformly in d for ε→ 0.
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Summary of Chapter 3
In the first part of this chapter, the decoupling technique and its applicability in one-shot
quantum information theory where discussed.
• Catalytic decoupling, a new generalized decoupling theorem was introduced.
• Catalytic decoupling allows appending a mixed catalyst that is returned in ap-
proximately the same state.
• It unifies two previously known techniques, and makes them available as a black
box for applications.
• That way, one-shot state merging is added to the family of tasks that can be solved
optimally using decoupling.
• The setting of free ancillary state is quite natural, as shown by the equivalence
between erasure of correlations and decoupling that does not hold otherwise.
In the second part, several results concerning port based teleportation were proven.
• Any optimal protocol can be transformed into a protocol yielding a unitarily co-
variant channel. The standard protocol is unitarily covariant as well.
• This shows that the known results in terms of the entanglement fidelity imply
similar bounds in terms of the diamond norm, without the loss of a dimension
factor.
• Port based teleportation of a d-dimensional quantum system with diamond norm
error ε requires at least d ·max
(
1
2
√
2ε
, d(1− ε2)2
)
ports.
• As a byproduct of the efforts towards a lower bound on the number of ports,
a lower bound on the dimension of the program register P of an ε-approximate
universal programmable quantum processor for a d-dimensional quantum system
is obtained, |P | ≥ O(d2/ε2) for large d.

Chapter 4
Quantum Cryptography with
classical keys – Non-malleability
and authentication
The topic of this Chapter are the results of [AM16], that have been obtained in collab-
oration with Gorjan Alagic, and large parts of this article are used here unaltered.
4.1 Introduction
In its most basic form, encryption ensures secrecy in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Besides secrecy, another desirable property is non-malleability, which guarantees that
an active adversary cannot modify the plaintext by manipulating the ciphertext. In
the classical setting, secrecy and non-malleability are independent: there are schemes
which satisfy secrecy but are malleable, and schemes which are non-malleable but
transmit the plaintext in the clear. If both secrecy and non-malleability is desired,
then pairwise-independent permutations provide information-theoretically perfect (one-
time) security [KPT11]. In the computational security setting, non-malleability can
be achieved by message authentication codes (MACs), and ensures chosen-ciphertext
security for authenticated encryption.
In the setting of quantum information, encryption is the task of transmitting quantum
states over a completely insecure quantum channel. Information-theoretic secrecy for
quantum encryption is well-understood. Non-malleability, on the other hand, has only
been studied in one previous work, by Ambainis, Bouda and Winter [ABW09]. Their
definition (which we will call ABW-non-malleability, or ABW-NM) requires that the
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scheme satisfies secrecy, and that the “effective channel” Dec ◦ Λ ◦ Enc of any adversary
Λ amounts to either the identity map or replacement by some fixed state. In the case of
unitary schemes, ABW-NM is equivalent to encrypting with a unitary two-design. Uni-
tary two-designs are a natural quantum analogue of pairwise-independent permutations,
and can be efficiently constructed in a number of ways (see, e.g., [BHH12, DCEL09].)
While quantum non-malleability has only been considered by [ABW09], the closely-
related task of quantum authentication (where decryption is allowed to reject) has
received significant attention (see, e.g., [ABE10, BCG+02, BW16a, DNS12, GYZ16].)
The widely-adopted definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail asks that the averaged
effective channel of any adversary is close to a map which does not touch the plain-
text [DNS12]; we refer to this notion as DNS-authentication. Recent work by Garg, Yuen
and Zhandry [GYZ16] established another notion of quantum authentication, which they
call “total authentication.” The notion of total authentication has two major differences
from previous definitions: (i.) it asks for success with high probability over the choice
of keys, rather than simply on average, and (ii.) it makes no demands whatsoever in
the case that decryption rejects. We refer to this notion of quantum authentication as
GYZ-authentication. In [GYZ16], it is shown that GYZ-authentication can be satisfied
with unitary eight-designs.
In this Chapter, we devise a new definition of non-malleability (denoted NM) for quan-
tum encryption, improving on ABW-NM in a number of ways. First, we consider more
powerful adversaries, which can possess side information about the plaintext. Second,
we remove the possibility of a “plaintext injection” attack, whereby an adversary against
an ABW-NM scheme can send a plaintext of their choice to the receiver. Finally, our defi-
nition does not demand secrecy; instead, we show that quantum secrecy is a consequence
of quantum non-malleability. This is a significant departure from the classical case, and
is analogous to the fact that quantum authentication implies secrecy [BCG+02].
The primary consequence of our work is twofold: first, encryption with unitary two-
designs satisfies all of the above notions of quantum non-malleability; second, when
equipped with blank “tag” qubits, the same scheme also satisfies all of the above notions
of quantum authentication. A more detailed summary of the results is as follows. For
schemes which have unitary encryption maps, we prove that NM is equivalent to encryp-
tion with unitary two-designs, and hence also to ABW-NM. For non-unitary schemes, we
prove a characterization theorem for NM schemes that shows that NM implies ABW-NM,
and provide a strong separation example between NM and ABW-NM (the aforementioned
plaintext injection attack). In the case of GYZ authentication, we prove that two-designs
(with tags) are sufficient, a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art, which re-
quires eight-designs [GYZ16]. Moreover, the simulation of adversaries in this proof is
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efficient, in the sense of Broadbent and Wainewright [BW16a]. Finally, we show that
GYZauthentication implies DNS-authentication, and that equipping an arbitrary NM
scheme with tags yields DNS-authentication.
An independent work of C. Portmann on quantum authentication gives an alternative
proof that GYZ-authentication can be satisfied by the 2-design scheme [Por16].
We now recall the definition of unitary t-design, and some relevant variants. We begin
by considering three different types of “twirls.”
1. For a finite subset D ⊂ U(H) of the unitary group on some finite dimensional
Hilbert space H, let
T (t)D (X) =
1
|D|
∑
U∈D
U⊗tX
(
U †
)⊗t
(4.1)
be the associated t-twirling channel. If we take the entire unitary group (rather
than just a finite subset), then we get the Haar t-twirling channel
T (t)Haar(X) =
∫
U⊗tX
(
U †
)⊗t
dU. (4.2)
The case t = 2 is characterized as follows.
Lemma 4.1. Let MA2B be a matrix on H⊗2A ⊗ HB. Then we have the following
formula for integration with respect to the Haar measure:∫
U⊗2A MA2B(U
⊗2
A )
†dU = 1A2 ⊗R1B + FA ⊗RFB, (4.3)
with
R1B =
1
d(d2 − 1) (dtrA2M − trA2FM) ,
RFB =
1
d(d2 − 1) (dtrA2FM − trA2M) . (4.4)
Proof. By Schur’s lemma,∫
U⊗2A MA2B(U
⊗2
A )
†dU = Π∧ ⊗R∧ + Π∨ ⊗R∨ (4.5)
for some matrices R
∧
and R
∨
, where Π∧ is the projector onto the antisymmetric
subspace and Π∨ the projector onto the symmetric subspace. As Π∧ = (1−F )/2
and Π∨ = (1+F )/2, this implies the correctness of Equation (4.3). The formulas
(4.4) follow by applying trA and trA(F (·)) to both sides of Equation (4.3) and
solving the resulting system of 2 equations for R1B and R
F
B.
Quantum Cryptography with classical keys – Non-malleability and authentication 98
2. We define the U -U twirl with respect to finite D ⊂ U(H) by
T D(X) = 1|D|
∑
U∈D
(
U ⊗ U)X (U ⊗ U)† . (4.6)
The analogous U -U Haar twirling channel is denoted by T Haar.
3. The third and final notion is called a channel twirl; this is defined in terms of
U -U -twirling, as follows. Given a channel Λ, let ηΛ be the CJ state of Λ. The
channel twirl T chD (Λ) of Λ is defined to be the channel whose CJ state is T D(ηΛ).
Next, we define three notions of designs, corresponding to the three types of twirl defined
above.
Definition 4.2. Let D ⊂ U(H) be a finite set. We define the following.
• If ∥∥T (t)D − T (t)Haar∥∥ ≤ δ holds, then D is a δ-approximate t-design.
• If ∥∥T D − T Haar∥∥ ≤ δ holds, then D is a δ-approximate U -U -twirl design.
• If ∥∥T chD (Λ)− T chHaar(Λ)∥∥ ≤ δ holds for all CPTP maps Λ, then D is a δ-approximate
channel-twirl design.
For all three of the above, the case δ = 0 is called an “exact design” (or simply “design”.)
All three notions of design are equivalent in the exact case. In the approximate case they
are still connected, but there are some nontrivial costs in the approximation quality. A
lemma relating approximate 2-designs and channel twirl designs can be found in [Low10]
(Lemma 2.2.14). The following Lemma completes the picture in the approximate case.
Lemma 4.3. Let dimH = d, and let D ⊂ U(H) be a finite set.
• If D is a δ-approximate channel twirl, then it is also a d · δ-approximate U -U twirl
design.
• If D is a δ-approximate U -U twirl design, then it is also a d·δ-approximate channel
twirl design.
Proof. Let D be a channel twirl design and ρAA′B be a quantum state with A
′ ∼= A and
B arbitrary. Let furthermore
σAA′B = (1− ρA′)1/2ρ−1/2A′ ρAA′Bρ−1/2A′ (1− ρA′)1/2.
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Then
ηAA′BC =
1
d
(ρAA′B ⊗ |0〉〈0|C + σAA′B ⊗ |1〉〈1|C)
is positive semidefinite, has trace 1 and ηA′ = τA′ , i.e. it is the CJ-state of a quantum
channel ΛA→ABC . By assumption we have that∥∥∥T chD (Λ)− T chHaar(Λ)∥∥∥ ≤ δ.
This implies in particular that the CJ states of the two channels have trace norm distance
at most δ, i.e.
δ ≥∥∥T D(η)− T Haar(η)∥∥1
=
1
d
(∥∥T D(ρ)− T Haar(ρ)∥∥1 + ∥∥T D(σ)− T Haar(σ)∥∥1)
≥1
d
∥∥T D(ρ)− T Haar(ρ)∥∥1 . (4.7)
As ρ was chosen arbitrarily this implies
∥∥T D − T Haar∥∥ ≤ d · δ. (4.8)
Conversely, let D be a U -U -twirl design, and let ΛA→A be a CPTP map and |ψ〉AA′ ∈
HA ⊗ HA′ be an arbitrary state vector with HA′ ∼= HA. For calculating the diamond
norm, we can choose |ψ〉AA′ =
√
dψA′ |φ+〉AA′ . We bound∥∥∥[(T chD − T chHaar) (Λ)]
A→A
(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′)
∥∥∥
1
=d
∥∥∥∥[(T chD − T chHaar) (Λ)]A→A
(
ψ
1
2
A′
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AA′ ψ
1
2
A′
)∥∥∥∥
1
=d
∥∥∥∥ψ 12A′ [(T D − T Haar) (ηΛ)AA′]ψ 12A′∥∥∥∥
1
≤d‖ψA′‖∞
∥∥(T D − T Haar) (ηΛ)AA′∥∥1
≤d · δ.
Here we used the mirror lemma in the second equality, the Ho¨lder inequality twice in the
first inequality, and the fact that ‖ρ‖∞ ≤ 1 for any quantum state ρ, and the assumption,
in the last inequality.
It is well-known that ε-approximate t-designs on n qubits can be generated by random
quantum circuits of size polynomial in n, t and log(1/ε) [BHH12]. In particular, the size
of these circuits is polynomial even for exponentially-small choices of ε. We emphasize
this observation as follows.
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Remark 4.4. Fix a polynomial t in n. Then, for any ε > 0, a random n-qubit quantum
circuit consisting of poly(n, log(1/ε)) gates (from a universal set) satisfies every notion
of -approximate t-design in Definition 4.2.
For exact designs, we point out two important constructions. First, the prototypical
example of a unitary one-design on n qubits is the n-qubit Pauli group. For exact
unitary two-designs, the standard example is the Clifford group, which is the normalizer
of the n-qubit Pauli group. Alternatively, the Clifford group is generated by circuits
from the gate set {H,P,CNOT}. It is well-known that one can efficiently generate
exact unitary two-designs on n-qubits by building appropriate circuits from this gate
set, using O(n2) random bits [AG04, DCEL09].
4.2 The zero-error setting
We begin with the zero-error. In the case of secrecy, zero-error means that schemes
cannot leak any information whatsoever. In the case of non-malleability, zero-error
means that the adversary cannot increase their correlations with the secret by even an
infinitesimal amount (except by trivial means; see below.)
4.2.1 Perfect secrecy
We begin with a definition of symmetric-key quantum encryption. Our formulation
treats rejection during decryption in a slightly different manner from previous literature.
Definition 4.5 (Encryption scheme). A symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme
(QES) is a triple (τK , E,D) consisting of a classical state τK ∈ End(HK) and a pair of
channels
E : End(HA ⊗HK) −→ End(HC ⊗HK)
D : End(HC ⊗HK) −→ End((HA ⊕ C |⊥〉)⊗HK)
satisfying [D ◦ E](· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) = (idA ⊕ 0⊥)⊗ |k〉〈k| for all k.
The Hilbert spaces HA, HC and HK are implicitly defined by the triple (τK , E,D).
The state |⊥〉 is an error flag that allows the decryption map to report an error. For
notational convenience when dealing with these schemes, we set
Ek = E(· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) EK = trKE(· ⊗ τK)
Dk = D(· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) DK = trKD(· ⊗ τK) .
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We will often slightly abuse notation by referring to decryption maps Dk as maps from C
to A; in fact, the output space of Dk is really the slightly larger space HA¯ := HA⊕C |⊥〉.
In many situations it makes sense to restrict ourselves to QES that have identical plain-
text and ciphertext spaces; due to correctness, this is equivalent to unitarity.
Definition 4.6 (Unitary scheme). A QES (τK , E,D) is called unitary if the encryption
and decryption maps are controlled unitaries, i.e., if there exists V =
∑
k U
(k)
A ⊗ |k〉〈k|K
such that E(X) = V XV †.
It is straightforward to prove that, for unitary schemes, ITS is equivalent to the statement
that the encryption maps {Ek} form a unitary 1-design. Note that unitarity of Ek and
correctness imply unitarity of Dk.
It is natural to define secrecy in the quantum world in terms of quantum mutual in-
formation. However, instead of asking for the ciphertext to be uncorrelated with the
plaintext as in the classical case, we ask for the ciphertext to be uncorrelated from any
reference system.
Definition 4.7 (Perfect secrecy). A QES (τK , E,D) satisfies information - theoretic
secrecy (ITS) if, for any Hilbert space HB and any ρAB ∈ End(HA ⊗ HB), setting
σCBK = E(ρAB ⊗ τK) implies I(C : B)σ = 0.
We note that, for perfect ITS, adding side information is unnecessary: the definition
already implies that the ciphertext is in product with any other system. In particular,
if the adversary has some auxiliary system E in their possession, then I(B : CE)σ =
I(B : E)σ. Several definitions of secrecy for symmetric-key quantum encryption have
appeared in the literature, but the above formulation appears to be new. In the case
of unitary schemes, information-theoretic quantum secrecy is equivalent to the unitary
one-design property.
Proposition 4.8. A unitary QES (τK , E,D) is ITS if and only if D = {Uk}k∈K is a
unitary 1-design, where Ek(X) = UkXU
†
k .
Proof. Let D be a unitary 1-design. Then the scheme is ITSby Schur’s Lemma (See, e.g.,
[FH91]). Conversely, let (τK , E,D) be ITS, i.e. T (1)D (ρAB) = (EK)(ρAB) = T (1)D (ρA)⊗ρB.
Suppose that there exist ρA, ρ
′
A such that T (1)D (ρA) 6= T (1)D (ρ′A). Then I(A : B)σ >
0 for σ = E(12 (ρA ⊗ |0〉〈0|B + ρ′A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B)), which is a contradiction. This implies
T
(1)
D (ρA) = σ
0
A for all ρA. But T
(1)
D (τA) = τA, i.e. σ
0
A = τA. The observation that the
positive semidefinite matrices span the whole matrix space finishes the proof.
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A different formulation of information-theoretic secrecy is the notion of indistinguisha-
bility of ciphertexts, or IND.
Definition 4.9 (IND). A QES(τK , E,D) is IND, if the encryption with a random key is
a constant channel, i.e. EK(X) = tr(X)EK(τA).
The two notions of perfect secrecy (ITS and IND) are equivalent.
Proposition 4.10. A QES (τK , E,D) is ITS if and only if it is IND.
Proof. Let (τK , E,D) be ITS. Then there exists a σ
C
0 such that for all ρAB (EK)KA→KC(ρAB) =
σ0C ⊗ ρB. This can be seen as follows: By definition every ρAB is mapped to a prod-
uct state. Suppose now EK(ρA) 6= EK(ρ′A), then I(C : B)σCB 6= 0 with σCB =
EK(
1
2(ρA ⊗ |0〉〈0|B + ρ′A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B)), a contradiction. From this observation the IND-
property follows immediately.
Conversely, let (τK , E,D) be IND, that is in particular∥∥∥(EK)A→C(ρ(0)A − ρ(1)A )∥∥∥
1
= 0 (4.9)
for all ρ
(i)
A , i = 0, 1, i.e. (EK)A→C = σ
0
Ctr(·) for some quantum state σ0C , as the set of
quantum states spans all of End(HC). Now the ITS-property follows immediately.
4.2.2 A new notion of non-malleability
4.2.2.1 Definition
We consider a scenario involving a user Alice and an adversary Mallory. The scenario
begins with Mallory preparing a tripartite state ρABR over three registers: the plaintext
A, the reference R, and the side-information B. The registers A and R are given to Alice,
while Mallory keeps B. Alice then encrypts A into a ciphertext C and then transmits
(or stores) it in the open. Mallory now applies an attack map
Λ : End(HC ⊗HB)→ End(HC ⊗HB˜) .
Mallory keeps the (transformed) side-information B˜ and returns C to Alice. Finally,
Alice decrypts C back to A, and the scenario ends. We are now interested in measuring
the extent to which Mallory was able to increase her correlations with Alice’s systems
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Figure 6: The quantum non-malleability scenario.
A and R. This can be understood by analyzing the mutual information I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(ρ)
where Λ˜AB→AB˜ is the effective channel corresponding to Mallory’s attack:
Λ˜ = trK(D ◦ Λ ◦ E)((·)⊗ τK) . (4.10)
We point out one way in which Mallory can always increase these correlations, regardless
of the structure of the encryption scheme. First, she flips a coin b, and records the
outcome in B. If b = 1, she replaces the contents of C with some fixed state σC ,
and otherwise she leaves C untouched. One then sees that Mallory’s correlations have
increased by h(p=(Λ, ρ)), where h denotes binary entropy and p= is a defined as follows.
p=(Λ, ρ) = tr
[
(φ+CC′ ⊗ 1B˜)Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ ρB)
]
. (4.11)
This quantity is the inner product between the identity map and the map Λ(( · )⊗ ρB),
expressed in terms of CJ states. Intuitively, it measures the probability with which
Mallory chooses to apply the identity map; taking the binary entropy then gives us the
information gain resulting from recording this choice.
We are now ready to define information-theoretic quantum non-malleability. Stated
informally, a scheme is non-malleable if Mallory can only implement the attacks described
above.
Definition 4.11 (Non-malleability). A QES (τK , E,D) is non-malleable (NM) if for
any state ρABR and any CPTP map ΛCB→CB˜, we have
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(ρ) ≤ I(AR : B)ρ + h(p=(Λ, ρ)). (4.12)
One might justifiably wonder if the term h(p=(Λ, ρ)) is too generous to the adversary.
However, as we showed above, every scheme is vulnerable to an attack which gains this
amount of information. This term also appears (somewhat disguised) in the classical
setting. In fact, if a classical encryption scheme satisfies Definition 4.11 against classi-
cal adversaries, then it also satisfies classical information-theoretic non-malleability as
defined in [KPT11]. Finally, as we will show in later sections, Definition 4.11 implies
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ABW-NM (see Definition 4.19), and schemes satisfying Definition 4.11 are sufficient for
building quantum authentication under the strongest known definitions.
4.2.2.2 Relationship to classical non-malleability
A desirable property of the quantum generalization of any classical security notion is,
that the former implies the latter when restricting to the classical scenario. We begin
by recalling the following definition of classical, information-theoretic non-malleability.
To this end we set down the notation in the classical case by giving a definition of a
classical symmetric key encryption scheme.
Definition 4.12. Let X , C,K be finite alphabets. A symmetric key encryption scheme
(SKES) (K,E,D) is a key random variable (RV) K on K together with a pair of stochas-
tic maps E : X ×K → C and D : C × K → X ∪ {⊥} such that
E(·, k) ◦D(·, k) = idX 1, (4.13)
where idX denotes the identity function of X ( correctness). We write Ek = E(·, k) and
analoguously Dk.
Definition 4.13 (Classical non-malleability [KPT11]). A classical SKES scheme (K,E,D)
is non-malleable if the following holds. For all RVs X on X independent of the key, and
all RVs C˜ on C independent of the key given X,C = E(X,K) such that P[C˜ = C] = 0,
I(X˜ : C˜|XC) = 0, (4.14)
where X˜ = D(C˜,K).
The following proposition shows that, if a classical scheme satisfies our notion of information-
theoretic quantum non-malleability, then it is also classically non-malleable according
to Definition 4.13 above.
Proposition 4.14. Let (τK , D,E) be a SKES embedded in to the quantum formalism in
the standard way, which satisfies NM. Then it is information theoretically non-malleable.
Proof. Let B be a trivial system and ρAR be a maximally correlated classical state. Let
furthermore B˜ ∼= CC ′, and let ΛC→CB˜ be a classical map from C to C that makes a copy
of both input and output to the B˜ register and where tr
(|i〉〈i|C ⊗ 1B˜)ΛC→CB˜(|i〉〈i|C) =
1This again is a slight abuse of notation, more correctly the composition of encryption and decryption
yields the canonical injection of X into X ∪ {⊥}.
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0 for all standard basis vectors |i〉 (this is the condition P[C = C˜] = 0). Then p=(Λ) = 0,
and therefore according to the assumption
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(ρ) = 0, (4.15)
as B was trivial. Let X,C, C˜, X˜ be random variables corresponding to the systems A in
the beginning, C after encryption, C after the application of Λ and A after decryption,
respectively. Then Equation (4.15) reads
0 =I(XX˜ : CC˜)
=I(XX˜ : C) + I(XX˜ : C˜|C) (4.16)
=I(XX˜ : C) + I(X : C˜|C) + I(X˜ : C˜|CX), (4.17)
as the input state was maximally classically correlated. The fact that all (conditional)
mutual information terms above are non-negative finishes the proof.
4.2.2.3 Non-malleability implies secrecy
In the classical case, non-malleability is independent from secrecy: the one-time pad
is secret but malleable, and non-malleability is unaffected by appending the plaintext
to each ciphertext. In the quantum case, on the other hand, we can show that NM
implies secrecy. This is analogous to the fact that “quantum authentication implies
encryption” [BCG+02]. The intuition is straightforward: (i.) one can only make use of
one copy of the plaintext due to no-cloning, and (ii.) if the adversary can distinguish
between two computational-basis states (e.g., |0〉 and |1〉) then they can also apply an
undetectable Fourier-basis operation (e.g., mapping |+〉 to |−〉). The technical statement
and proof follows.
Proposition 4.15. Let (τK , E,D) be an NM QES. Then (τK , E,D) is ITS.
Proof. Let B, ρAB, and σCBK = E(ρAB ⊗ τK) be as in the definition of ITS (Definition
4.7). We first rename B to R. We then consider the non-malleability property in the
following special-case scenario. The initial side-information register is empty, the final
side-information register B˜ satisfies HB˜ ∼= HC , and the adversary map ΛC→CB˜ is defined
as follows. Note that the “ciphertext-extraction” map ΘC→CB˜ = idC→B˜(·)⊗ τC has CJ
state ηΘ
CC′B˜ = φ
+
C′B˜
⊗ τC . We choose Λ so that its CJ state satisfies
ηΛ
CC′B˜ =
d2
d2 − 1Π
−
CC′ η
Θ
CC′B˜ Π
−
CC′ . (4.18)
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Applying the above projection to the CJ state of Θ ensures that Λ will have p=(Λ) = 0
(note: p=(Θ) > 0.)
Direct calculation of the C ′B˜ marginal of the CJ state of Λ yields
ηΛ
C′B˜ =
d2 − 2
d2 − 1φ
+
C′B˜
+
1
d2 − 1τC′ ⊗ τB˜. (4.19)
This implies that the output σARB˜ = Λ˜A→AB˜(ρAB) of the effective channel Λ˜ will satisfy
σB˜R =
d2 − 2
d2 − 1γB˜R +
1
d2 − 1τB˜ ⊗ ρR, (4.20)
where γCR = (EK)A→C(ρAR) and we used the fact that HB˜ ∼= HC . By non-malleability,
we have
I(B˜ : R)σ + I(B˜ : A|R)σ = I(B˜ : AR)σ = 0. (4.21)
In particular, I(B˜ : R)σ = 0 and thus σB˜R = σB˜⊗ρR. It follows by Equation (4.20) that
γB˜R =
d2 − 1
d2 − 2
(
σB˜ −
1
d2 − 1τB˜
)
⊗ ρR, (4.22)
i.e., γB˜R is a product state. This is precisely the definition of information-theoretic
secrecy.
4.2.2.4 Characterization of non-malleable schemes
Next, we provide a characterization of non-malleable schemes. First, we show that
unitary schemes are equivalent to encryption with a unitary 2-design.
Theorem 4.16. A unitary QES (τK , E,D) is NM if and only if {Ek}k∈K is a unitary
2-design.
This fact is particularly intuitive when the 2-design is the Clifford group, a well-known
exact 2-design. In that case, a Pauli operator acting on only one ciphertext qubit will be
“propagated” (by the encryption circuit) to a completely random Pauli on all plaintext
qubits. The plaintext is then maximally mixed, and the adversary gains no information.
The Clifford group thus yields a perfectly non-malleable (and perfectly secret) encryption
scheme using O(n2) bits of key [AG04].
It will be convenient to prove Theorem 4.16 as a consequence of our general character-
ization theorem. To prove it, we need a lemma, a kind of generalized data processing
inequality.
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Lemma 4.17. Let Λ
(i)
A→A′ be CPTP maps and Λ
(i)
B→B′, i = 1, ..., k CP maps for i =
1, ..., k such that
∑
i Λ
(i)
B→B′ is trace preserving. Let Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′ = Λ
(i)
A→A′ ⊗ Λ(i)B→B′ and
define the CPTP maps
ΛAB→A′B′C =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|C and
Λ′B→B′C =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
B→B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|C . (4.23)
Then
I(A′ : B′)Λ(ρ) ≤ I(A : B)ρ +H(C|A)Λ′(ρ) ≤ I(A : B)ρ +H(C)Λ(ρ) (4.24)
for any quantum state ρAB.
Proof. Let ρAB be a quantum state and define the following quantum states,
σA′B′CC′ =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′(ρAB)⊗ |i〉〈i|C ⊗ |i〉〈i|C′ and
σ′AB′CC′ =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
B→B′(ρAB)⊗ |i〉〈i|C ⊗ |i〉〈i|C′ , (4.25)
i.e. σ and σ′ are Λ and Λ′ applied to ρ with an extra copy of C. We bound
I(A′ : B′)σ ≤I(A′C : B′C ′)σ
≤I(AC : B′C ′)σ′
=I(A : B′C ′)σ′ + I(C : B′C ′|A)σ′
=I(A : B′C ′)σ′ +H(C|A)σ′
≤I(A : B)ρ +H(C|A)σ′
≤I(A : B)ρ +H(C)σ′ . (4.26)
The first and second inequality are due to the data processing inequality of the quan-
tum mutual information. The first equality is the chain rule for the quantum mutual
information. The second equation is the fact that the mutual information of two copies
of a classical system cannot be increased by adding systems on one side, relative to any
conditioning system, and is equal to its entropy. The third inequality is due to the data
processing inequality for the quantum mutual information again and the last inequality
is the fact that conditioning can only decrease entropy. Using the definition of σ and σ′
this implies the claim.
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Non-malleable quantum encryption schemes can be characterized in terms of the effective
map an attack achieves.
Theorem 4.18. Let (τ, E,D) be a QES. Then (τ, E,D) is NM if and only if, for any
attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜ has the form
Λ˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (4.27)
where Λ′ = trCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = trCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
We remark that the forward direction holds even if (τ, E,D) only fulfills the NM condition
(Equation (4.12)) against adversaries with empty side-information B. The full proof is
somewhat technical and will be given in the approximate setting (Theorem 4.26). Here
we give a proof sketch to convey the idea of the proof without the full bulky analysis
being in the way.
Proof sketch. The first implication, i.e. NM implies Equation (4.27), is best proven in
the Choi-Jamoi lkowski picture. Here, any QES defines a map
ECC′→AA′ = 1|K|
∑
k
Dk ⊗ ETk , (4.28)
where the transpose ETk is the map whose Kraus operators are the transposes of the
Kraus operators of Ek (in the standard basis). Our goal is to prove that this map
essentially acts like the UU¯ -twirl. We decompose the space H⊗2C as
H⊗2C = C |φ+〉 ⊕ suppΠ− (4.29)
which induces a decomposition of
End(H⊗2C ) = C
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣⊕ {∣∣φ+〉〈v| ∣∣∣ 〈φ+〉 v = 0}
⊕
{
|v〉〈φ+∣∣ ∣∣∣ 〈φ+〉 v = 0}⊕ {X ∈ B∣∣∣ 〈φ+|X = X |φ+〉 = 0} . (4.30)
On the first and last direct summands, the correct behavior of E is easy to show: the
first one corresponds to the identity, and the last one to the non-identity channels Λ with
p=(Λ) = 0. For the remaining two spaces, we employ Lemma 4.28 which shows that the
encryption map of any valid encryption scheme has the form of appending an ancillary
mixed state and then applying an isometry. Evaluating E(|φ+〉〈v|) for 〈φ+〉 v = 0 reduces
to evaluating the adjoint of the average encryption map, E†K , on traceless matrices. It
is, however, easy to verify that
trAECC′→AA′(σC ⊗ (·)C′) = (ETK)C′→A′
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for any σC . This can be used to prove EK = 〈τC〉 by observing that 〈φ+|CC′ σC ⊗
ρC′ |φ+〉CC′ = tr(σCρC), so for rank-deficient ρ we can calculate ECC′→AA′(σC ⊗ (·)C′)
using what we have already proven.
The other direction is proven by a simple application of Lemma 4.17.
The fact that NM is equivalent to 2-designs (for unitary schemes) is a straightforward
consequence of the above.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.16) First, assume (τK , E,D) is a unitary NM QES with Ek =
Uk(·)U †k . Then it has |C| = |A|, and DK(τC) = τA, so the conclusion of Theorem
4.18 in this case (i.e., Equation (4.27)) is exactly the condition for {Uk} to be an exact
channel twirl design and therefore an exact 2-design. If (τK , E,D), on the other hand,
is a unitary QES and {Uk} is a 2-design, then Equation (4.27) holds and the scheme is
therefore NM according to Theorem 4.18.
4.2.2.5 Relationship to ABW non-malleability
Ambainis, Bouda and Winter give a different definition of non-malleability, expressed in
terms of the effective maps that an adversary can apply to the plaintext by acting on
the ciphertext produced from encrypting with a random key [ABW09]. According to
their definition, a scheme is non-malleable if the adversary can only apply maps from a
very restricted class when averaging over the key, and without giving side information
to the active adversary. Let us recall their definition here.
First, given a QES (τK , E,D), we define the set S := {DK(σC) |σC ∈ End(HC)} con-
sisting of all valid average decryptions. We then define the class CSA of all “replacement
channels”. This is the set of CPTP maps belonging to the space
spanR{idA, (X 7→ tr(X)σA) : σA ∈ S} . (4.31)
We then make the following definition, which first appeared in [ABW09].
Definition 4.19 (ABW non-malleability). A QES (τK , E,D) is ABW-non-malleable
(ABW-NM) if it is ITS, and for all channels ΛC→C , we have
trK [DCK→AK ◦ ΛC→C ◦ EAK→CK( · ⊗ τK)] ∈ CSA. (4.32)
As indicated in [ABW09], an approximate version of Equation (4.32) is obtained by
considering the diamond-norm distance between the effective channel and the set CSA;
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this implies the possibility of an auxiliary reference system, which is denoted R in NM.
We emphasize that this reference system is not under the control of the adversary. In
particular, ABW-NM does not allow for adversaries which maintain and actively use side
information about the plaintext system.
Another notable distinction is that [ABW09] includes a secrecy assumption in the defi-
nition of an encryption scheme; under this assumption, it is shown that a unitary QES is
ABW-NM if and only if the encryption unitaries form a 2-design. By our Theorem 4.16,
we see that NM and ABW-NM are equivalent in the case of unitary schemes. So, in
that case, ABW-NM actually ensures a much stronger security notion than originally
considered by the authors of [ABW09].
In the general case, NM is strictly stronger than ABW-NM. First, by comparing the con-
ditions of Definition 4.19 to Equation (4.27), we immediately get the following corollary
of Theorem 4.18.
Corollary 4.20. If a QES satisfies NM, then it also satisfies ABW-NM.
Second, we give a separation example which shows that ABW-NM is highly insecure; in
fact, it allows the adversary to“inject”a plaintext of their choice into the ciphertext. This
is insecure even under the classical definition of information-theoretic non-malleability
of [KPT11]. We now describe the scheme and this attack.
Example 4.21. Suppose (τK , E,D) is a QES that is both NM and ABW-NM. Define
a modified scheme (τK , E
′, D′), with enlarged ciphertext space HC′ = HC ⊕HAˆ (where
HAˆ ∼= HA) and encryption and decryption defined by
E′(X) = E(X)C ⊕ 0Aˆ
D′(X) = DCK→AK(ΠCXΠC) + idAˆK→AK(ΠAˆXΠAˆ) .
Then (τK , E
′, D′) is ABW-NM but not NM.
While encryption ignores HAˆ, decryption measures if we are in C or Aˆ and then decrypts
(in the first case) or just outputs the contents (in the second case.) This is a dramatic
violation of NM: set HB˜ ∼= HA, trivial B and R, and
ΛC′→C′B˜(X) = tr(X)0C ⊕
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AˆB˜
; (4.33)
it follows that, for all ρ,
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(ρ) = 2 log |A|  h(|C ′|−2) = h(p=(Λ, ρ)) . (4.34)
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Now let us show that (τ, E′, D′) is still ABW-NM. Let ΛC′→C′ be an attack, i.e., an
arbitrary CPTP map. Then the effective plaintext map is
Λ˜A→A = D ◦ ΛCC→C ◦ E + ΛAˆC→A ◦ E, (4.35)
where ΛC(XC) = ΠCΛ(XC ⊕ 0Aˆ)ΠC and ΛAˆ(XC) = idAˆ→A(ΠAˆΛ(XC ⊕ 0Aˆ)ΠAˆ). Since
(τ, E,D) is ITS (Theorem 4.15), there exists a fixed state ρ0C such that EK(ρA) = ρ
0
C
for all ρA. Since (τ, E,D) is ABW-NM, we also know that
trK ◦D ◦ ΛCC→C ◦ E = Λ˜1 ∈ CSA ,
with S = {DK(σC) |σC ∈ End(HC)}. We therefore get
Λ˜A→A = Λ˜1 + 〈ΛAˆ(ρ0C)〉 ∈ CS
′
A , (4.36)
with S′ = {D′K(σC′) |σC′ ∈ End(HC′)}. This is true because S′ contains all constant
maps, as D′K(0C ⊕ ρAˆ) = ρA.
4.3 The approximate setting
We now consider the case of approximate non-malleability. Approximate schemes are
relevant for several reasons. First, an approximate scheme with negligible error can be
more efficient than an exact one: the most efficient construction of an exact 2-design
requires a quantum circuit of O(n log n log log n) gates [CLLW16], where approximate
2-designs can be achieved with linear-length circuits [DCEL09]. Second, in practice,
absolutely perfect implementation of all quantum gates is too much to expect—even
with error-correction. Third, when passing to authentication one must allow for errors,
as it is always possible for the adversary to escape detection (with low probability) by
guessing the secret key.
For all these reasons, it is important to understand what happens when the perfect
secrecy and perfect non-malleability requirements are slightly relaxed. In this section,
we show that our definitions and results are stable under such relaxations, and prove
several additional results for quantum authentication. We begin with the approximate-
case analogue of perfect secrecy.
Definition 4.22 (Approximate secrecy, ε-ITS and ε-IND). Fix ε > 0. A QES (τK , E,D)
is ε-approximately secret (-ITS) if, for any HB and any ρAB, setting σCBK = E(ρAB ⊗
τK) implies I(C : B)σ ≤ ε. (τK , E,D) is called ε-IND, if for all pairs of quantum states
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ρAB and σAB,
1
2
‖(EK)A→C (ρAB − σAB)‖1 ≤
1
2
‖ρB − σB)‖1 + ε. (4.37)
Analogously to the exact case, unitary schemes satisfying approximate secrecy are equiv-
alent to approximate one-designs.
Using Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 1.12) and the Alicki-Fannes inequality (Lemma 1.13)
one can also show that ε-ITS implies (4
√
2ε)-IND, and that ε-IND implies (4h(ε) +
6ε log |A|)-ITS.
The following example shows that, in the approximate setting, there exist unitary
schemes which can only be broken with access to side information. This is in contrast
to the exact setting, where side information is unhelpful.
Example 4.23. Let D = {Uˆ (k)}k be an exact unitary 2-design on a Hilbert space HA
of even dimension |A| = d. Let VA be the unitary matrix with
Vj (d−j+1) = i · sign(d− 2j + 1)
for all j, and all other entries equal to zero. Set, for each k,
U (k) = Uˆ (k)V
(
Uˆ (k)
)T
.
Define a QES by Ek(X) = U
(k)X
(
U (k)
)†
and Dk = E
†
k.
It is easy to check that EK(XA) =
1
d−1(dτA−XTA) is the Werner-Holevo channel [WH02].
For any two quantum states ρA, ρ
′
A,
∥∥EK(ρA)− EK(ρ′A)∥∥1 = 1d− 1 ∥∥∥ρ′TA − ρTA∥∥∥1
≤ 2
d− 1 . (4.38)
On the other hand
‖EK − 〈τ〉‖ =
1
d− 1 ‖〈τ〉 − θ‖
≥ 1
d− 1 (‖θ‖ − ‖〈τ〉‖)
≥1. (4.39)
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The last step follows because the transposition map, here denoted by θ, has diamond
norm d2. By the definition of the diamond norm there exists a state ρAB such that
‖EK(ρAB − τA ⊗ ρB)‖1 = ‖(EK − 〈τA〉) (ρAB)‖1 ≥ 1. (4.40)
In other words, we have exhibited a QES that is not ε-IND for any ε < 1/2, but adver-
saries without side information achieve only negligible distinguishing advantage.
4.3.1 Approximate non-malleability
4.3.1.1 Definition
We now define a natural approximate-case analogue of NM, i.e., Definition 4.11. Let
us briefly recall the context. The malleability scenario is described by systems A, C,
B and R (respectively, plaintext, ciphertext, side-information, and reference), an ini-
tial tripartite state ρABR, and an attack channel ΛCB→CB˜. Given this data, we have
the effective channel Λ˜AB→AB˜ defined in Equation (4.10) and the “unavoidable attack”
probability p=(Λ, ρ) defined in Equation (4.11). The new definition now simply relaxes
the requirement on the increase of the adversary’s mutual information.
Definition 4.24 (Approximate non-malleability). A QES (τK , E,D) is ε-non-malleable
(ε-NM) if for any state ρABR and any CPTP map ΛCB→CB˜, we have
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(ρ) ≤ I(AR : B)ρ + h(p=(Λ, ρ)) + ε. (4.41)
We record the approximate version of Theorem 4.15, i.e., non-malleability implies se-
crecy. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the exact case.
Proposition 4.25. Let (τK , E,D) be an ε-NM QES. Then (τK , E,D) is 2ε-ITS.
4.3.1.2 Non-malleability with approximate designs
Continuing as before, we now generalize the characterization theorems of non-malleability
(Theorem 4.18 and Theorem 4.16) to the approximate case.
Theorem 4.26. Let (τ, E,D) be a QES with ciphertext dimension |C| = 2m and r > 0
a sufficiently large constant. Then the following holds:
2this is well known, the lower bound needed here can be obtained by applying the transposition to
half of a maximally entangled state
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1. If (τ, E,D) is 2−rm-NM, then for any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜
is 2−Ω(m)-close (in diamond norm) to
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜,
with Λ′, Λ′′ as in Theorem 4.18.
2. Suppose that log |R| = O(2m), where R is the reference register in Definition 4.24.
Then there exists a constant r, such that if every attack ΛCB→CB˜ results in an
effective map that is 2−rm-close to Λ˜exact, then the scheme is 2−Ω(m)-NM.
The condition on R required for the second implication is necessary, as the relevant
mutual information can at worst grow proportional to the logarithm of the dimension
according to the Alicki-Fannes inequality (Lemma 1.13). This is not a very strong
requirement, as it should be relatively easy for the honest parties to put a bound on
their total memory.
Before commencing the lengthy proof of a version of Theorem 4.26, we record the corol-
lary which states that, for unitary schemes, approximate non-malleability is equivalent
to encryption with an approximate 2-design. The proof proceeds as in the exact case,
now starting from Theorem 4.26.
Theorem 4.27. Let Π = (τK , E,D) be a unitary QES for n-qubit messages and f :
N → N a function that grows at most exponential. Then there exists a constant r > 0
such that
1. If {Ek} is a Ω(2−rn)-approximate 2-design and log |R| ≤ f(n), then Π is 2−Ω(n)-
NM.
2. If Π is Ω(2−rn)-NM, then {Ek}k∈K is a 2−Ω(n)-approximate 2-design.
Proof of characterization theorem
This section is dedicated to proving the characterization theorem for non-malleable quan-
tum encryption schemes, i.e., Theorem 4.26. We begin with three preparatory lemmas.
The first lemma characterizes quantum channels that are invertible on their image such
that the inverse is a quantum channel. This is exactly the set of possible encryption
maps.
Lemma 4.28. Let (τK , E,D) be a QES. Then the encryption maps have the structure
(Ek)A→C = (Vk)ACˆ→C
(
(·)⊗ σ(k)
Cˆ
)
(Vk)
†
ACˆ→C , (4.42)
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and the decryption maps hence must have the form
(Dk)C→A = trCˆ
[
Πsuppσk (Vk)
†
ACˆ→C (·) (Vk)ACˆ→C
]
+
(
Dˆk
)
C→A
[Πf (·) Πf ] (4.43)
for some quantum states σ
(k)
Cˆ
, isometries (Vk)C→ACˆ , and some CPTP map Dˆk. The
projector Πf is the projector onto the subspace of invalid ciphertexts,
Πf = 1C − (Vk)ACˆ→C (Πsuppσk) (Vk)†ACˆ→C , (4.44)
and Πsuppσk is the projector onto the support of σk.
Proof. Let |φ〉AA′ be some bipartite pure state. By the correctness of the scheme and
the data processing inequality of the mutual information (see Lemma 4.17), we have
that
2H(A′)φ =2H(A′)Ek(φ) ≥ I(A′ : C)Ek(φ)
≥I(A′ : A)Dk(Ek(φ)) = 2H(A′)φ, (4.45)
i.e. 2H(A′)φ = I(A′ : C)ψ. The first inequality is an easy-to-check elementary fact. It
is easy to see that this only holds if the purification of ψA′ = φA′ lies entirely in C, i.e.
there exists an isometry U
(k)
C→ACˆ such that
U
(k)
C→ACˆEk(φ)
(
U
(k)
C→ACˆ
)†
= φAA′ ⊗ σ(k). (4.46)
note that by the linearity of Ek and U
(k), σ(k) cannot depend on φ. As the state φ was
arbitrary, this implies that
Ek =
(
U
(k)
C→ACˆ
)† (
(·)⊗ σ(k)
)
U
(k)
C→ACˆ , (4.47)
i.e. Ek has the claimed form with Vk =
(
U (k)
)†
. The form of the decryption map then
follows immediately by correctness.
Lemma 4.29. For any QES (τ, E,D) the map E := |K|−1∑kDk ⊗ ETk satisfies
E (∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
CC′ (XC ⊗ idC′)
)
=
|A|
|C|
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AA′ (E
†
K(X)⊗ idA′)
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Proof. Using Lemma 4.28 we derive an expression for ETk ,
tr
[
ETk (Y )X
]
=tr
[
E†k(Y )X
]
=tr [YCEk(XA)]
=tr
[
YCVk(XA ⊗ σ(k)Cˆ )V
†
k
]
=tr
[
trCˆ
(
σ
(k)
Cˆ
V †k Y Vk
)
X
]
=tr
[
trCˆ
(
σ
(k)
Cˆ
V Tk Y V k
)
X
]
. (4.48)
Here we use the definition of the adjoint in the second equality and the cyclicity of the
trace in the third equality. Hence
ETk = trCˆ
(
σ
(k)
Cˆ
V Tk (·)V k
)
(4.49)
Define Πk = Πsuppσ(k) to be the projector onto the support of σk. In the following
we omit the subscripts of CP maps and isometries to save space. We start with one
summand in the sum defining E and omit the second summand from the expression for
Dk in Equation (4.43)
trCˆCˆ′
[
(Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ
(k)
Cˆ′
] [
V †k ⊗ V Tk
]
φ+CC′XC
[
Vk ⊗ V k
]
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C| trCˆCˆ′
[
(Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ
(k)
Cˆ′
] [
φ+AA′ ⊗ φ+CˆCˆ′
]
V †kXCVk
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C| trCˆCˆ′φ
+
AA′ ⊗ φ+CˆCˆ′V
†
kXCVkσ
(k)
Cˆ
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C| φ
+
AA′ 〈φ+|CˆCˆ′ V †kXCVkσ
(k)
Cˆ
|φ+〉CˆCˆ′
=
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′trCˆV
†
kXCVkσ
(k)
Cˆ
=
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′ (Ek)
†
C→A (XC). (4.50)
Here we have used Lemma 1.2 for the first and the second equality, and in the fourth
equality is due to the elementary fact that
〈φ+|CˆCˆ′ YCˆ |φ+〉CˆCˆ′ =
1
|Cˆ|trY. (4.51)
Finally we have used the complex conjugate of Equation (4.49) in the last equation.
Now we look at the same expression but only taking the second summand from Equation
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(4.43) into account.{
Dˆk ⊗ trCˆ′
}[
(1−Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ
(k)
Cˆ′
] [
V †k ⊗ V Tk
]
φ+CC′XC
[
Vk ⊗ V k
]
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C|
(
Dˆk
)
ACˆ→A
⊗ trCˆ′ (1−Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ
(k)
Cˆ′
φ+AA′ ⊗ φ+CˆCˆ′V
†
kXCVk
=0 (4.52)
where the steps are the same as above and in the last equality we used that (1−Πk)Cˆ σCˆ =
0. Adding Equations (4.50) and (4.52), summing over k and normalizing finishes the
proof.
Lemma 4.30. Suppose (τK , E,D) satisfies Definition 4.24 for trivial B. Then E :=
|K|−1∑kDk ⊗ ETk satisfies∥∥∥∥∥E(X)− |A||C|
[
〈φ+|X |φ+〉 ∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣+ tr (Π−X) 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)A ⊗ τA′ − φ+AA′)
]∥∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
(
2
√
|A||C|+ 1
)
. (4.53)
Proof. It follows directly from the fact that (τK , E,D) is a QES together with Lemma
1.2 that
E(φ+CC′) =
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′ . (4.54)
Let Λ
(i)
C→CB˜1 , i = 0, 1 be two attack maps such that ηΛ(i) |φ
+〉 = 0 for i = 0, 1 and define
ΛC→CB˜1B˜2 =
1
2
∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜2 ⊗ Λ(i).
The the ε-NM property implies
I(AA′ : B˜1B˜2)ηΛ˜ ≤ ε,
and therefore, using Pinsker’s inequality, Lemma 1.12,∥∥∥∥∥12 ∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜ ⊗
(
ηΛ˜(i)
)
CC′B˜1
− 1
4
∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜ ⊗
(
ηΛ˜(i)
)
B˜1
⊗
∑
i=0,1
(
ηΛ˜(i)
)
CC′
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2ε. (4.55)
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Observe that
ηΛ˜ =
1
|K|
∑
k
Dk ◦ Λ ◦ Ek(φ+AA′)
=
|C|
|A|
1
|K|
∑
k
(
Dk ⊗ ETk
) ◦ Λ(φ+CC′)
=
|C|
|A| E ◦ Λ(φ
+
CC′). (4.56)
Setting (ηΛ(0))CC′B˜1 = τ
−
CC′ ⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 , we get
ηΛ˜(0) =
|C|
|A| E(τ
−)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1
=
|C|
|A|
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2E(τCC′)− E(φ+CC′))⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1
=
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 . (4.57)
and therefore∥∥∥∥∥ 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 − |C||A| E ((ηΛ(1))CC′B˜1)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε
(4.58)
for all Λ(1). For any state ρCC′B˜1 with ρCC′B˜ |φ+〉CC′ = 0, we define the state
ρ′
CC′B˜1B˜2
=
1
C
(
|0〉〈0|B˜2 ⊗ ρCC′B˜1 + |1〉〈1|B˜2 ⊗
[
((1C − ρC)⊗ VC′)φ+ ((1C − ρC)⊗ VC′)
]⊗ ρB˜2) .
Here, V is a unitary such that tr(1C − ρC)V TC = 0. It is easy to see that such a
unitary always exists, the existence is equivalent to the fact that any |C|-tuple of real
numbers is the ordered list of side lengths of a polygon in the complex plain. Note that
ρ′
CC′B˜1B˜2
|φ+〉CC′ = 0, and ρ′C′ = τC′ . Together with the triangle inequality, equation
(4.58) implies therefore that
1
|C|
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E(ρ)− 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ ρB˜1
∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E [((1C − ρC)⊗ VC′)φ+ ((1C − ρC)⊗ VC′)]
−|C| − 1|C|
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′) ∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε,
i.e. in particular∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E(ρ)− 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ ρB˜1
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|C|.
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As ρ was arbitrary we have proven that∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E −
〈
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)〉∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|C|. (4.59)
The only fact that is left to show is, that ‖E(|φ+〉〈v|)‖1 is small for all normalized |v〉
such that 〈φ+〉 v = 0. To this end, observe that trA ◦E(σC⊗(·)C′) = ETK for all quantum
states σC . Let ρC be any quantum state that does not have full rank, note that such
states span all of End(HC), and for hermitian operators there exists a decomposition
into such operators that saturates the triangle inequality. Taking a quantum state σC
such that 〈φ+| ρ⊗ σ |φ+〉 = 1|C|trρCσTC = 0 (the first equality is the mirror Lemma 1.2),
we have ∥∥∥∥E(ρ⊗ σ)− |A||C| 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
according to what we have already proven. Using inequality (4.59) we arrive at∥∥∥∥E†K(X)− |A||C|τAtr(X)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|‖X‖1 (4.60)
For Hermitian matrices X and therefore∥∥∥∥E†K(X)− |A||C|τAtr(X)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
2ε|A|‖X‖1 (4.61)
For arbitrary X. We can write |v〉CC′ = XC |φ+〉CC′ for some traceless matrix XC . Now
we calculate
∥∥E(∣∣φ+〉〈v|CC′)∥∥1 =∥∥∥∥ |A||C| ∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣AA′ (E†K(X†))A
∥∥∥∥
1
=
|A|
|C|
∥∥∥(E†K(X))
A
|φ+〉AA′
∥∥∥
2
=
√|A|
|C|
∥∥∥E†K(X)∥∥∥
2
≤
√|A|
|C|
∥∥∥E†K(X)∥∥∥
1
≤|A|
3/2
|C| 4
√
2ε‖X‖1
≤4
√
2ε|A|3/2. (4.62)
The first equation is Lemma 4.29, the sencond and third equations are easily verified,
the first inequality is a standard norm inequality, the second inequality is Equation
(4.61), and the last inequality follows from the normalization of |v〉. By the Schmidt
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decomposition, we get a stabilized version of this inequality,∥∥∥E(|φ+〉CC′ |α〉B˜1 〈v|CC′B˜1)∥∥∥1 ≤2√2ε|A|3/2, (4.63)
for all |α〉B˜1 and all |v〉CC′B˜ such that 〈φ+〉 v = 0 Combining everything we arrive at∥∥∥∥∥E(X)− |A||C|
[
〈φ+|X |φ+〉 ∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
+ tr
(
Π−X
) 1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)A ⊗ τA′ − φ+AA′) ]
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
.
(4.64)
We are now ready to prove a version the characterization theorem (i.e., Theorem 4.26)
with explicit constants. We remark that the exact setting Theorem 4.18 is simply the
case where ε = 0.
Theorem 4.31 (Precise version of Theorem 4.26). Let Π = (τ, E,D) be a QES.
1. If Π is ε-NM, then any attack map ΛCB→CB˜ results in an effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜
fulfilling ∥∥∥Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜∥∥∥ ≤ 2√2ε|A|4|C|(4√|A|+ 1) , (4.65)
where
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜,
with Λ′ = trCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = trCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
2. Conversely, if for a scheme all effective maps fulfil Equation (4.65) with the right
hand side replaced by ε, then it is 5ε(log(|A|) + r) + 3h(ε)-NM, where r is a bound
on the size of the honest user’s side information.
Proof. We start with 1. We want to bound the diamond norm distance between the
effective map Λ˜ resulting from an attack Λ and the idealized effective map Λ˜exact. Let
|ψ〉AA′BB′ =
|A|2−1∑
i=0
√
pi |αi〉AA′ ⊗ |βi〉BB′
be an arbitrary pure state given in its Schmidt decomposition across the bipartition
AA′ vs. BB′. We can Write |αi〉AA′ = X(i)A′ |φ+〉 for some matrices X(i) satisfying
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‖X(i)‖∞ ≤ |A|. We calculate the action of Λ˜ on |αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′ ,
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜(|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′) = X
(i)
A′
( ∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AA′ ⊗ Λ′B→B˜(|βi〉〈βj |BB′)
+
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τ)A ⊗ τA′ − ∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣AA′)⊗ Λ′′B→B˜(|βi〉〈βj |BB′))X(j)A′ . (4.66)
In a similar way we get
Λ˜AB→AB˜(|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′) = X(i)A′ Λ˜AB→AB˜(
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X
(i)
A′
=
|C|
|A|X
(i)
A′ ECC′→AA′ ◦ ΛCB→CB˜(
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
CC′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X
(i)
A′ .
(4.67)
Using Lemma 4.30 we bound∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)∥∥∥1
=
∥∥∥X(i)A′ (Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(j)∥∥∥1
≤
∥∥∥X(i)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥X(j)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)∥∥∥1
=
∥∥∥X(i)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥X(j)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| ECC′→AA′ ◦ ΛCB→CB˜(∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣CC′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
− Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜(
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣
AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤2
√
2ε|A|2|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (4.68)
The inequalities result from applying Ho¨lder’s inequality twice, and Lemma 4.30, re-
spectively. Using the triangle inequality we get
∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′)∥∥∥1 ≤2√2ε|A|2|C|(4√|A|+ 1)
|A|2−1∑
i,j=0
√
pipj
≤2
√
2ε|A|4|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (4.69)
As |ψ〉 was arbitrary, we have proven∥∥∥Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜∥∥∥ ≤2√2ε|A|4|C|(4√|A|+ 1) . (4.70)
Now let us prove 2. Let ΛCB→CB˜ again be an arbitrary attack map, and assume that
the resulting effective map is ε-close to Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜. Observe that p
=(Λ, ρ) = trΛ′(ρB).
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By Lemma 1.13 and Lemma 4.17, this implies
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(ρ) ≤ I(AR : B)ρ + h(p=(Λ, ρ)) + 5ε log(|A||R|) + 3h(ε) (4.71)
with the help of Lemma 4.17
4.3.1.3 Relationship to approximate ABW
Recall that, in Section 4.2.2.5, we discussed the relationship between our notion of
exact non-malleability and that of Ambainis et al. [ABW09] (i.e., ABW-NM.) As we
now briefly outline, our conclusions carry over to the approximate case without any
significant changes.
As described in Equation (3”) of [ABW09], one first relaxes the notion of ABW-NM ap-
propriately by requiring that the containment (4.32) in Definition 4.19 holds up to ε
error in the diamond-norm distance. In the unitary case, both definitions are equivalent
to approximate 2-designs (by the results of [ABW09], and our Theorem 4.27). In the
case of general schemes, the plaintext injection attack described in Example 4.21 again
shows that approximate ABW-NM is insufficient, and that approximate NM is strictly
stronger.
4.3.2 Authentication
We now consider the well-studied task of information-theoretic quantum authentication,
and explain its connections to non-malleability.
4.3.2.1 Definitions
Our definitions of authentication will be faithful to the original versions in [DNS12,
GYZ16], with one slight modification. When decryption rejects, our encryption schemes
(Definition 4.5) output ⊥ in the plaintext space, rather than setting an auxiliary qubit to
a “reject” state. These definitions are equivalent in the sense that one can always set an
extra qubit to “reject” conditioned on the plaintext being ⊥ (or vice-versa). Nonetheless,
as we will see below, this mild change has some interesting consequences.
We begin with the definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail [DNS12], which demands
that the effective average channel of the attacker ignores the plaintext.
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Definition 4.32 (DNS Authentication [DNS12]). A QES (τK , E,D) is called ε-DNS-
authenticating if, for any CPTP-map ΛCB→CB′, there exists CP-maps ΛaccB→B˜ and Λ
rej
B→B˜
such that Λacc + Λrej is 3 TP, and for all ρAB we have
∥∥trKD(Λ(E(ρAB ⊗ τK)))− (Λacc(ρAB) + |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ Λrej(ρB))∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.72)
An alternative definition was recently given by Garg, Yuen and Zhandry [GYZ16]. It
asks that, conditioned on acceptance, with high probability the effective channel is close
to a channel which ignores the plaintext.
Definition 4.33 (GYZ Authentication [GYZ16]). A QES (τK , E,D) is called ε-GYZ-
authenticating if, for any CPTP-map ΛCB→CB′, there exists a CP-map ΛaccB→B˜ such that
for all ρAB
∥∥ΠaccD(Λ(E(ρAB ⊗ τK))) Πacc − Λacc(ρAB)⊗ τK∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.73)
Here Πacc is the acceptance projector, i.e. projection onto HA in HA ⊕ C |⊥〉.
A peculiar aspect of the original definition in [GYZ16] is that it does not specify the
outcome in case of rejection, and is thus stated in terms of trace non-increasing maps.
Of course, all realistic quantum maps must be CPTP; this means that the designer of
the encryption scheme must still declare what to do with the contents of the plaintext
register after decryption. Our notion of decryption makes one such choice (i.e., output
⊥) which seems natural.
4.3.2.2 GYZ authentication implies DNS authentication
A priori, the relationship between Definition 2.2 in [DNS12] and Definition 8 in [GYZ16]
is not completely clear. On one hand, the latter is stronger in the sense that it requires
success with high probability (rather than simply on average.) On the other hand, the
former makes the additional demand that the ciphertext is untouched even if we reject.
As we will now show, with our slight modification, we can prove that GYZ-authentication
implies DNS-authentication.
Theorem 4.34. Let (τ, E,D) be ε-totally authenticating for sufficiently small ε. Then
it is O(
√
ε)-DNS authenticating.
3Note that there is a typographic error in [DNS12] and [BW16a] at this point of the definition. In
those papers, the two effective maps are asked to sum to the identity, which is impossible for many
obvious choices of Λ.
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Proof. Let ΛCB→CB˜ be a CPTP map and ε ≤ 62−2. By Definition 4.33 there exists a
CP map Λ′
B→B˜ such that for all states ρAB,∥∥ΠaD(Λ(E(ρAB ⊗ τK)))Πa − Λ′(ρAB ⊗ τK)))∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.74)
Assume for simplicity that D = M⊥◦D, where M⊥ measures the rejection symbol versus
the rest. (otherwise we can define a new decryption map that way.) Define the CP maps
Λ
(1)
AB→B˜ = trAΠaΛ˜(·)
Λ
(2)
AB→B˜ = 〈⊥|A Λ˜(·) |⊥〉A
Λ′′
B→B˜ = trCΛ(EK(τA)⊗ (·)).
By Theorem 15 in [GYZ16] we have
|EK(ρABR)− EK(τA)⊗ ρBR‖1 ≤ 14
√
ε, (4.75)
which implies that
∥∥trA ⊗ Λ′′ − trC ◦ Λ ◦ EK∥∥ ≤ εˆ := 14√ε. (4.76)
Note that
trC ◦Λ◦EK = trCK ◦Λ◦E((·)⊗ τK)
= trAK ◦D◦Λ◦E((·)⊗ τK) = trA◦Λ˜. (4.77)
On the other hand, we also have that, by Equation (4.74),
∥∥trA ◦ Λ˜− trA ⊗ Λ′ − Λ(2)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥trA (ΠaΛ˜(·))− Λ′∥∥ ≤ ε (4.78)
Combining Equations (4.76), (4.77) and (4.78), we get
∥∥Λ(2) − trA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)∥∥ ≤ ε+ εˆ. (4.79)
Now observe that
[
trA ⊗ (Λ′ − Λ′′)B→B˜
] ◦ ΞA→A = trA ⊗ (Λ′ − Λ′′)B→B˜ (4.80)
For all CPTP maps ΞA→A. We define Λ′′′B→B˜ = Λ
(2)(τA ⊗ (·)) and calculate
∥∥Λ(2) − trA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Λ(2) − trA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)∥∥
+
∥∥trA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− trA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ,
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by the triangle inequality for the diamond norm. Continuing with the calculation,
∥∥Λ(2) − trA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ≤ ε+ εˆ+ ∥∥trA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− trA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥
= ε+ εˆ+
∥∥trA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− Λ(2) ◦ 〈τA〉A→A∥∥
= ε+ εˆ+
∥∥[trA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− Λ(2)] ◦ 〈τA〉A→A∥∥
≤ 2(ε+ εˆ) = 28√ε+ 2ε. (4.81)
The first inequality above is Equation (4.79). The first equality is just a rewriting of the
definition of Λ′′′, and the second equality is Equation (4.80). Finally, the last inequality
is due to Equation (4.79) and the fact that the diamond norm is submultiplicative.
We have almost proven security according to Definition 4.32, as we have shown Λ˜ to
be close in diamond norm to idA ⊗ Λ′ +
〈 |⊥〉〈⊥| 〉 ⊗ Λ′′′. However, Λ′ + Λ′′′ is only
approximately TP; more precisely, we have that for all ρABR,
|tr(Λ′ + Λ′′′)(ρABR)− 1| = |tr(Λ′ + Λ′′′ − Λ)(ρABR)|
≤ |tr(Λ′ − Λ(1))(ρABR)|+ |tr(Λ′′′ − Λ(2))(ρABR)|
≤ 28√ε+ 3ε. (4.82)
We therefore have to modify Λ′+ Λ′′ so that it becomes TP, while keeping the structure
required for DNS authentication. Let MB = (Λ
′ + Λ′′′)†(1B˜), and λmin and λmax its
minimal and maximal eigenvalue. Then Equation (4.82) is equivalent to λmin ≥ 1 − η
and Λmax ≤ 1 + η, where we have set η := 28
√
ε + 3ε. Now define the corresponding
CP-map, i.e., M(X) = M−1/2XM−1/2. Note that M is invertible for η < 1 which
follows from ε ≤ 62−2. We bound
‖M− id‖ = sup
ρBE
∥∥M−1/2B ρBEM−1/2B − ρBE∥∥1
≤ sup
ρBE
{∥∥M−1/2B ρBE(M−1/2B − 1B)∥∥1 + ∥∥(M−1/2B − 1B)ρAB∥∥1}
≤ (∥∥M−1/2∥∥∞ + 1)∥∥M−1/2 − 1∥∥∞
= (1 + λ
−1/2
min ) max(1− λ−1/2max , λ−1/2min − 1)
≤ (1 + (1− η)−1/2) max[1− (1 + η)−1/2, (1− η)−1/2 − 1]
= (1 + (1− η)−1/2)((1− η)−1/2 − 1) = η
1− η ≤ 2η (4.83)
The first inequality is the triangle inequality of the trace norm. The second inequality
follows by three applications of Ho¨lder’s inequality with p = 1 and q = ∞. The last
inequality follows from the assumption ε ≤ 62−2. The second to last equality holds
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because
√
1 + x ≤ 1 + x2 and (1 + x/2)−1 ≥ 1− x/2 for x ∈ [−1, 1] imply
(1− η)−1/2 − 1 ≥(1− η/2)−1 − 1 ≥ η/2 (4.84)
and
1− (1 + η)−1/2 ≤1− (1 + η/2)−1 ≤ η/2. (4.85)
Altogether we have
∥∥(idA ⊗ Λ′ + 〈 |⊥〉〈⊥| 〉⊗ Λ′′′) ◦M− Λ˜∥∥
≤ ∥∥(idA ⊗ Λ′ + 〈 |⊥〉〈⊥| 〉⊗ Λ′′′ − Λ˜) ◦M∥∥ + ∥∥Λ˜ ◦ (M− id)∥∥
≤ ∥∥idA ⊗ Λ′ + 〈 |⊥〉〈⊥| 〉⊗ Λ′′′ − Λ˜∥∥‖M‖ + ∥∥M− id∥∥
=
(∥∥idA ⊗ Λ′ −ΠaΛ˜Πa∥∥ + ∥∥〈 |⊥〉〈⊥| 〉⊗ Λ′′′ − |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ Λ(2)∥∥)‖M−1‖∞
+ ‖M− id‖
≤ 2(ε+ 28√ε+ 2ε) + 2η = 4η (4.86)
The first and second inequality are the triangle inequality and the submultiplicativity
of the diamond norm. The third inequality is due to Equations (4.74), (4.81) and
(4.83), as well as ε ≤ 62−2. For the first equality, note that it is easy to check that
‖M‖ = ‖M−1/2‖2∞ = λ−1min.
4.3.2.3 Achieving GYZ authentication with two-designs
In [GYZ16], the authors provide a scheme for their notion of authentication based on
unitary eight-designs. We now show that, in fact, an approximate 2-design suffices.
This is interesting, as it implies that the well-known Clifford scheme (see e.g [DNS10,
BW16b]) satisfies the strong security of Definition 4.33. All of the previous results
on authentication which use the Clifford scheme thus automatically carry over to this
stronger setting. We remark that our proof is inspired by the reasoning based on Schur’s
lemma used in results on decoupling [BCR11, DBWR14, MBD+17, BBMW16].
Theorem 4.35. Let D = {Uk}k be a δ-approximate unitary 2-design on HC . Let HC =
HA ⊗HT and define
Ek(XA) = Uk (XA ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ) (Uk)†
Dk(YC) = 〈0|T (Uk)† Y Uk |0〉T + tr((1T − |0〉〈0|T ) (Uk)† Y Uk) |⊥〉〈⊥| .
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Then the QES (τK , E,D) is 4(1/|T |+ 3δ)1/3-GYZ-authenticating.
Remark 4.36. The following proof uses the same simulator as the proof for the 8-design
scheme in [GYZ16], called “oblivious adversary” there. The construction exhibited there
is efficient given that the real adversary is efficient.
Proof. To improve readability, we will occasionally switch between adding subscripts to
operators (indicating which spaces they act on) and omitting these subscripts.
We begin by remarking that it is sufficient to prove the GYZ condition (specifically,
Equation (4.73)) for pure input states and isometric adversary channels. Indeed, for
a general state ρAB and a general map ΛCB→CB˜, we may let ρABR and VCB→CB˜E be
the purification and Stinespring dilation, respectively. We then simply observe that the
trace distance decreases under partial trace (see e.g. [NC00]).
Let ρAB be a pure input state and
ΛCB→CB˜(XCB) = VCB→CB˜XCBV
†
CB→CB˜
an isometry. We define the corresponding “ideal” channel ΓV , and the corresponding
“real, accept” channel Φk, as follows:
(ΓV )B→B˜ =
1
|C|trCV and
(Φk)AB→AB˜ = 〈0|T (Uk)†CVCB→CB˜Uk |0〉T . (4.87)
Note that for any matrix M with ‖M‖∞ ≤ 1, the map ΛM (X) = M †XM is completely
positive and trace non-increasing. We have
‖ΓV ‖∞ ≤
1
|C|
∑
i
‖〈i|V |i〉‖∞ ≤ 1. (4.88)
We begin by bounding the expectation of
∥∥((ΓV )B→B˜ − (Φk)AB→AB˜) |ρ〉AB∥∥22, as fol-
lows. To simplify notation, we set σABT := |ρ〉〈ρ|AB ⊗ |0〉〈0|T to be the tagged state
corresponding to plaintext (and side information) ρAB.
1
|K|
∑
k
‖(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉‖22 =
1
|K|
∑
k
〈ρ| (ΓV − Φk)†(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉
=
1
|K|
∑
k
tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †Uk |0〉〈0| (Uk)†V Uk
]
− 2 1|K|
∑
k
tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †UkΓV
]
+ 〈ρ| (ΓV )† ΓV |ρ〉 . (4.89)
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First we bound the second term, using the fact that ΓV only acts on B.
1
|K|
∑
k
tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †UkΓV
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
tr
[
UkσABT (Uk)
†V †ΓV
]
=
∫
tr
[(
UσABTU
† + ∆
)
V †ΓV
]
≥
∫
tr
[
UσABTU
†V †ΓV
]
− δ
=
∫
tr
[
σABTU
†V †UΓV
]
− δ = 〈ρ| (ΓV )† ΓV |ρ〉 − δ . (4.90)
In the above, the operator ∆ is the “error” operator in the δ-approximate 2-design. The
second equality above follows from ‖∆‖1 ≤ δ and the fact that a 2-design is also a
1-design; the inequality follows by Ho¨lder’s inequality, and the last step follows from
Schur’s lemma.
The first term of the RHS of Equation (4.89) can be simplified as follows. We will
begin by applying the swap trick (Lemma 1.1) tr[XY ] = tr[FX ⊗ Y ] in the second line
below. The swap trick is applied to register CC ′, with the operators X and Y defined
as indicated below.
1
|K|
∑
k
tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†
CV
†
CB˜→CB(Uk)C |0〉〈0|T︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
(Uk)
†
CVCB→CB˜(Uk)C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
U⊗2k
)
CC′ V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2k
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
tr
[(
U⊗2k
)†
CC′ (σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
U⊗2k
)
CC′ V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜FCC′
]
≤
∫
tr
[(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ (σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜FCC′
]
+ δ
=
∫
tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V †CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
+ δ. (4.91)
The inequality above follows the same way as in Equation (4.90). Let d = |C|. We
calculate the integral above using Lemma 4.1, as follows.∫
U⊗2V †
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
dU = 1CC′ ⊗R1B + FCC′ ⊗RFB, (4.92)
where we have set
R1B =
1
d(d2 − 1)
(
d3Γ†V ΓV − d1
)
=
1
(d2 − 1)
(
d2Γ†V ΓV − 1
)
RFB =
1
d(d2 − 1)
(
d21− d2Γ†V ΓV
)
=
d
(d2 − 1)
(
1− Γ†V ΓV
)
.
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plugging (4.92) into (4.91) and using Lemma 1.1 again, we get∫
tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V †CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
= tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
1CC′ ⊗R1B2→B˜2 + FCC′ ⊗RFB2→B˜2
)
FCC′
]
= tr
[|ρ〉〈ρ|B (R1B + |A|RFB)]
= tr
[
|ρ〉〈ρ|B
(
d(d− |A|)
d2 − 1
(
Γ†V ΓV
)
B
+
d|A| − 1
d2 − 1 1B
)]
. (4.93)
Now recall that d = |A||T |. Using the fact that (a− 1)/(b− 1) ≤ a/b for b ≥ a, we can
give a bound as follows.
tr
[
|ρ〉〈ρ|
(
d(d− |A|)
d2 − 1
(
Γ†V ΓV
)
+
d|A| − 1
d2 − 1 1
)]
=
d|A|(|T | − 1)
d2 − 1 〈ρ|
(
Γ†V ΓV
)
|ρ〉+ d|A| − 1
d2 − 1
≤ 〈ρ|
(
Γ†V ΓV
)
|ρ〉+ 1|T | . (4.94)
Putting everything together, we arrive at
1
|K|
∑
k
‖(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉‖22 ≤
1
|T | + 3δ. (4.95)
By Markov’s inequality this implies
P
[∥∥(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉∥∥22 > α( 1|T | + 3δ
)]
≤ 1
α
(4.96)
which is equivalent to
P
[∥∥(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉∥∥2 > α1/2( 1|T | + 3δ
)1/2]
≤ 1
α
, (4.97)
where the probability is taken over the uniform distribution on D. Choosing α = (1/|T |+
3δ)−1/3 this yields
P
[
‖(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉‖2 >
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3]
≤
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
. (4.98)
Let S ⊂ D be such that |S|/|D| ≥ 1− (1/|T |+ 3δ)1/3 and ‖(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ (1/|T |+
3δ)1/3 for all Uk ∈ S. Using the easy-to-verify inequality ‖ |ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ| ‖1 ≤ 2‖ |ψ〉 −
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|φ〉 ‖2, given as Lemma 1.7 in the supplementary material, we can bound
1
|K|
∑
Uk∈D
∥∥∥Φk |ρ〉〈ρ| (Φk)† − ΓV |ρ〉〈ρ|Γ†V ∥∥∥
1
≤ 1|S|
∑
Uk∈S
∥∥∥Φk |ρ〉〈ρ| (Φk)† − ΓV |ρ〉〈ρ|Γ†V ∥∥∥
1
+ 2
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
≤ 2|S|
∑
Uk∈S
‖(ΓV − Φk) |ρ〉‖2 + 2|T |−1/3
≤ 4
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
. (4.99)
This completes the proof for pure states and isometric adversary channels. As noted
above, the general case follows.
As an example, one may set |T | = 2s (i.e. s tag qubits) and take an approximate
unitary 2-design of accuracy 2−s. The resulting scheme would then be Ω(2−s/3)-GYZ-
authenticating.
A straightforward corollary of the above result is that, in the case of unitary schemes,
adding tags to non-malleable schemes results in GYZ authentication. We leave open the
question of whether this is the case for general (not necessarily unitary) schemes.
Corollary 4.37. Let (τ, E,D) be a 2−rn-non-malleable unitary QES with plaintext space
A. Define a new scheme (τ, E′, D′) with plaintext space A′ where A = TA′ and
E′(X) = E(X ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )
D′(Y ) = 〈0|T D(Y ) |0〉T + tr [(1T − |0〉〈0|T )D(Y )] |⊥〉〈⊥| .
Then there exists a constant r > 0 such that (τ, E′, D′) is 2−Ω(n)-GYZ-authenticating if
|T | = 2Ω(n).
The proof is a direct application of Theorem 4.27 (approximate non-malleability is equiv-
alent to approximate 2-design) and Theorem 4.35 (approximate 2-designs suffice for GYZ
authentication.) We emphasize that, by Remark 4.4, exponential accuracy requirements
can be met with polynomial-size circuits.
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4.3.2.4 DNS authentication from non-malleability
We end with a theorem concerning the case of general (i.e., not necessarily unitary)
schemes. We show that adding tags to a non-malleable scheme results in a DNS-
authenticating scheme. In this proof we will denote the output system of the decryption
map by A to emphasize that it is A enlarged by the reject symbol.
Theorem 4.38. Let r be a sufficiently large constant, and let (τ, E,D) be an 2−rn-
NM QES with n qubit plaintext space A, and choose an integer d dividing |A|. Then
there exists a decomposition A = TA′ and a state |ψ〉T such that |T | = d and the scheme
(τ, E′, D′) defined by
Et(X) = E(X ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|T )
Dt(Y ) = 〈ψ|T D(Y ) |ψ〉T + tr [(1T − |ψ〉〈ψ|T )D(Y )] |⊥〉〈⊥| .
is (4/|T |) + 2−Ω(n)-DNS-authenticating.
Proof. We prove the statement for ε = 0 for simplicity, the general case follows easily
by employing Theorem 4.26 instead of Theorem 4.18.
By Theorem 4.18, for any attack map ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map is equal to
Λ˜AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2〈DK(τC)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (4.100)
for CP maps Λ′ and Λ′′ whose sum is TP. The effective map under the tagged scheme is
therefore
Λ˜t
A′B→A′B˜ = 〈ψ|T Λ˜AB→AB˜((·)⊗ ψT ) |ψ〉T
+ tr
[
(1T − ψT )Λ˜AB→AB˜((·)⊗ ψT )
] |⊥〉〈⊥|
= (idA′)A′→A′ ⊗ Λ′B→B˜
+
(|C|2〈(〈ψ|T DK(τC) |ψ〉T )A′ ⊕ β |⊥〉〈⊥| 〉− idA′)A→A′ ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜|C|2 − 1
with β = tr [(1− ψ)TDK(τC)]. We would like to say that, unless the output is the
reject symbol, the effective map on A is the identity. We do not know, however, what
DK(τC) looks like. Therefore we apply a standard reasoning that if a quantity is small in
expectation, then there exists at least one small instance. We calculate the expectation
of tr 〈ψ|T DK(τC) |ψ〉T when the decomposition A = TA′ is drawn at random according
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to the Haar measure,∫
tr 〈ψ|U †ADK(τC)UA |ψ〉T dUA = tr
[(∫
UA |ψ〉T ⊗ 1A′ψU †AdUA
)
DK(τC)
]
=
tr1A
trΠacc
trΠaccDK(τC)
≤ 1/|T |. (4.101)
Hence there exists at least one decomposition A = TA′ and a state |ψ〉T such that
γˆ := tr 〈ψ|T DK(τC) |ψ〉T ≤ 1/|T |. Define γ = max(γˆ, |C|−2). For the resulting primed
scheme, let
Λrej :=
(1− γ)|C|2
|C|2 − 1 Λ
′′ and Λacc = Λ′ +
γ|C|2 − 1
|C|2 − 1 Λ
′′ .
We calculate the diamond norm difference between the real effective map an the ideal
effective map,
∥∥Λ˜t − id⊗ Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥
≤ ∥∥id⊗ Λ′ + 1|C|2 − 1(|C|2〈(〈ψ|DK(τ) |ψ〉)〉− id)⊗ Λ′′ − id⊗ Λacc∥∥
+
∥∥〈|⊥〉〉〈⊥〉| ⊗ (1− γˆ)|C|2Λ′′/(|C|2 − 1)− 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥
≤ (1 + |C|−2)(|T |−1 + 2|C|−2)
= |T |−1(1 + (|A′||T |)−2)(1 + 2|A′|−2)
≤ 4|T |−1 (4.102)
as desired .
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Summary of Chapter 4
• A strengthened definition of quantum non-malleability (NM) was introduced
• Contrary to the definition from [ABW09], the new definition takes adversaries with
prior side-information into account
• It removes the vulnerability for a certain attack we call plain text injection attack
• It implies secrecy, a result analogous to the fact that quantum authentication
implies secrecy
• The encryption scheme that applies a random element from a two-design, like, e.g.,
the Clifford group, is NM
• Adding a fixed tag to the message before encrypting with a NM yields a quantum
authentication scheme
• If a unitary NM scheme is used for constructing an authentication scheme, a
stronger notion of authentication is achieved that allows for full key recycling

Conclusion
In this thesis, a collection of results on quantum entropy and its applications, as well
as port based teleportation, have been presented. What follows is a short informal
summary of all results to provide an overview over them. A new inequality for the von
Neumann entropy has been proven in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, two topics in one-shot
quantum information theory have been discussed. The decoupling technique has been
generalized to be applicable to the one-shot setting. As the resulting notion of decoupling
requires some ancillary helper state that can be handed back approximately unaltered,
we have baptized this new notion to the name catalytic decoupling. Subsequently we
have explored different techniques to find lower bounds on the resource requirement for
port based teleportation. On the way, we have proven a lower bound for the necessary
size of the program register of an approximate universal quantum processor with given
parameters. In the last chapter, Chapter 4, we have generalized a classical entropic
definition of the cryptographic security notion of information-theoretic non-malleability
to the quantum setting. This new definition strengthens, at the same time, a previous
definition of quantum non-malleability. Furthermore, schemes that fulfill it can be used
as a primitive to build quantum authentication schemes.
This is a wide spectrum of results, leaving an array of open question for future research.
The problem of finding an unconstrained non-von-Neumann type entropy inequality is
still wide open in general, and in particular the question whether any more constraints
can be removed from the inequality (2.20).
In catalytic decoupling, we have no proof that the catalyst is actually necessary. Partic-
ularly interesting is the finite block length regime. Here, standard decoupling is getting
better and better. When applying catalytic decoupling, however, the necessary ancilla
size is increasing exponentially in the block length. Therefore, if the ancilla were to be
necessary, a trade off between ancilla size and remainder system size would be interesting.
For port based teleportation, the main open question concerns the gap between the
achievability result from References [IH09, BK11] and our best lower bound, Equation
(3.182). Which of the results is not tight? Is the standard protocol using maximally
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entangled states and the pretty good measurement optimal, or can entanglement across
the ports help?
Finally, there are some important open questions concerning non-malleability and au-
thentication in the quantum symmetric key setting. There are two main future directions
of research that could be considered opposite. On the one hand, it will be interesting to
relax the security requirements to the computational setting, but strengthen the security
at the same time by considering adversaries with oracle access to the encryption and/or
decryption function (chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext security). On the other
hand, it might be good to get even better information-theoretic security guarantees.
This could be in the form of composability, or a security requirement that has to hold
with high probability over the choice of the key.
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